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ABSTRACT 
The Irish revolution of 1918-1923 not only led to the establishment of 
an independent Irish state; it is also recalled for the notoriety of the 
Black and Tans, the gendarmerie of war veterans recruited by the British 
government to fight a war of reprisals against the IRA. Historians have 
held that public perceptions of the war in Ireland were crucial to its 
outcome. In particular they cite critical press coverage as instrumental in 
turning the British public against the government's policy in Ireland. But 
there has been no study which thoroughly examines the work of 
journalists and writers who went to Ireland at this time. 
This thesis uses the published work of journalists and writers, evidence 
from archives in Britain, Ireland and the United States, journalists' 
memoirs and contemporary press criticism to explain the role journalists 
played in the conflict. It shows how British and American newspaper 
correspondents were able to report from Ireland with far greater freedom 
than they enjoyed during the First World War. Aided by their sympathy 
for the Irish cause and splits among the political elite in London, British 
correspondents set out to restore their reputation as crusading truth 
tellers by making visible practices of colonial warfare that would usually 
have remained hidden. American correspondents were enlisted by 
British officials as mediators. The war occurred in an age when the press 
and public opinion were thought to have a crucial influence on politics. 
Both the British government and the Irish revolutionaries tried to define 
the news. While examining the professional assumptions and rituals of 
the correspondents, the thesis examines the impact of wider political 
ideas on journalism. And it looks at how famous literary journalists used 
Ireland as a site for debates about their own societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Anglo-Irish war of 1919-1921 finally ruptured the constitution of 
the United Kingdom, drawing a line under one hundred and twenty 
years of turbulent history since the Act of Union. In the Republic of 
Ireland it is referred to as the War of Independence, celebrated as the 
heroic struggle which forged a new sovereign state. In Britain it is 
retrospectively regarded as the first loosened brick that presaged the 
crumbling of the whole edifice of Imperial rule, vindicating Lord 
Salisbury's prediction in 1883 that if Irish separatism succeeded the 
Empire would disintegrate step by step.l Corelli Barnett has described 
the treaty which ended the war and established the Irish Free State as "of 
the utmost significance for the future of British power,,2 and in her 
history of the Empire Jan Morris writes that "it was in Ireland that the 
prototype of imperial revolution was launched, the precursor of all the 
coups, rebellions and civil wars which were to harass the British empire 
from now until the end.,,3 
The new state was not established by defeating the British forces on the 
battlefield; the IRA guerrillas and the panoply of civic organisations 
allied to them were merely able to endure long enough to force the 
British government to negotiate a new settlement. It was a moral victory, 
not a military triumph. In the view of the Irish historian Michael Laffan, 
1 H.V. Brasted: 'Irish Nationalism and the British Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century' in Oliver 
MacDonagh, W.F. MandIe and Pauric Travers (eds): Irish Culture and Nationalism 1750-1950 
(Macmillan, London, 1983) p 84 
2 Corelli Barnett: The Collapse of British Power (Eyre Methuen, London, 1972) p 184 
3 Jan Morris: Farewell the Trumpets (Faber, London, 1978) p 219 
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"Lloyd George's government changed its policy more in response to 
international hostility and to the shame and revulsion felt by British 
public opinion, than as a consequence of military weakness or defeat.,,4 
Corelli Barnett makes the same point from a different angle: "[The] 
British decided the question of Ireland not in the light of whether or not, 
on drawing a balance of political and strategic factors, Ireland was worth 
holding, but out of humanitarian qualms as yet rare in a barbarous 
world. [This] was a demonstration that the British ruling classes and 
British public opinion after the Great War were ill-suited to the 
preservation of their imperial inheritance."s 
The common theme of both these explanations is the power of public 
opinion to determine the strategic decisions of the British government. 
What 'public opinion' means at any given moment is often an elusive 
concept; pursuing it and nailing it down in this or any specific historical 
context would be material for an entire thesis by itself. What is certain 
is that any consideration of public opinion in Ireland, Britain or the rest 
of the world during the Irish revolution would have to deal with news, 
analysis and opinion that appeared in the daily press, political journals 
and contemporary books of commentary. This thesis will examine a 
range of this material with a heavy and consistent emphasis on the 
accounts and views of those who actually visited Ireland, whether as 
reporters tied to daily deadlines, essayists enjoying more literary licence 
and leisure or novelists bending their talents to the capture of 
contemporary history. All of this work is journalism of one form or 
4 Michael Laffan: The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party 1916-1923 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) p 295 
5 Barnett op. cit. p 185 
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another, although as will become clear, the specific form employed has 
as much significance for how we should read these observations as the 
content. 
This journalism is regularly acknowledged by historians of the period as 
having had an influence on the outcome of the war. In the first 
comprehensive nationalist account of the War of Independence 
(published in 1937 and endorsed by Eamon De Valera) Dorothy 
McArdle writes of how "great English newspapers ... were tirelessly 
exposing the brutal terrorist regime" in Ireland.6 But this was a reference 
to April 1921, within a few months of the truce and after several of the 
worst incidents of the war. In fact, she gives credit for the original 
exposure of British tactics in Ireland to committees of activists both Irish 
and English, implying that the press correspondents joined a bandwagon 
near the end of its journey.7 Sometimes she refers to British journalists 
collectively as "the English Press"; other times they are labelled 
'sympathetic' or representatives of 'conservative opinion.'s 
In the latest history of the war Michael Hopkinson goes much further 
than McArdle in giving the journalists credit for undermining the British 
campaign; in his estimate journalists from the Fleet Street papers did 
more for the cause of the Irish rebels than their own formidable publicity 
effort. "For all the volume of propaganda, the greatest effect was almost 
certainly achieved by visiting Britishjournalists ... The eyewitness 
reports by muckraking correspondents were much more readable, 
6 Dorothy McArdle: The Irish Republic (Corgi edition, London, 1968) p 407 
7 Ibid P 330 
8 Passim but see for example p 278 and p 302 
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colourful and entertaining than the propaganda sheets and came with 
dramatic photographs of burning buildings and the suffering and 
terrified populace ... While it was important that a free press exposed 
British atrocities to world attention, events actually spoke fOF 
themselves. It is doubtful that Britain could have hidden the harsh truth 
from the rest of the world.,,9 Given how much attention these historians 
devote to the influence of the press, it's surprising how little attention 
they pay to journalistic practice. Hopkinson's conclusions raise more 
questions than they answer: Why should the writings of British 
journalists produce such an "effect"? What are "muckraking 
correspondents"? Was the fact that they worked for a free press the only 
reason they exposed British authorities? And if "events actually spoke 
for themselves" why did it need a special breed of correspondent 
('muckraking') to communicate what was going on in Ireland? 
There is also a contrary view to McArdle and Hopkinson, an assumption 
that far from being relentlessly critical of coercion in Ireland the British 
press had connived to demonise the IRA through constant repetition of 
the worst assaults carried out by the Volunteers. In a book on the 
origins of the troubles in Northern Ireland during the last three decades 
of the twentieth century, Richard Bourke argues that during the Irish 
revolution "the British press had teemed with reports of unconscionable 
extremities ... perpetrated by the Republican forces" and that this 
contributed to "an air of profound suspicion" during the peace 
negotiations which began in London in the autumn of 1921.10 This 
9 Michael Hopkinson: The Irish War of Independence (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 2002) p 45 
10 Richard Bourke: Peace in Ireland: The War ofIdeas (Pimlico, London, 2003) p 121 
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assertion led to him being accused of believing "that IRA atrocities 
existed primarily in the pages of the British press"ll but the real question 
is which version of history is right? 
Granted, for all of these authors the work of journalists during the Irish 
revolution was but one part of a much bigger mosaic. However, since all 
of them attach such importance to the press coverage of the war their 
often contradictory arguments and assumptions cry out for a more 
systematic exploration. Some writers have attempted lengthier and 
more considered surveys of this terrain. D.G. Boyce's book, Englishmen 
and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish 
Policy, published more than thirty years ago, is still the main account of 
the development of British mentalities during the revolution. It is 
especially enlightening on Ireland's place in the English conception of 
the British nation. But his focus is on opinion in London rather than 
reportage from Ireland: he sees the press as "a forum of national 
debate", quoting a particular newspaper when "it advocated certain 
views with a reasonable degree of consistency ... ,,12 Thus, Boyce is more 
concerned with political argument in London than eyewitness accounts 
of street warfare in Dublin and, when it comes to newspapers, pays more 
attention to the views of editorial writers than to the professional 
practice of reporters. 
II Kevin Myers: 'An Irishman's Diary', The Irish Times, Tuesday, September 16,2003. Bourke 
later replied: "Mr Myers drew the conclusion that because I mentioned the reporting of such outrages 
I must be implying that they did not in fact take place - which, of course, they did." The Irish Times, 
Tuesday, February 10,2004. 
12 D.G. Boyce: Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making ofIrish 
Policy (Jonathan Cape, London, 1972) p 200-201 
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Aside from this broad approach to public opinion, the other lens 
affording a glimpse of the press coverage of Ireland is that of the 
propaganda campaign by the Irish revolutionaries. In his book on the 
alternative government that the revolutionaries established in Ireland to 
undermine the authority of the British government, Arthur Mitchell 
devotes some attention to the venerated propaganda efforts of the 
revolutionaries, listing the attributes of the publicity department that in 
his view contributed to its success. "It had the advantage of representing 
a nation fighting for self-government; it had the attraction of the 
underdog confronting and sometimes besting the bigwig, the brasshat 
and the bully. It possessed the Irish capacity for the ready welcome, for 
making visiting journalists feel like accepted companions in a common 
venture. It skilfully revealed and proclaimed excesses on the part of the 
old regime, yet was selective in the material it supplied: while almost 
always avoiding lies and fabrication, it said little about the IRA and its 
acts of violence." 13 All this may be true but the instrumental focus on the 
Irish propagandists - how they did it, how good they were at it - closes 
off any exploration of what the journalists they sought to influence 
brought to this encounter or, indeed, the nature of the shared ideas that 
made them "accepted companions in a common venture." Later I will 
devote a chapter to the Irish propagandists, examining them not as sui 
generis wizards of persuasion but in relation to their British 
counterparts, to the journalists whom both sides wanted desperately to 
influence and, as well, to other contemporary instances where 
revolutionary movements suddenly discover the importance of trying to 
13 Arthur Mitchell: Revolutionary Government in Ireland: Dail Eireann 1919-22 (Gill & 
Macmillan, Dublin, 1995) p 101-102 
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get a good press, notably Mexico and Cuba. For now, I want to argue 
that writing about the propaganda battle on its own falls short of the 
account that is needed of the nature of journalistic coverage of the Irish 
revolution. Partly this is because looking at propaganda covers only one 
route through which journalists and writers engaged with the revolution 
in Ireland. And also because my research has revealed that at the time 
there was a vigorous and intense discussion in political and cultural 
circles in Britain and the United States about the nature of the press, 
public opinion and propaganda, a discussion which connects with the 
larger political issues of the day but which is nowhere reflected in 
accounts of the foreign press coverage of Ireland. To this extent these 
accounts are woefully superficial, an afterthought that goes nowhere 
near filling the gaping hole in the literature. 
The evident reluctance in Irish historiography to interrogate the work of 
journalists is puzzling since historians of modem Ireland enthusiastically 
use the press as a source. The evidence of newspaper reports is often 
cited but rarely tested. McArdle's chronicle of the birth of the Irish 
Republic is a case in point here; her book is peppered with references to 
British and Irish newspapers. And there are many other examples, 
particularly in studies of the Land War and Home Rule movement when 
Ireland received extensive coverage in the British press. 14 One 
explanation might be that these historians have a schizoid view of what 
appears in the newspapers, trusting the record of cold print while 
holding in low esteem those who produce it. For instance, David 
14 For examples see Conor Cruise O'Brien: Parnell and His Party 1880-90 (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1957); T.W. Moody: Davitt and Irish Revolution 1846-82 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1981) 
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Fitzpatrick relies heavily on newspapers for his intensive study of the 
War of Independence in County Clare15 but elsewhere reveals a disdain 
for the competence of even the most distinguished reporters. In his 
- biography of the revolutionary Harry Boland he notes how Henry Wood 
Nevinson misidentified Boland and a colleague in his report of speeches 
they delivered in Washington. "Like many journalists", Fitzpatrick 
comments acerbically, "Nevinson was evidently at his sharpest on the 
morning after.,,16 This waspishness resonates with a more general scorn 
for journalistic writings among certain critics. Croce dismissed 
journalism as "writings without any originality or profundity [crafted 
by] men with few mental scruples and almost no aesthetic sensibility.,,17 
And one literary historian has summarised a widespread view in the 
academy of the failings of journalism, "a factual, conventional, heavy-
handed commercial practice, the antithesis of literature's integrity and 
creativity.,,18 Even many media scholars often choose to ignore the 
content of journalism in their attempt to fit it into more overarching 
sociological schemes, an issue I will return to in more detail later. My 
argument is that even if some of these criticisms are correct it would be 
a mistake to take them as a licence for ignoring a hugely important 
cultural practice. 
The Irish revolution occurred at a time when mass circulation 
newspapers had come to maturity, dominating the political landscape. In 
15 David Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Cork 
University Press, 1998 edn) 
16 David Fitzpatrick: Harry Boland's Irish Revolution (Cork University Press, 2003) p 402, n 100 
17 Quoted in Brendan Dooley: 'From Literary Criticism to Systems Theory in Early Modem 
Journalism History' in .Journal of the History ofIdeas Vol 51, NO.3 (1990) p 461 
18 Kate Campbell: 'On perceptions of Journalism' in Kate Campbell (ed): .Journalism, Literature 
and Modernity: From Hazlitt to Modernism (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p 1 
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1913 R.A. Scott-James had noticed that newspapers had become a 
universal addiction. "The reading of newspapers has become a habit all 
over the civilized world ... And now almost every man in the most 
- modestly assured position begins his day with a perusal of the morning 
paper. It is with the workman when he travels by train or tram to his 
work, and it is replaced by the evening paper when he returns. It has 
insinuated itself into our culture, affording us the new material upon 
which to exercise such ideas as we may possess.,,19 The newspaper was 
the symbol of modem city life, signifying the bustle and dynamism of 
alert, up to the minute popUlations. In his memoirs, Hamilton Fyfe, a 
veteran Fleet Street foreign correspondent, and editor of the Daily 
Herald reminisced how: "You cannot take a step in a town, or even a 
village of any size, without having the ubiquity of the Press forced on 
your notice. Both early and late, newspaper contents bills, when there 
was plenty of paper, used to meet the eye. Vans carrying evening papers 
are conspicuous in the traffic. From nine 0' clock in the evening until 
after midnight morning-paper lorries are discharging at every main-line 
railway terminus; special newspaper trains are leaving one after 
another.,,20 The effect is to conjure up a network of unavoidable 
stimulus. An American, writing on the eve of the First World War, may 
have been guilty of hyperbole in describing the extent of the influence of 
the press but he came up with an arresting metaphor for his sense of how 
newspaper culture had infiltrated modem consciousness. "We see it 
visibly affecting pretty nearly all we do and say and think, competing 
with the churches, superseding Parliaments, elbowing out literature, 
19 R.A. Scott James: The Influence of the Press (S.W. Partridge & Co, London, 1913) P 11 
20 Hamilton Fyfe: Sixty Years of Fleet Street (W.H. Allen, London, 1949) p 168 
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rivalling the schools and universities, furnishing the world with a new 
set of nerves.',2! 
This idea finds a curious resonance in Virginia Woolf' sdiaries where 
the jangling of that "new set of nerves" creates a commotion in the real 
nerves of the individual conscience. In her entry for October 25 th, 1920, 
Woolf notes the funeral procession through London that day for the 
Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence McSwiney who died on hunger strike in 
Brixton prison. The spectacle prompts her to feel that "life itself. .. for 
us in our generation [is] so tragic-no newspaper placard without its 
shriek of agony from some one.',22 A year later the news from Ireland 
was still touching a nerve: "People go on being shot & hanged in 
Ireland ... The worst of it is the screen between our eyes & these gallows 
is so thick. So easily one forgets it - or I do. For instance why not set 
down that the Maids of Honour shop was burnt out the other night? Is it 
a proof of civilisation to envisage suffering at a distance ... ?,,23 Joseph 
Conrad was struck by the same phenomenon in relation to accounts of 
atrocities in war: "In this age of knowledge our sympathetic 
imagination ... remains strangely impervious to information, however 
correctly and even picturesquely conveyed.',24 Conrad seems more 
resigned to accepting a kind of innate callousness than Woolf but for our 
purposes their reflections point up the ubiquity of news and suggest the 
21 Sydney Brooks: 'The Press in War-Time' in North American Review, Vol CC, December, 1914, 
f: 858 
2 Anne Olivier Bell (ed): The Diary of Virginia Woolf Volume II: 1920-1924 (The Hogarth 
Press, London, 1978) P 72-73 
23 Ibid P 100 
24 Joseph Conrad: Notes on Life and Letters (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London, 1921) p 112 
13 
degree to which the contemporary press seemed to be demanding new 
levels of response to world events. 
Little of the historical work on the Irish revolution has grasped thi-s 
zeitgeist. Curiously, an acclaimed fictional treatment of the Irish 
revolution has shown greater awareness of this context than the 
historians. In Troubles, the first of a trilogy charting the decline of the 
British Empire, J.G. Farrell writes of a crumbling Anglo-Irish seaside 
hotel whose inhabitants seem wilfully oblivious to the rampant decay all 
around them and the war going on outside. Their plight is symbolic of 
the inexorable marginalisation of the Irish ascendancy. The text is 
regularly interrupted with passages of Irish and world news extracted 
from contemporary newspapers which shape the views of the central 
character, Major Brendan Archer, a shellshocked veteran of the trenches 
who has a more lucid appreciation of unfolding events than most of the 
guests at the hotel. It is the newspaper which gives the Major his 
bearings even when he himself becomes a witness to history. On a visit 
to Dublin, the Major finds himself walking along a street where an IRA 
squad assassinate a retired army officer who worked as an intelligence 
agent in Dublin Castle. Although he had "seen bright blood scattered on 
the pavement" it was only by reading the newspaper that he was able to 
make sense of it: "It was the newspaper which had explained to him 
what he had seen. ,,25 The effect of reading about the assassination he had 
witnessed was to persuade him to accept it. Just as for Woolf and 
Conrad, the newspaper draws the Major into the flow of world events 
but his response is to feel that the daily reports are designed to reconcile 
25 J.G. Farrell: Troubles (Phoenix edition, London, 1993) p 102 
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readers to the inevitability of history. The Major imagined that the 
newspaper reports were "poultices placed on sudden inflammations of 
violence. In a day or two all the poison had been drawn out of them. 
-They became random events of the year 1919, inevitable, without 
malice, part of history ... A raid on a barracks, the murder of a policeman 
on a lonely country road, an airship crossing the Atlantic, a speech by a 
man on a platform ... this was the history of the time. The rest was 
merely the 'being alive' that every age has to do.,,26 This was his 
intellectual response to reading the newspaper; but the experience also 
unsettled his nerves: "He could hardly bear to open the newspaper, for it 
seemed that the war, which he thought he had escaped, had pursued and 
caught him after all.,,27 Eventually he becomes accustomed to it "as he 
had once become used to the dawn barrage.,,28 What is worth noting 
here is the power ascribed to the newspaper reports, an impact similar to 
that described by Woolf and Conrad. The Major, of course, is a fictional 
character and J.G. Farrell is a novelist. But his book is based on an 
extensive survey of some of the newspapers of the time; J.G. Farrell 
begins an analysis lacking in the historical literature, an absence that this 
thesis aims to address. 
There is another correspondence between Farrell's fiction and 
contemporary commentary on the press. In Troubles the Major has an 
argument with Sarah - the daughter of the local Roman Catholic bank 
manager with whom he falls in love - about reports of atrocities in the 
newspapers: a story about a woman who had pig rings inserted in her 
26 Ibidp 102 
27 Ibid P 290 
28 Ibid P 318 
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buttocks for supplying milk to the police; a donkey knifed to death for 
carrying turf to the RIC barracks. Sarah replies that these stories were 
invented by the British to tarnish Sinn Fein and adds with evident 
vehemence: "We've no way of knowing whether the newspapers tell 
the truth. Everything belongs to the British in Ireland. Everything.,,29 
Several years before this fictional exchange took place, James Joyce 
wrote an article about Ireland in an Italian newspaper in which he cited 
the story of an old man on trial for murder in the west of Ireland who 
couldn't understand English and whose interpreter failed to make his 
case in the courtroom. Joyce informed his Italian audience that the old 
man, "a deaf mute before the judge", was "a symbol of the Irish nation 
at the bar of public opinion. Like him, Ireland cannot appeal to the 
modern conscience of England or abroad. The English newspapers act 
as interpreters between Ireland and the English electorate ... So the Irish 
figure as criminals, with deformed faces, who roam around at night with 
the aim of doing away with every Unionist. ,,30 Once again, Farrell in his 
fiction has hit upon an issue that contemporary writers had raised in 
commentary: could English newspapers be trusted to represent Irish 
reality? As we shall see later, this doubt was given considerable 
polemical mileage by Sinn Fein propagandists, even though they were 
simultaneously helping British journalists to write that reality. The 
nationalist revolutionaries could refer to ')ournalists who had come to 
sneer" while at the same time - pace McArdle - quoting the British 
. f h . 31 press III support 0 t elr cause. 
29 Ibid P 84 
30 Kevin Barry (ed): James Joyce: Occasional, Critical and Political Writing (Oxford University 
Press, 2000) p 146 
31 David Hogan (Frank Gallagher): The Four Glorious Years (Irish Press, Dublin, 1953) p 62 
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So far I have been arguing that this thesis addresses an important topic 
tantalisingly acknowledged but underexplored in Irish historiography. 
What will the thesis bring to scholarship on the media? I will argue that 
while conventional historians fail to critically analyse the press, media 
scholars invariably ignore or discount history. For many of the canonical 
books of journalistic practice published over the last thirty years history 
is at best incidental. Herbert Gans's study of American magazines and 
television networks, Gaye Tuchman's work on news production and 
Jeremy Tunstall's account of the working lives of British journalists are 
still cited for their insights into modern media practice.32 But their 
work is grounded in the present (or the present of the 1970s). James 
Curran has written of this pioneering work that its "main limitation ... is 
that it is sociology. Its conclusions become potentially misleading if 
they are viewed as generalizations that apply outside their specific 
setting.,,33 Some of this work also tends to abstract the media from its 
historical setting, flattening out perspective and producing an atrophied 
account of institutional structures devoid of the nuances of politics, 
circumstances and time. Paolo Mancini makes a similar point in his 
criticism of the persistence of classical liberal theories of the press as the 
main model of reference for media studies. "Journalism and, more 
generally, media structures do not grow up in a vacuum. They are born 
and develop within a network of interactions and negotiations with a 
32 Herbert Gans: Deciding What's News (Pantheon, New York, 1979); Gaye Tuchman: Making 
News (Free Press, New York, 1978); Jeremy Tunstall: Journalists at Work (Constable, London, 
1971) 
33 James Curran: Media and Power (Routledge, London, 2002) p 46 
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number of other social systems and factors, most of all with economics 
and politics.,,34 
To some extent what I have outlined here in my discussion of the 
approach of Anglo-Irish historiography to the press and the attitude of 
some media scholars to historical context is a version of a long 
established struggle between history and sociology. Peter Burke has 
characterised this tension in terms of "Historians [regarding] 
sociologists as people who ... lack any sense of place or time [and] 
sociologists [who] see historians as amateurish myopic fact-collectors 
without a method, the vagueness of their data matched by their 
incapacity to analyse them.,,35 Or in Charles Tilly's succinct caricature 
of a sociologists viewpoint: "History does the transcription, sociology 
the analysis,,36 My aim in this thesis is to use both history and sociology 
to reach a better understanding of the role of the press during a decisive 
event in Irish, British and indeed world history; to look at both the Irish 
revolution and the professional practice and mentality of foreign 
correspondents through a new optic. James Curran has suggested that 
one way of addressing his concerns about the trend towards ahistorical 
media scholarship would be to "fold the history of the British media into 
a narrative of British society.,,37 In looking at the nature of journalistic 
coverage within the narrative frame of a particular moment of 
34 Paolo Mancini: "Political complexity and alternative models of journalism: The Italian case' in 
Myung-Jin Park and James Curran: De-Westernizing Media Studies (Routledge, London 2000) p 
265 
35 Peter Burke: Sociology and History (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980) p 13-14 
36 Charles Tilly: As Sociology Meets History (Academic Press Inc., New York, 1981) p 5 
37 Curran: Media and Power op. cit. p 47 
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revolutionary change in Britain, Ireland and the empire I am hoping to 
make some contribution towards moving scholarship in this direction. 
As I indicated at the outset, my focus in this thesis will be on the work 
of journalists and writers who came to Ireland during the revolution. 
Media history scholarship has been curiously neglectful of individual 
journalists. Some of the best examples of media history tend to focus on 
broad themes across long time spans: Michael Schudson on the 
emergence of objectivity as a professional totem in the United States, 
Jean Chalaby on the development of the modern press in Britain, Mark 
Hampton on changing ideas of the place of the press in British 
democracy.38 Philip Knightley' s much cited book about war 
correspondents from the Crimean war to Vietnam raises many 
interesting questions but tends more to impressionistic narrative than 
rigorous analysis.39 All of these studies are valuable and I will make use 
of their insights in this thesis. But none of them look at how specific 
journalists wrote about specific events. The scarcity of such work cannot 
be explained by a bias against writing about individuals. The media 
history for my period - from the end of the First World War to the early 
1920s - is distinguished by intense interest in press barons. There is a 
proliferation of biographical studies of figures such as Northcliffe, 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere as well as detailed accounts of the buying 
and selling of titles by a small band of plutocrats. More general 
38 Michael Schudson: Origins of the Ideal of Objectivity in the Professions: Studies in the 
History of American Journalism and American Law 1830-1940 (Garland, New York, 1990); 
Jean Chalaby: The Invention of Journalism (Macmillan, London, 1998); Mark Hampton: Visions 
of the Press in Britain, 1850-1950 (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 2004) 
3Y Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and 
Myth Maker (Quartet, London, revised edition, 1982) 
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accounts of the press at this time, such as the work of Stephen Koss, are 
also exclusively concerned with the men at the top; editors are regarded 
as the only figures of consequence in newspapers and weeklies.40 The 
contribution of reporters and writers is regarded as unworthy of detailed 
consideration; they remain anonymous editorial fodder whose treatment 
brings to mind E.P. Thompson's famous remark about "the immense 
condescension of history." In this thesis I want to shift the perspective 
from the boardroom and the editor's desk to the correspondents on the 
ground. 
In taking this approach I am not discounting the extent to which 
institutions, politics and professional routines and conventions 
influenced and shaped the work of correspondents who reported from 
Ireland - indeed, as will become clear in the chapters which follow these 
influences will be at the heart of my analysis of the coverage. But my 
argument is that some of the most well known work on the early 
twentieth century press in Britain and the United States betrays a 
tendency to regard what actually appeared in newspapers as merely the 
impoverished literary by-product of larger institutional and economic 
forces. Ferdinand Braudel once dismissed the history of events as felt 
and described by contemporaries on the grounds that it was concerned 
with "ephemera ... which pass across the stage like fireflies, hardly 
glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into 
40 Stephen Koss: The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (Fontana edition, London, 
1990) and Fleet Street Radical: A.G. Gardiner and the Daily News (Allen Lane, London, 1973) 
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oblivion,,41 and this I would argue seems to be the view some media 
scholars take of actual journalism. What I believe is a more balanced 
assessment was offered by l.A. Hobson, the theorist of imperialism. 
Hobson published much of his most serious intellectual work in 
newspapers and magazines; he reported on the Boer War for the 
Manchester Guardian. In his autobiography he noted how "In certain 
high intell~ctual quarters journalism has always been treated as the 
lowest of printed matter, as vulgar necessity ... degrading in its thought 
and literary form ... " But Hobson protested that this attitude revealed a 
failure to discriminate. He acknowledged that "the hasty unchecked 
publication of news and opinions which strict 'journalism' implies has 
obvious dangers to truth and literary style ... " But he argued that "in its 
best form, in the current commentary upon important events, it has 
virtues of its own to set against and qualify the defects of its hasty 
production. Not only has it a vitality and bite of thought, feeling and 
expression, caught from the immediacy of the happenings it handles, but 
its very fragmentation evades some of the dangers that beset the longer, 
formal, more scientific, and philosophical expositions which claim the 
seats of intellectual authority. ,,42 
This thesis argues that understanding the way journalists and writers 
chose to record and comment on the day to day developments in Ireland 
is an essential step towards an assessment of the Irish revolution itself 
and the role of the press and journalism in that phase of world history. 
41 Quoted in Niall Ferguson: 'Virtual History: Towards a 'chaotic' theory of the past' in Niall 
Ferguson (ed): Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (Picador, London, 1997) p 
58-59 
42J.A. Hobson: Confessions of an Economic Heretic (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1938) p 
85-86 
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The reason the journalist can be restored to the centre of the picture is 
that by the tum of the nineteenth century writers for the commercial 
press had established a degree of independence concomitant with their 
assertion that they were members of a profession and that their 
"credibility derived in large part from a command of facts.,,43 This is 
often overlooked by some writers impressed by what they see as the 
apparently limitless power of the press barons to dictate what appears in 
their news columns. Even Max Weber worried at the time that "the 
journalist worker gains less and less as the capitalist lord of the press, of 
the sort of 'Lord' Northcliffe, for instance, gains more and more 
political influence.,,44 But by the 1920s in Britain and the United States 
it is clear that journalists were allowed (and would expect to enjoy) a 
degree of freedom to interpret events for themselves; special 
correspondents sent abroad and literary figures commissioned for 
special assignments enjoyed special licence. Thus, as Daniel Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini observed in their survey of media systems, while 
journalists "have rarely asserted and almost never achieved the right to 
control media organizations outright. .. they have often been successful 
in achieving significant relative autonomy within those organizations.,,45 
A vivid definition of that sense of entitlement to autonomy is provided 
by a former editor of the Jerusalem Post in Hallin and Mancini's book. 
Explaining why he resigned when his paper was taken over by an 
interfering Canadian proprietor, the editor said: "Journalism is an 
43 Mark Hampton: Visions of the Press op.cit. p 76-77 
44 Max Weber: 'Politics as a Vocation' in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds): From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (Routledge, London, 1991) p 97 
45 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini: Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p 35 
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enterprise in social judgment. The object of that judgment is the 
historical present, the fast flood of daily events. Journalism plucks from 
this infinite flow those events deemed worthy of public regard, 
- reporting them as honest witness ... and it seeks by .. .interpretive 
judgement to help place those events in a more explicit context of 
narrative understanding.,,46 This sense of independence, particularly the 
ideal of the "honest witness," would have been shared by special 
correspondents during the Irish revolution. Of course, as I have already 
indicated, many different influences - some professional, some 
institutional and some political and cultural - would have shaped their 
judgment of events. But in the early twentieth century the idea of 
journalists as interpreters of reality and not mere stenographers or hired 
scriveners had begun to take hold as evidenced by the advice offered by 
one writer at the time to prospective recruits to the trade that 'the 
journalistic eye is now of far greater importance than the journalistic 
pen,47 
The professionalisation of journalism was one development in evidence 
in the British newspapers this time. There were also broader shifts in 
perceptions of the function of the press in democratic society. In his 
research on the role of the press in Britain from the mid-nineteenth to 
the mid-twentieth century, Mark Hampton identified two broad 
conceptions of how the press fitted into politics. What Hampton calls 
the "educational ideal" placed the press in the classic liberal tradition of 
46 Ibid P 40 
47 E.H.L. Watson: Hints to Young Authors, London (1906) quoted by Kate Campbell: "Journalistic 
Discourses and Construction of Modem Knowledge" in Laurel Brake, Bill Bell and David Finkelstein 
(eds): Nineteenth Century Media and the Construction of Identities (Pal grave, London, 2000) p 
42 
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politics of public discussion: "[The] press was regarded as a powerful 
agent for improving individuals ... [Newspapers] could 'influence', 
'inform' or 'elevate' readers ... [In] the most idealized version, 
newspapers were seen as creating an arena for public discussion on the 
'questions of the day.",48 This notion, Hampton argues, held sway until 
around the 1880s. In the second tradition, the 'representative ideal' , 
which took full form in the early part of the twentieth century, the press 
did not so much influence readers as reflect their views. "In this 
rendering, newspapers conveyed the opinions, wants, or needs of 
readers, crystallizing them into a powerful form that could bring 
pressure to bear on Parliament. This version of the press is most nearly 
conveyed in the press's label as the 'Fourth Estate': the press was the 
champion of the people ... Rather than seeking to involve the mass 
readers in a discussion or seeking to persuade these readers, those who 
articulated the representative ideal offered to speak on their behalf.,,49 
Hampton does not posit a schematic transformation from one paradigm 
to the other; rather he suggests that, although the representative ideal 
was dominant by the early 1920s, strong vestiges of the educational 
ideal were still invoked to explain the purpose of the press, particularly 
the 'elite' newspapers.50 
By the time of the Irish revolution, therefore, the press had begun to 
articulate a vision of itself as a vigilant defender of the interests of the 
public. In January 1918 The Spectator declared that the "The function 
of the Press - and it may be a public service of untold good - is to act as 
48 Mark Hampton: Visions of the Press in Britain op.cit. p 9 
49 Ibid P 9-10 
50 Ibid P 13 
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critic and watchman, to be perpetually warning the country of the 
dangers that beset the State.,Sl At the end of that year the Daily 
Telegraph was stepping up to the watchdog role. Noting the lack of 
publicity about the allied intervention in the civil war in Russia ("a 
war ... such as would have filled the newspapers at any normal time") the 
Telegraph put itself forward as proxy for the electorate demanding that 
"the nation is entitled to know how the war is going, and what end to it 
is contemplated by the Government."S2 As we shall see later, these 
justifications came to the fore during the war in Ireland. British 
newspapers came into conflict with the government over their coverage 
and had recourse to versions of this "Fourth Estate" myth to defend 
themselves. The practice of the American correspondents whose work I 
examine in Chapter 5 is also informed by a sense of the mission of the 
press. 
There is a trail of evidence of how politicians accepted rather than 
resisted the positioning of the press as a 'Fourth Estate.' In 1908 
Asquith told the Imperial Press Conference that 'the press is the daily 
interpreter and mouthpiece of the tastes, the interests, the ideas - one 
might go further and say the passions and the caprices' of the 
electorate."s3 In 1919 two commentators sympathetic to the Labour 
Party estimated that the press was "for the purposes of democratic 
government, practically the sole education which the mass of the people 
51 Ibid P 137 
52 Hugh Brogan: The Life of Arthur Ransome (Jonathan Cape, London, 1984) p 227 
53 Quoted in Mark Hampton: Visions of the Press in Britain op. cit. p 109 
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at present has ... ,,54 By the time he wrote his war memoirs in the 1930s, 
Lloyd George could claim that public opinion dominated the actions of 
British governments. 55 Allowance must be made, of course, for the fact 
that this point was made to trumpet the superiority of the British system 
over European dictatorships. But there is plenty of evidence - some of 
which we shall see later on with reference to Ireland - that Lloyd 
George was profoundly convinced of the centrality of the press to 
politics.56 This was not just a politician's folly: a contemporary political 
scientist estimated that there were only two ways for public opinion to 
find expression in democracies: "One is the vote at elections, the other is 
journalism.,,57 And even where "elections were pro forma rubber stamps 
for the state, tsar and kaiser needed to manipulate and control the thing 
represented as 'public opinion' in a way that their ancestors did not.,,58 
The emergence of the press as the "Fourth Estate" paralleled the 
enlargement of the electorate. In the general election of 1918 - when 
Sinn Fein scored its dramatic breakthrough in Ireland - all males over 
twenty-one and all women over thirty were allowed to vote for the first 
time. The overlapping of the newspaper audience and the electorate 
54 F.H. Hayward and B.N. Langdon-Davies: Democracy and The Press (The National Labour Press 
Ltd, Manchester, 1919) p 4 
55 Quoted in Gary Bass: Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunal 
(Princeton University Press, 2000) p 73 
56 His most recent biographer has affirmed: "Throughout his career Lloyd George took the press very 
seriously ... he was ever conscious that the press and those who controlled it had unique resources for 
interpreting and influencing public opinion." Note that this view takes in both the educational and the 
representative ideal. John Grigg: Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916-1918 (Allen Lane, London, 
2002) p 614 
57 E.L. Godkin: Unforseen Tendencies of Democracy (Boston, 1898) quoted in Quagliariello, 
Gaetano: Politics Without Parties: Moisei Ostrogorski and the Debate on Political Parties on 
the Eve of the Twentieth Century (Avebury, Aldershot, 1996) n 5, p 158 
5~ C.A.Bayly: The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914 (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004) p 
484 
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made press and politics evermore interlinked. One historian has 
concluded that 1918 was a watershed for the role of the media in 
politics: "In twentieth-century Britain, mass politics has always been 
constituted in the mass media: to think of these as separate 
developments is to miss the centrality of these mediated imaginings. ,,59 
This is the context in which we must assess the government's response 
to the correspondents' reports from Ireland in later chapters. 
It was not only the newly expanded electorate that shaped the 
relationship of the press to politics. The First World War had been a 
'total' war, a conflict where the whole population was mobilised in an 
enormous collective effort to fight and sustain the fight. For the first 
time the press had been deployed as "a weapon of warfare.,,60 In the 
politician's eyes public opinion was now synonymous with morale and 
"propaganda began to emerge as the principal instrument of 
control. .. and an essential weapon in the national arsenal.,,61 Lloyd 
George acknowledged to C.P. Scott over breakfast at Downing Street in 
December 1917 how a combination of co-option and censorship had 
kept the true horror of the war hidden from the public. "If people really 
knew the war would be stopped tomorrow", Lloyd George admitted. 
"But of course they don't and can't know. The correspondents don't 
write and the censorship would not pass the truth.,,62 
59 Bill Schwarz: 'Politics and Rhetoric in the Age of Mass Culture' in History Workshop Journal 
No.46 (1998) p 154 
60 Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War (Basic Books, New York, 1999) P 212 
61 David Welch: Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission (The 
Athlone Press, London, 2000) p 1 
62 Quoted in Phillip KnightIey: The First Casualty op. cit. p 93 
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After the war there were second thoughts about the success of the 
propaganda effort. By becoming, in Philip Elliott's term, "the self-
appointed script writer to the national morale" the press had undermined 
trust in the veracity of its news.63 Norman-Angell argued that the 
newspapers had been corrupted. "Those who cared to exercise a little 
vigilance could see in every other column of their newspaper the trail of 
propaganda. What the reader not 'in the know' often took for unalloyed 
'news' was, as a matter of fact, often a partial statement concocted for 
military or political purposes in the 'Information Department' of some 
interested Foreign (or Home) Government.,,64 Another contemporary 
commentator, Walter Raleigh, agreed that the press had helped to hold 
the nation together but in so doing had failed to fulfil a basic need of the 
British people which made their patriotism superior to that of Germans: 
their desire to be allowed to regularly exercise reason and imagination. 
Instead of presenting facts the newspapers had dealt in "flattery and 
flight": they had been timid in admitting to reverses and never admitted 
the humanity of the enemy.65 "If I had my way", Raleigh concluded, "I 
would staff the newspaper offices, as far as possible, with wounded 
soldiers, and I would give some of the present staff a holiday as stretcher 
bearers. Then we should hear more of the truth.,,66 But newspaper staff 
themselves were not immune to second thoughts about the collusion 
between the government and the press during the war. When Desmond 
FitzGerald, the head of the Irish revolutionaries' publicity department, 
63 Philip Elliott: 'All the World's a Stage or What's Wrong with the National Press' in James Curran 
(ed): The British Press: A Manifesto (Macmillan, London, 1978) p 143 
64 Norman Angell: The Press and the Organisation of Society (The Labour Publishing Company 
Ltd., London, 1922) p 20 
65 Walter Raleigh: The War and the Press (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1918) p 9-10 
66 Ibid pI8 
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visited London to see the correspondents from foreign newspapers he 
noted that their wartime experience made them wary of anything they 
construed as propaganda.67 I will be discussing the response of British 
journalists to wartime propaganda in the next chapter. But when we 
come to consider the adversarial reporting of the British campaign in 
Ireland it is essential to bear in mind the context of the post-war 
criticisms of the press. Equally, this general distrust of propaganda IS 
the context for the discussion of the publicity work of the revolutionaries 
and the British authorities in Ireland in Chapter 4. For Angell, the 
deceptions of war spilled over into peacetime; he now believed it was 
more profitable for the press to pedal familiar falsehoods rather than 
confront "unpleasant truth.,,68 And he concluded that the press had 
become "perhaps the worst of all the menaces to modem democracy,,69 
and "the main instrument by which any real movement towards a new 
social order is resisted." 70 
This debate was being conducted while a new international order was 
taking shape with little resistance from the allied powers. Anthony 
Smith has remarked that, although the First World war was fought by 
bureaucratic states with colonial empires, it "promoted the cause of 
ethnic nations across Europe .. .',71 In many places the invigoration of 
nationalist movements was assisted by the great powers. "[The] empires 
committed suicide during the 1914-18 war by fomenting nationalism 
67 Letter from Desmond FitzGerald to Dail Eireann, January I, 1920, Desmond FitzGerald Papers, 
Archive Department, University College Dublin, P80Jl4Jl 
68 Angell: The Press and the Organisation of Society, op. cit. p 37-38 
69 Ibid P 16 
70 Ibid P 17 
71 Anthony Smith: 'War and Ethnicity: the role of warfare in the formation, self-images and cohesion 
of ethnic communities', Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol 4, No.4 (October 1981) p 387 
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as a form of political warfare against their opponents." 72 By the time of 
the Paris Peace Conference the old colonial system was being 
challenged by two universalist ideologies: Lenin's appeal for world 
revolution on one side and Woodrow Wilson's- crusade for self-
determination on the other. Toby Dodge has written that the legitimacy 
of the colonial system was being undermined by America's growing 
economic superiority. "If markets were to be open, if consumers across 
the world were to be allowed freedom of choice, then there was little 
room for colonial notions of tutelage and protected markets. This 
argument gained ideological coherence when Wilson began to counter 
Lenin's internationalist appeals to the working class with propaganda 
aimed at extolling the freedoms and prosperity to be achieved by self-
determining nations.,,73 Forced to take sides, Wilsonian 
internationalism, for all its drawbacks, was the only choice from a 
British point of view. But the currency given to the notion of self-
determination was a gift for Ireland's revolutionaries. All successful 
revolutions of the twentieth century, as John Dunn has observed, 
"succeeded by establishing a government of a nation state in a world of 
other nation states.,,74 The post-war international order gave a new 
legitimacy to Ireland's historic claim to nationhood. 
All this is important for this thesis because the shifting ideas of a new 
international settlement would have informed the correspondents 
72 Mark Mazower: Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (Allen Lane, London, 1998) p 
45 
73 Toby Dodge: Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (Hurst and 
Company, London, 2003) p 5 
74 John Dunn: Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to an Analysis of a Political Phenomenon 
(Cambridge University Press, 1972) p xii 
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heading to Ireland to cover the revolution. When they arrived they 
would also be exposed to local versions of universal arguments because, 
as Ben Levitas pointed out in a discussion of arguments about anti-
Semitism between Irish polemicists, "all sides-of the cultural and 
political debate [in Ireland] fed off international currents of thought.,,75 
Now more than before these political thinkers and activists would have 
to connect the cause of Irish nationalism with world events. The vogue 
for publicity and propaganda was animating colonialists as well. C.A. 
Bayly has suggested that public relations was a kind of 'new 
imperialism' . But diffusing the empire message cut both ways: "At the 
same time, spokesmen of the colonized peoples also began to present 
their case more vigorously in metropolitan circles with the aid of 
telegrams, newspapers, and high-profile publicists." 76 Irish 
revolutionaries were aware of the need to appeal to this new 
international public sphere which exalted humanitarian values. In the 
late nineteenth century, Patrick Ford, the editor and proprietor of the 
most widely read newspaper among Irish-Americans, the Irish World, 
aligned the Irish cause with slave emancipation, arguing that Ireland's 
suffering was not singular but part of worldwide oppression of the 
common man.77 Ford advocated that Irish revolutionaries must connect 
with similar movements around the world and especially in the British 
empire. "The concept of Indians as brown Irishmen, as discontented and 
as revolutionary-minded as themselves, was a basic tenet of Ford's 
75 Ben Levitas: The Theatre of Nation: Irish Drama and Cultnral Nationalism 1890-1916 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002) p 91 
76 C.A. Bayly: 'Representing Copts and Muhammadans: Empire, Nation and Community in Egypt 
and India, 1880-1914' in Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly (eds): Modernity and Culture from 
the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002) p 160 
77 T.W. Moody: Davitt and Irish Revolution op.cit. p 142 
31 
strategy.,,78 An argument running through this thesis will be that the 
reporting of the Irish revolution was the culmination of that strategy. 
The interest shown by the journalists who converged on Ireland to report 
the war, the commentary and reportage connecting Ireland to world 
themes and the prominence given to the Irish struggle in newspapers 
around the world combined to allow George Gavan Duffy, the first 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new government of the Irish Free 
State, to boast in a memorandum in 1922 that "[We] are still beyond 
question, in high favour among influential people on the continent and 
our Envoys will be much sought after. The reasons are: first that 
Ireland is a world-race with great possibilities ... ,,79 
The first half of this thesis will follow in a broadly narrative frame the 
course of the war in Ireland and the shifts in the reporting of events by 
British correspondents. Chapter 1 will offer a brief account of the state 
of Ireland in 1919 when the newly elected Sinn Fein MPs refused to go 
to Westminster and assembled in their own Irish parliament, Dail 
Eireann. I will trace how the First World War at first appeared to 
postpone a final reckoning with the 'Irish Question' but then provided 
the opportunity for the rebellion of 1916, the dramatic rise of Sinn Fein 
and the eclipse of the constitutional nationalists. In the second half of 
Chapter 1 I will discuss in detail the impact of the war on the British 
press and examine the prevailing notions of what it was to be a special 
78 H.V. Brasted: 'Irish Nationalism and the British Empire' op. cit. p 89 
79 Quoted in Donal Lowry: 'New Ireland, Old Empire and the Outside World, 1922-49: The Strange 
Evolution of a "Dictionary Republic'" in Mike Cronin and John Regan (eds): Ireland: The Politics 
ofIndependence,1922-49, Macmillan, London (2000) p 173 
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correspondent through the memoirs of Philip Gibbs and Henry Wood 
Nevinson. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will explore in detail the work of British 
correspondents in Ireland, the growing adversarial nature of their 
relationship with the government in London and the impact their work 
had on a London audience. I have looked at a variety of newspapers and 
weeklies including the Morning Post which was notorious for its "rabid, 
even violent, anti Irish stance ... ,,80 But I've concentrated on the work of 
correspondents for the Daily News, the Manchester Guardian and The 
Times because these are the papers which took the lead in oppositional 
reporting of the war. Their coverage was often criticised by the Post and 
other right-wing journals but, since I'm interested more in the 
professional practice of relatively autonomous correspondents rather 
than merely the political positions of their newspapers, I regard this 
debate as a context rather than the centre of my inquiry. Most 
mainstream journalism in Britain was arguably 'liberal' in a broad sense, 
a label which did not imply inevitable defiance of authority as is 
sometimes mistakenly assumed. The celebrated 'liberal' editor of the 
Daily News, A.G. Gardiner, worried constantly that his special 
correspondent covering the revolution in Russia, Arthur Ransome, was 
out of line with British foreign policy. Gardiner was sensitive to "the 
atmosphere in official circles.,,81 In 1918 he wrote to Ransome to 
express his hope that he "would not embarrass the News by writing in 
too pro-Bolshevik and anti-interventionist a vein" And he was glad 
80 John M. McEwen: 'The National Press During the First World War: Ownership and Circulation' 
in .Tournai of Contemporary History Vol 17, No 3 (July 1982) P 472 
81 Hugh Brogan: The Life of Arthur Ransome op.cit. p 190 
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when he received signs from Ransome that he had the approval of 
British authorities, "reassuring to an editor who did not want to drift too 
far into opposition." 82 Gardiner was eventually forced to resign because 
of his constant criticisms of Lloyd George but the News continued its 
adversarial Irish coverage which hurt the prime minister directly. 83 
These examples illustrate that, at a time of great flux in British politics, 
adopting the traditional approach of viewing newspapers through the 
lens of their stated political outlook misses a great deal of complexity. I 
believe my approach, of looking at correspondents, is a more fruitful 
route of investigation. 
Chapters 4 to 6 will step outside the narrative frame of the war to 
examine in detail some specific issues. In Chapter 4 I will look at the 
propaganda war and at how both sides tried to interest the journalists in 
their cause, making the point which other treatments of this missed: that 
it was an acute understanding of the modern media world and the 
function of news and propaganda which informed both sides. 
Chapter 5 will swing the focus away from Britain to the United States. 
Using the personal papers of the Philadelphia Inquirer's correspondent 
in Ireland, Carl Ackerman and the work of Francis Hackett, an editor at 
the New Republic and an Irishman who sympathised with Sinn Fein's 
cause, I will look at two contrasting schools of American journalism: 
one heavily informed by professionalism and the ideal of objectivity, the 
other partisan and inspired by the original ideology of muckraking. 
82 Ibid P 208-209 
83 Stephen Koss: Fleet Street Radical op. cit. p 265-267 
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Finally in Chapter 6 I examine the work of three literary figures who 
visited Ireland at the time of the war. G .K. Chesterton's book Irish 
Impressions is a-study of Ireland at the beginning of the rebellion in 
which Chesterton absorbs the Irish nationalism into his overarching 
critique of modem industrialism (an example of a tradition in which 
English writers project their own fantasies onto Irish reality.) Wilfred 
Ewart, then a best selling novelist, was sent by the Sunday Times to 
describe conditions in Ireland in 1921 and wrote a travelogue heavily 
influenced by his experiences in the trenches in France. Finally, V.S. 
Pritchett, starting out on his literary career, was the Dublin 
correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor during 1923 and was 
an acute observer of the early days of the new Irish state which was the 
fruit of the revolution. 
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CHAPTER! 
The Impact of War 
The Irish revolution that became a focus of attention in the British press 
- and gradually in newspapers around the world - in 1919 cannot be 
considered in isolation from the cataclysmic changes wrought by the 
First World War. In 1914 the 'Irish question' - the source of profound 
controversy in modem British politics - seemed to be on the brink of 
settlement. Ireland was finally to have its own administration while still 
remaining part of the United Kingdom and the British Empire. The 
issue of Home Rule had threatened to provoke a civil war in 1912 when 
the Ulster Unionists refused to accept it and vowed - with the support of 
the Conservative Party - to resist with violence. But the conflict in 
Europe superseded this poisonous domestic controversy; decisions on 
how to implement the Home Rule bill to the satisfaction of all sides 
were deferred until the end of the war, a milestone then considered to be 
merely months away. The Irish Parliamentary Party, which had finally 
won the concession of Home Rule from Westminster, prepared itself for 
power. But by 1918 the Home Rulers - the major political force in the 
country for almost half a century - had been supplanted by separatists. 
This chapter will explain how this extraordinary reversal came about 
and provide an outline of the troubled country to which foreign 
correspondents came in numbers in 1919. 
The war changed Ireland - but it also changed journalism. Since this 
thesis concentrates on the work of British and American correspondents 
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in Ireland - both reporters and freelance writers - I will trace the impact 
of the war on the British press and on journalistic practice in general. 
"Before 1914 it was not seriously considered to be the responsibility of 
government to explain, still less to justify, its policies to the public at 
large ... ,,1 But by 1918 - when Ireland once more began to move to the 
centre stage of British politics - controlling, influencing and reacting to 
the news had become a major concern of the government in London. 
This profoundly affected the work and self-image of the most glamorous 
footsoldiers of the newspaper world, the special correspondents. In an 
attempt to establish a context for the later consideration of the coverage 
of Ireland I will sketch out what it meant to be a "special" at the end of 
the First World War through a close examination of the careers of two 
men who were official war correspondents in France, Philip Gibbs and 
H.W. Nevinson. Both of them had important connections with Ireland 
and both wrote memoirs and autobiography which reflected on what it 
was to be a journalist at this time. 
On August 5th 1914 The Irish Times, the chief organ of Irish unionism, 
hailed the declaration of war with what seems, in retrospect, a 
grievously misplaced sense of relief and optimism: "We believe that the 
people of these kingdoms are today more cheerful than they have been 
at any time since the war cloud began to gather over Europe". This was 
not editorial jingoism or war mongering, at least in its traditional sense. 
The editorial soon revealed that the inspiration for such a breezy 
embrace of war in Europe was an intensely parochial anxiety. "In this 
1 Philip Taylor: "Publicity and diplomacy: the impact of the First World War upon Foreign Office 
attitudes towards the press" in David Dilks (ed): Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign 
Policy of the Twentieth Century Vol! (Macmillan, London 198 I) P 42 
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hour of trial the Irish nation has 'found itself' at last", The Irish Times 
declared with undisguised relief. "Unionist and nationalist have ranged 
themselves together against the invader of their common liberties.,,2 For 
The Irish Times, and many others in the British Isles;- the war between 
the Great Powers would help to draw a line under one of the most 
dangerous periods in the history of the United Kingdom since the Act of 
Union in 1800. In the summer of 1914 Ireland was preparing for its 
own war. Thousands of volunteer militiamen were drilling in Ulster to 
oppose Home Rule; thousands had mobilised in the rest of Ireland in 
support of it. In the previous four years the struggle between Liberals 
and Unionists in the House of Commons over Home Rule for Ireland 
had threatened a grave constitutional crisis. 
The issue had dominated Irish politics - and by extension Westminster -
for a generation. "The promise or threat of Home Rule was the driving 
force behind every substantial faction in Irish politics from 1870 to 
1916.,,3 Pressure from the increasingly disciplined Irish Parliamentary 
Party in the House of Commons during this period won a series of 
concessions from both Liberal and Conservative governments - tenant-
right, rent control, subsidies for tenants to purchase farms from their 
landlords, a national university. Such was the success of constitutional 
Irish nationalists that they were able to "[provoke] state intervention in 
Irish social and economic affairs to a degree quite unparalleled in the 
rest of the United Kingdom.,,4 Their pivotal coup had been Gladstone's 
2 Quoted in David Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921 op.cit. p 53 
3 Ibid P 72 
4 Jose Harris: Private Lives, Public Spirit: A Social History of Britain 1870-1914 (Oxford 
University Press, 1993) p 204 
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adoption of Home Rule as part of Liberal policy for the pacification of 
Ireland. But this success had turned Irish Home Rule into the most 
divisive issue in British domestic politics. Gladstone's decision split his 
Liberal party and for Conservatives his conversion amounted to, in Lord 
Randolph Churchill's words, "trafficking with treason".5 Every time 
the Liberals succeeded in passing a Home Rule bill they were thwarted 
by the House of Lords. However, in 1911 the Commons voted to 
remove the veto power of the House of Lords after it had rejected Lloyd 
George's 'People's Budget'. Now, with the Irish nationalist MPs 
keeping the Liberals in power, the way was open for Home Rule. Ireland 
became, as Roy Foster has pointed out, "the issue upon which the 
landed and plutocratic interests decided to confront Lloyd George's 
welfare politics.,,6 When a Home Rule bill was introduced in April 
1912 its enactment was inevitable. The reaction in Ulster, home to the 
majority of Irish unionists (almost overwhelmingly Protestant), was the 
creation of a mass movement and the recruitment of a private army 
which threatened civil war if they were to be forced to accept Home 
Rule with Ireland run by a predominantly Catholic parliament in Dublin. 
The refusal of Ulster Protestants to accept Home Rule drew support 
from all the leading figures of British Conservatism who "denied the 
right of the government to force the unionists to fall under the sway of a 
polity other than the UK parliament.,,7 For Unionists, Home Rule for 
Ireland meant separation, the eventual disintegration of the United 
Kingdom and, in time, the unravelling of the entire British empire. As 
5 Quoted in Conor Cruise O'Brien: Parnell and His Party op. cit. p 194 n. 3 
6 R.F Foster: Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (Allen Lane, London 1988) p 465 
7 Paul Bew: Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912-
1916 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) p 53 
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one writer framed it in terms of the popular First World War marching 
song" 'Goodbye Tipperary' was tantamount to saying 'Farewell 
Leicester Square. ",8 After British officers at the Curragh barracks near 
Dublin said they would resign rather than fight against the volunteer 
army raised by Ulster unionists, the high command of the British army 
made it clear they were not prepared to coerce Ulster into Home Rule. A 
majority of the cabinet appeared reluctant to even attempt to overrule the 
military.9 
So it is in the context of the United Kingdom being tom apart by Home 
Rule that the relief of The Irish Times at the outbreak of war should be 
viewed. Indeed, the paper's hope that the war would unify the divided 
factions in Ireland seemed to have some justification at the time. In a 
sober speech to the House of Commons the Irish nationalist leader John 
Redmond pledged his support for the war effort and committed his 
volunteers in the south to co-operating in the defence of Ireland. To his 
own followers, Redmond could scarcely conceal his delight, remarking 
tactfully that "as things stand now, our position has been improved 
enormously by the foreign complications."!O The reason for his pleasure 
was that the war gave Redmond - "a kind of imperialist nationalist"!! -
the opportunity to demonstrate that Ireland under Home Rule would be 
just as loyal to the King (if not even more so) as it was during the Union. 
At the same time the Ulster Unionists would be deflated: threatening 
8 Keith Jeffery: The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922 (Manchester University 
Press 1984) p 75 
9 J.J. Lee: Ireland 1912-1985 (Cambridge University Press, 1989) p 18 
]0 David Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op.cit. p 91 
]] D. George Boyce: Ireland 1828-1923: From Ascendancy to Democracy (Blackwell, Oxford, 
1992) p 80 
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. I 
violence to resist Home Rule under the guise of allegiance to the Crown 
now seemed ludicrous. The national emergency provoked by the 
declaration of war had left them "imprisoned by their patriotism.,,12 
Catholic nationalists now seemed poised to outdo their-Protestant 
brethren in the north when it came to patriotic devotion. Even non-
unionist newspapers declared it the duty of Irishmen to fight the despotic 
Germans. The head of the Catholic church in Ireland, Cardinal Logue, 
provided doctrinal support for the war when he condemned "the 
barbarity of the Germans in burning Rheims Cathedral.,,13 
The War Office pitched its recruitment campaign to suit the 
circumstances: leprechauns, shamrocks, harps and saints were the staple 
illustrations on recruiting posters in Ireland and frequent appeal was 
made to the Irish fighting spirit, duty, honour and the atrocities allegedly 
committed by the enemy.14 But the response to the recruitment 
campaign among Catholic Home Rulers was not as enthusiastic as their 
leaders might have hoped or expected. In the words of one caustic 
assessment "while most Irishmen professed to approve of others 
fighting, they preferred not to participate in person.,,15 Others have 
argued that recruitment in Ireland did not differ that much from other 
parts of the Kingdom and that "there could hardly have been an 
individual Irishman or woman who did not personally know someone 
12 John O. Stubbs: 'The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-1918" in Historical.Tournal No. 33, Vol 4 
(December 1990), quoted in Bew: Ideology and the Irish Ouesion op.cit. p 142 
13 Keith Jeffery: Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge University Press, 2000) p 12 
14 Mark Tierney et. al: "Recruiting Posters" in David Fitzpatrick (ed): Ireland and the First World 
War (Lilliput Press and Trinity History Workshop, Dublin 1988) p 54-56 
IS Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op.cit. p 92 
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serving in the colours.,,16 In the end over two hundred thousand 
Irishmen participated in the war and some thirty five thousand were 
killed. 17 The burden of the war fell mostly on Protestants in the North. 
But the conflict also had cataclysmic consequences for the Ascendancy 
families in the South. The writer Lennox Robinson observed that "the 
Big Houses were emptied of all men of a fighting age [the Great War 
being] the last chapter in the history of many families.,,18 Keith Jeffery 
argues that the idea of the 'lost generation' applies most forcefully to the 
Ascendancy class in southern Ireland. 19 By the end of the war "in all too 
many Irish country houses in 1919 the Young Master was no more than 
a memory and a photograph in uniform on a side-table." 20 
Throughout the worst horrors of the war the Irish gentry supported the 
soldiers at the front in ways "almost indistinguishable from those 
followed in the quietest, loyalist village in the British Isles.,,21 At the 
same time much of Catholic Ireland, those not seduced by the recruiting 
officers, enjoyed the fruits of the economic boom that the war brought to 
the home front. Thousands crossed the Irish Sea to work in munitions 
factories and as seasonal labourers on farms in England.22 In Ireland 
tenant farmers who had graduated to being proprietors, thanks to the 
16 Jeffery: Ireland and the Great War op. cit. p 6 and Kevin Myers: "The Irish and the Great War: 
A Case of Amnesia" in Richard English and Joseph Morrison Skelly (eds): Ideas Matter: Essays 
in Honour of Conor Cruise O'Brien (Poolbeg Press, Dublin 1998) p 104 
17 Myers p 103-104 
18 Quoted in Jeffery: Ireland and the Great War op. cit. p 70 
19 Ibid P 70 
20 Mark Bence-Jones: Twilight of the Ascendancy (Constable, London 1993) p 187 
21 Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op.cit. p 56 
22 David Fitzpatrick: "The Overflow of the Deluge: Anglo-Irish Relationships, 1914--1922" in 
Oliver MacDonagh and W.F. MandIe (eds): Ireland and Irish-Australia: Studies in Cultural and 
Political History (Croom Helm, London 1986) p 86 
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government land acts, benefited from increased prices and families of 
serving soldiers received state allowances.23 
This ready identification with Britain's war was a feature of the 
ambivalent nature of Irish society at the tum of the twentieth century. 
The Great Famine fifty years before had hastened the pace of 
Anglicisation to the extent that "town culture in Ireland was essentially a 
variant on British provincial culture, the main difference being the 
religious life and the content of the political culture.,,24 But as the war 
began it seemed that even religious and cultural dissension could be 
subsumed by constitutional nationalism as it stood on the brink of 
succeeding in its long struggle towards creating a viable Irish nation. 
Home Rule appeared to be more assured than ever and commitment to 
the war in Europe seemed to offer moderate Irish nationalism the 
opportunity to fulfil its promise that Ireland could be self governing and 
an important part of the British empire. "'Ireland a nation' was a slogan 
equally acceptable to friends and enemies of Britain, each of whom 
could assign what meaning they chose to the phrase.,,25 
The Irish Parliamentary Party's detractors in the more extreme 
nationalist groups appeared to be morally disarmed. Desmond 
Fitzgerald, the IRA's director of publicity during the War of 
Independence in 1921, recalled how only seven years earlier he and his 
comrades were "a very small minority, without influence, impotent." 
23 D.G. Boyce: Ireland 1828-1923 op. cit. P 88 
24 Tom Garvin: The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1981) P 
103 
25 Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op.cit. p 78 
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John Redmond's exhortations that Irish people should support Britain, 
he wrote, had "really represented the views of the majority of the Irish 
people.,,26 The movement to which Fitzgerald belonged was at once 
cultural and political. Those who came under the umbrella title of 'Irish 
Ireland' included language enthusiasts who saw true nationality in the 
restoration of Gaelic, sports administrators promoting ancient Irish 
games and economic nationalists who believed Ireland was being sucked 
dry by the English connection. They were all determined to do 
something about what the Catholic Bishop of Killaloe referred to as "the 
leprosy of Anglicisation.,,27 Many were mortal enemies of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party. One moderate leader, Eoin MacNeil regarded the 
party's MPs as enfeebled and corrupt and referred derisively to their 
conduct at Westminster where they "had wheedled, fawned, begged, 
bargained and truckled for a provinciallegislature.,,28 His contempt was 
shared by groups of more political militants. Some, like the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood were conspiratorial revolutionaries seeking to 
emulate the Fenian rising of the mid nineteenth century. Others, 
including Sinn Fein, had a separatist agenda without being quite sure 
how to achieve it. 29 
Until 1914 these parties and movements existed on the fringes. But the 
war created the conditions in which they came into their own. Instead of 
unifying the nation under the Crown as The Irish Times and the Irish 
Parliamentary Party hoped, the war helped to transform Ireland from an 
26 Garret FitzGerald: "The Meaning of the Rising" in The Irish Times July 13-18, 1991, quoted in 
Bew: Ideology and the Irish Question op. cit. p xvii 
27 Michael Laffan: The Resurrection ofIreland: The Sinn Fein Party 1916-1923 p 224 
28 Ibid P 11 
29 Ibid P 11-33 
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emerging pillar of Empire into a site of nationalist agitation of the kind 
that could be seen allover Europe by 1918. By the end of the war self-
determination had eclipsed Home Rule as the slogan of the day. 
How did this happen? For one thing the war which had seemed to hold 
no terrors for the parliamentary nationalists turned out to be corrosive of 
their hold on the public imagination. Nobody expected that the fighting 
would be so prolonged or so bloody. As trench warfare continued with 
no conclusion in sight, the prospect of actual Home Rule receded into 
the distance and as a consequence the parliamentarians seemed more 
ineffective than ever. There was nothing on which to expend their 
campaigning energies; and while the carnage in France depressed 
potential recruits it emboldened the extremists who believed that it 
presented an opportunity for action. In November 1915 Sir Matthew 
Nathan, the under-secretary for Ireland, warned Redmond's deputy, 
John Dillon, that Sinn Fein was gaining support at the expense of the 
parliamentarians.3o Secondly, pervasive militarism itself helped to give 
an impetus to "the undercurrent of sedition,,31 in Irish nationalist 
politics. The formation of the Volunteers to resist Home Rule in Ulster 
had prompted the launching of a countervailing force among 
nationalists. Mobilisation was the prevailing method of political action. 
"For unionists, nationalists and republicans alike, soldiery was an idea to 
be extolled rather than a menace to be confronted.,,32 
30 ES.L. Lyons: John Dillon: A Biography (Routledge & Keegan Paul, London 1968) p 366 
31 Ibid P 365 
32 David Fitzpatrick: "Militarism in Ireland 1900-1922" in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery 
(eds): A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge University Press 1996) P 379 
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The Easter Rising of 1916 was a shock for the British government. 33 
The men who carried it out formed a conspiracy within a conspiracy; 
the anti-recruiting campaigns, pro-German sentiments and the 
manoeuvring of the Irish Volunteer force itself provided a cover of 
threatening but not apparently bellicose agitation. The conspirators 
plans were indeed closely guarded, so much so that their plans to 
involve most of the Volunteer movement on Easter Sunday backfired.34 
Famously the rebellion was carried out with scant regard for the 
possibility of victory. Its driving force, Patrick Pearse, believed in a 
blood sacrifice that would revive the spirit of the Irish nation. At the end 
of 1915 - four months before the Rising - he exulted in the possibilities 
offered by the war in Europe for rousing Ireland from its lethargy. "The 
last six months have been the most glorious in the history of Europe. It 
is good for the world that such things should be done. The old heart of 
the earth needed to be warmed with the red wine of the 
battlefields ... Ireland will not find Christ's peace until she has taken 
Christ's sword. What peace she has known in these latter days has been 
the devil's peace, peace with sin, peace with dishonour. .. ,,35 Pearse saw 
his redemptive role as equivalent to that of Christ36 but other leaders of 
the rebellion also shared a poetic commitment to separatism and saw 
their task as an effort to awaken the nation to the depth of that 
dishonour. They were joined by the socialist and Labour leader James 
33 On April nOd, 1916 - two days before the Rising took place - Nathan wrote to his boss Augustine 
Birrell: "I see no indications of a rising." Ibid p 368 
34 British naval intelligence were made fully aware of the conspirator's plans by intercepted German 
naval codes but kept officials at Dublin Castle in the dark for fear of revealing to the Germans that 
their codes were compromised. But the fact that the Dublin administration seemed oblivious of the 
Rising contributed to its reputation for incompetence. See Laffan: The Ressurrection of Ireland op. 
cit. p 36-40 
35 F.S.L. Lyons: Ireland Since the Famine (Fontana, London, 1976) p 334--339 
36 Ibid P 338 
46 
Connolly, who - though he had disavowed Pearse's rhetoric about the 
purifying goodness of war by characterising anyone who thought that 
way as "a blithering idiot,,37 - seized the moment as an opportunity for 
revolution. Connolly felt betrayed when socialist movements around 
Europe abandoned internationalism to join their national war efforts. 
Influenced by the revolutionary rhetoric of some of the separatist leaders 
he became convinced that "Irish independence was a prerequisite for 
socialist success.,,38 
The Rising that lasted for six days during Easter Week of 1916 was "the 
most serious and sustained rebellion in Ireland for more than a century" 
even though the casualties - 450 killed and 2,500 wounded - bore no 
comparison with the slaughter in France?9 Neither did the tactics 
employed: the British army had little experience of urban warfare and 
the kind of battle played out on the streets of Dublin "was an extremely 
rare military phenomenon ... ,,40 The rebels had seized key buildings in 
Dublin, the most famous being the General Post Office. It was from the 
steps of the GPO that Pearse read out the Proclamation of the Irish 
Republic: "Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the 
dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of 
nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and 
strikes for her freedom ... " 41 British forces arrived from the rest of 
Ireland and from England, rapidly outnumbering the rebels and, with 
very effective use of artillery, pounded them into surrender within six 
37 Foster: Modern Ireland op.cit. p 479 
38 Ruth Dudley Edwards: James Connolly (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1998) p 123 
39 Laffan: The Resurrection of Ireland op. cit. p 46 
40 Charles Townshend: Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (Allen Lane, London 2005) p 301 
41 Ibid 
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days. Accounts by people who were in Dublin at the time emphasise 
confusion, uncertainty and rumour. There is little evidence of any 
public support for the rebellion: the citizens of Dublin either looted the 
destroyed shops in the city centre, "[watched] the fight at the Post Office 
as if it were a Cinema show" 42 or, by the end, abused the defeated 
insurrectionists as they were led away to prison. But over the next few 
weeks it became clear that Pearse's notion of a dramatic sacrifice that 
would transform the consciousness of Irish people had come to pass and 
that F.S.L. Lyons's description of the Rising as "the point of 
departure ... for all subsequent Irish history" 43 was well justified. 
In Britain the Rising was seen as a stab in the back. The charges against 
the rebels arrested in Easter Week specifically accused them of 
"assisting the German enemy.,,44 John Redmond himself publicly 
declared that the rebellion had been engineered in Berlin.45 Even in the 
confusion of the events in Dublin there was a sense of dread that some 
draconian response was being prepared. Almost immediately after the 
suppression of the Rising, John Dillon wrote to Redmond: "You should 
urge strongly on the government the extreme unwisdom of any 
wholesale shooting of prisoners.,,46 The wording here suggests that such 
a "wholesale" response was believed to be a possibility even at such an 
early stage. The Irish Times - which had looked forward to the harmony 
among Irishmen that the Great War would bring - was "thirsting for 
42 J.R. Clark diary quoted in Laffan: The Resurrection of Ireland op.cit. p 46 
43 Lyons: Ireland Since the Famine op. cit. p 369 
44 Jeffery: Ireland and the Great War op. cit. p 53 
45 Lyons: .lohn Dillon op. cit. p 380 
46 Lyons: .lohn Dillon op.cit. p 373 
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blood".47 It soon got its wish. Ninety death sentences were imposed and 
over a ten-day period in early May there were fifteen executions, the 
martyrs including Pearse and other leaders of the Rising. The effect, 
according to observers at the time, was cumulative: :'Day by day, as the 
Rebellion itself receded .. .into memory ... the tale of executions was told 
piecemeal. ,,48 
When parliament debated the Rising on May 11 th, Dillon - with the 
authority of someone who had been marooned in his house near the 
centre of Dublin throughout Easter Week - described how the civilian 
authorities had become powerless in the face of military government. He 
brought news from Dublin of rumours of secret executions at military 
barracks. In a passage which illustrates how the repression was 
transforming the perception of the rebels, Dillon told the Commons: 
"[It] is not murderers who are being executed; it is insurgents who have 
fought a clean fight, a brave fight, however misguided, and it would 
have been a damned good thing for you if your soldiers were able to put 
up as a good a fight as did these men in Dublin - three thousand men 
against twenty thousand with machine-guns and artillery. (An Hon. 
Member: 'Evidently you wish they had succeeded.') That is an 
infamous falsehood ... They have held us up to public odium as traitors to 
our country because we have supported you at this moment and have 
47 Ibid P 375 
48 Warre B. Wells and N. Marlow: A History of the Irish Rebellion of 1916 (MaunseI & Company 
Ltd., London, 1916) p 204-205 
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stood by you in this great war ... " Dillon accused the prime minister 
Asquith of "washing out our whole life's work in a sea of blood. ,,49 
Dillon's desperation had its source in an intuition that constitutional 
nationalism was being swept aside by the emotional reaction to the 
brutal suppression of the Rising. John Redmond saw the Rising as an 
attempt to destroy his party and the reaction of the British government 
appeared almost calculated to help in robbing the parliamentarians of 
legitimacy. Redmond and his colleagues had repudiated the Rising; 
their passionate rhetoric in the House of Commons had failed to stop the 
executions. In June 1916 Dillon warned Lloyd George: "Since the 
executions we have a new Ireland to deal with - seething with discontent 
and rage against the government. Old historic passions have been 
aroused to a terrible extent.,,50 The promises of the parliamentary party 
- that Home Rule could be won by trusting the British government to do 
the decent thing - were shown to be naIve and useless; distrust of British 
intentions seemed a more astute attitude in the light of what had 
happened. The beneficiaries of this were the revolutionaries who were 
now organising through Sinn Fein. Within months of the executions 
requiem Masses were being held in memory of the rebels and pictures of 
the leaders were being circulated and displayed in people's houses. 
"The symbols of the Easter martyrdom were being forged .. .into the 
iconography of a new political movement.,,51 The national crusade 
which had been the property of the parliamentary party for the previous 
thirty years was now taken over by the inheritors of the mantle of the 
49 Lyons: John Dillon op.cit. p 381-382 
50 Lyons: John Dillon op.cit. p 395 
51 Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op. cit. pIll 
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Rising and they revitalised politics. A police inspector in Co. Clare 
noticed several weeks after the Rising that the locals had become less 
friendly towards his constables; by December they were regarded as 
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~ eneillles. 
The context for the Rising - it occurred during the preparations for the 
Battle of the Somme - is crucial in explaining the British response. 
Trying to allay Dillon, Lloyd George excused the executions in Dublin 
in terms of the brutalisation caused by the war. "People are getting 
accustomed to scenes of blood" Lloyd George wrote. "Their own sons 
are falling by the hundred-thousand and the nation is harder and more 
ruthless than it has ever been.,,53 Lloyd George seems to have been 
aware of the impact of the harsh measures. When he replaced Asquith 
as prime minister in December 1916 the conciliation of Ireland became a 
priority for the cabinet: the prisoners were released before Christmas, 
producing an effect in Ireland that was "electrifying".54 However, on 
the ground, the military authorities in Ireland continued to be as 
repressive as ever in the year that followed. As support for Sinn Fein 
and the commemoration of the Rising increased, more meetings were 
banned, football matches and cattle fairs were disrupted by soldiers 
searching for suspects, and more people were arrested and imprisoned. 
The indiscriminate nature of this policy meant that it drew in many 
people whose sympathies for extremism and rebellion were passive or 
lukewarm. In David Fitzpatrick's assessment "the Castle made heroes 
out of nobodies and provoked savage indignation among countless 
52 Ibid P 8 
53 Lyons: John Dillon op.cit. p 391 
54 Townshend: Easter 1916 op.cit. p 369 
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families which had previously supported the new movement, if at all, 
only out of herd instinct.,,55 Sinn Fein had now absorbed proponents of 
violent and civil resistance to British rule under one banner. The threat 
of conscription in the spring of 1918 "crystallized the wide nationalist 
front which had been in gradual formation since 1916", with Sinn Fein 
now giving a lead to the old-style parliamentarians and the Catholic 
clergy.56 This was the prototype for the military/civilian organisation 
which would wage the Anglo-Irish War. 
If the First World War was a major agent of revolutionary change in 
Ireland it also had a profound impact on the outlook of Anglo-American 
journalists. During the war all belligerent governments realised that the 
press was as much a resource as the artillery gun or the tank. The mass 
media "opened new avenues for reaching vast new populations.,,57 After 
the war the man who had run the British government's Press Bureau, Sir 
Edward Cook (himself a distinguished liberal journalist), praised the 
loyalty of the newspapers in co-operating with voluntary censorship. 
Cook believed that "the Press did all that it possibly could, and often 
more than from a strictly journalistic point of view might reasonably 
have been expected, to print everything that the Departments desired to 
impart to the public.,,58 Cook regarded the press as crucial for 
"reinforcing and sustaining" the national impulse towards war. He gave 
as an example the coverage of Lord Kitchener's call to arms and the 
daily accounts of recruiting drives in different localities. "Great 
55 Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op. cit. p 124 
56 Towshend: Easter 1916 op. cit. P 381 
57 Alice Goldfarb: "Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany During the First World 
War" in Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 13, No.3 (July 1978) 
58 Sir Edward Cook: The Press in War-Time (Macmillan and Co., London 1920) p 51 
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influence must be attributed to the forces of suggestion, encouragement 
and rivalry which were thus brought into action and which could not 
have been so powerfully exerted in any other way ... [The newspapers] 
- were avant-couriers of necessary policy.,,59 In Cook's conceit, the press 
was "the reporter-in-chief to the nation, and in that capacity it holds up 
to the rest of the world a mirror of the country's activities, thought 
purposes and moral.,,60 
Cook formed this view of the press as the means by which the nation 
came to know itself at a pivotal moment in the history of journalism in 
Britain and the United States. The early twentieth century was the 
heyday of mass circulation, national newspapers run by financially 
independent proprietors who had emerged in the Victorian era.61 The 
economic pressures faced by the press barons meant that their 
newspapers had to be intensely competitive in pursuit of larger 
circulations. The editorial and technical resources of newspapers 
expanded rapidly with "rising levels of paging, bigger editorial staffs 
and, above all, massive promotion", all a consequence of increased 
investment.62 News coverage was a key measure of editorial advantage 
and reporters were sent out to discover facts that could produce 
commercial retum.63 Editors vied with competitors to publish 
59 Ibid p 4-5 
60 Ibid P 9 
61 See James Curran and Jean Seaton: Power Without Responsibility: The Press and 
Broadcasting in Britain (Routledge, London 1988) p 46-63 and D.G. Boyce: "Crusaders without 
Chains: Power and the Press Barons 1896-1951" in James Curran et al: Impacts and Influences: 
Essays on Media Power in the Twentieth Century (Methuen, London 1987) 
62 Curran and Seaton: Power Without Responsibility op. cit. p 53 
63 Michael Schudson notes that in the United States it was at the tum of the twentieth century that 
"reporters were for the first time actors in the drama of the newspaper world." Michael Schudson: 
Origins of the Ideal of Objectivity in the Professions op. cit. p 162 
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"scoops", or at least ensure that their own paper carried the same stories 
as its rivals. Facts became the currency of success or failure. Jean 
Chalaby has identified the era of the press barons as the moment when 
-news displaced opinion as the main content of newspapers and 
"information became the prime element ... and the main commodity in 
the trade ... Press-owners and editors devoted increasingly important 
resources to collect information from local, national and international 
sources.,,64 The "reporter" emerged as a recognisable figure, forging a 
distinct form of communication that became the news story. Since 
"many editors conferred on foreign news an exceptional importance", 65 
an outstanding performance by the right reporter possessed of flair and 
commitment could make a big story a major money spinner for his 
newspaper. The circulation of the Daily News had trebled on the 
strength of its coverage of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870.66 From 
then until the First World War began "the pUblicity given to politics and 
foreign affairs was increased a thousand times. More people were 
informed, or misinformed, about the Empire and England's relations to 
her neighbours than ever before.,,67 Special correspondents and foreign 
correspondents had come into their own. "Their deeds, their sweeping 
narratives, their bold assumption of policy-making authority and, above 
all, the swiftness of their communications gave them a status that none 
had attained before and few have achieved since.,,68 
64 Jean Chalaby: The Invention of Journalism op.cit. p 79 
65 Ibid P 79 
66 Ibid P 84 
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Diplomacy" op. cit. p 45 
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The exalted position which these correspondents saw themselves 
occupying, and the way in which they were encouraged to cultivate this 
role by their editors, can be deduced from a letter from the managing 
director of The Times, C.P. Moberly Bell, to a war correspondent in 
1894 advising him to adopt a position of restrained detachment towards 
the flow of events. Moberly Bell cautioned that "we are historians, not 
history makers." Around the same time he instructed a newly appointed 
correspondent that his duties were: "1. The transmission of all authentic 
news of importance without regard to any particular view which may be 
entertained by the correspondent personally or any particular policy 
which may be advocated by the paper. 2. The transmission of your own 
appreciation of the situation, well founded and without any personal 
prejudice.,,69 But there was a tension at the heart of this advice which 
would become a persistent complication for the professional self-image 
of many correspondents. On the one hand The Times man was being 
asked to keep his personal views out of his news copy. On the other, he 
was being encouraged to become an authority on his subject, an 
aspiration which would mean that the correspondent's own judgment -
albeit "well founded" - would become a critical ingredient in his 
reporting. As we will see shortly, this tension between the idealised 
freedom of the newspaper correspondent to use his own judgement, and 
the necessity of conforming to editorial direction and the industrial 
discipline of the newspaper, is a recurring theme in the memoirs of 
journalists of this era. The harnessing of the press to the war effort made 
69 Quoted in Robert w. Desmond: The Information Process: World News Reporting to the 
Twentieth Century (University of Iowa Press, 1978) p 325 
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this tension even more acute. Hamilton Fyfe tells of how, after he had 
mentioned some kindly act by German soldiers in his despatches to the 
Daily Mail, he received an admonishing cable from the editor: 
":Nothing wanted', he said, 'about good kind Germans. There are no 
good Germans but dead Germans. ",70 Similarly he accepted that much 
of what he wrote for the paper from Petrograd about the situation in 
Russia was only for Lord Northc1iffe and the cabinet to see: 
"The British nation did not at the time hear anything about the nearness 
of revolution in the autumn of 1915." 71 On his way home he bought 
German newspapers in Stockholm and saw "how they told about us 
exactly the same lying stories that the British and French press were 
telling about them."n 
When the war began, the War Office refused to give official recognition 
to reporters to follow the action on the orders of Lord Kitchener, who 
had hated war correspondents since the Sudan campaign sixteen years 
earlier when he dismissed them as "drunken swabs.,,73 But a group of 
younger correspondents made their way to France and, at the risk of 
arrest and imprisonment, travelled towards the Belgian border. Philip 
Gibbs, a reporter for the Daily Chronicle, went to Paris at the beginning 
of the war but soon decided that he had no hope of getting credentials to 
go to the front. "It was, it seemed, to be a secret war, and the peoples 
who had given their sons and husbands were to know nothing about it, 
70 Hamilton Fyfe: My Seven Selves (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1935) p 193-194 
71 Ibid P 194 
72 Ibid P 213 
73 Philip Knightley: The First Casualty op.cit. p 69 
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except by brief bulletins which tell them nothing or very little.,,74 Gibbs 
and some of the other younger reporters set out on their own, without 
permission, to find out what was happening in the north-east. He 
recounted how many of these impetuous correspondents "were arrested, 
put into prison, caught again in forbidden places, re-arrested and 
expelled from France. That was after fantastic adventures in which they 
saw what war meant in civilized countries; where vast populations were 
made fugitives of fear; where millions of women and children and old 
people became wanderers along the roads in a tide of human 
misery ... ,,75 This rich parade of incident contrasts with Sir Edward 
Cook's avowal that the early part of the war was characterised by 
tedium and that "there was nothing to tell.,,76 
Despite procuring Red Cross credentials in an effort to stay at the front, 
Gibbs ended up being detained for two weeks. He was released after his 
editor in London pulled strings with a minister at the Foreign Office. 
Gibbs thought this had put paid to his career as a war correspondent in 
France. "The game was up I thought. I had committed every crime 
against War Office orders. I should be barred as a war correspondent 
when Kitchener made up his mind to allow them out.,,77 But he was 
wrong. Early in 1915 the British military authorities relented to pressure 
from the cabinet to allow correspondents into the field. The intention 
was to increase the supply of morale-boosting 'news', not to allow a 
74 Philip Gibbs: The Pageant of Years: An Autobiography (William Heinemann, London, 1946) p 
141--142 
75 Philip Gibbs: Realities of War (Hutchinson & Co., London 1929) p 11 
76 Sir Edward Cook: The Press in War-Time op. cit. p 48 
77 Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 162 
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reflective or critical portrait of life and death on the battlefield.78 Gibbs 
was one of five official war correspondents who, kitted out in army 
uniform were provided with a house to work in, daily transport to the 
front, conducting officers and on-the-spot censors.79 The Gibbs who had 
been disdainful of official sanction became a kept man of the high 
command. 
In his memoirs and autobiography published after the war, Gibbs - who 
was knighted for his work as an official correspondent - betrays a sense 
of shame about his submission to the censorship. In Realities of War, 
published in 1929, he writes of an encounter between the correspondents 
and General Haig. The general listened to the journalists' petition to be 
allowed to mention the names of combat units in order to "give honour 
to the troops". Haig appeared sympathetic: "I think I understand fairly 
well what you gentlemen want. You want to get hold of little stories of 
heroism and so- forth to write them up in a bright way to make good 
reading for Mary Ann in the kitchen and the man in the street." But 
Gibbs and his colleagues took umbrage at this "slur" on their profession. 
"We took occasion to point out to him that the British Empire which had 
sent its men into this war yearned to know what they were doing and 
how they were doing and that their patience and loyalty depended upon 
closer knowledge of what was happening ... " At this, Hague relented 
and ordered a relaxation of rules so that men and their units could be 
78 Philip Knightly suggests the Cabinet was swayed by a letter from the former American President 
Theodore Roosevelt saying the only real war news written by Americans was coming from the 
German side and the refusal by British and French censorship was harming their cause in America. 
See Knightley: The First Casualty op. cit. p 79 
79 Gibbs describes the working conditions of the correspondents in Realities of War op. cit. p 15-
26 and 
The Pageant of Years p 163--167 
58 
identified more often in despatches. This achieved, Gibbs appeared 
satisfied: "in later stages of the war I personally had no complaint 
against the censorship and wrote all that was good to write of the actions 
day by day, though I had to leave out something of the underlying 
horror of them all, in spite of my continual emphasis, by temperament 
and by conviction, on the tragedy of all this sacrifice of youth.,,80 [my 
italics] 
This passage is more than a little apologetic about the accommodations 
necessary to continue reporting from France. In his autobiography, The 
Pageant of Years, published in 1946, the question of his co-operation 
with the censorship still bothers him. He explains how he was hurt by a 
passage in Lloyd George's war memoirs stating that "Gibbs lied merrily 
like the rest of them.,,81 This, Gibbs writes indignantly, was "grossly 
untrue" and "very unjust". 82 But Lloyd George knew exactly how 
reticent Gibbs had been in public. In 1917 he wrote to C.P. Scott about a 
dinner he had attended in Gibbs' honour when the correspondent had 
returned from France. Lloyd George described it as "the most 
impressive and moving description of what the war in the West really 
means ... Even an audience of hardened politicians and journalists was 
stronglyaffected.,,83 Despite his protests, Gibbs was aware of what he 
had held back. A few pages after accusing Lloyd George of lying he 
writes of a conversation with his wife, Agnes, while he was home on 
sick leave from France in August 1918. "She hated the despatches of 
80 Gibbs: Realities of War p 27-28 
81 Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 207-208. 
82 Ibid P 208 
83 Alice Goldfarb: "Words as Weapons" op. cit. p 482 
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war correspondents always holding out a hope which was never 
fulfilled, always describing the heroic valour of boys who, of course, 
were sentenced to death. In the end she hated mine, for the same 
reasons and I didn't blame her because that was the truth.,,84 Later in his 
autobiography Gibbs expresses a desire to put things right nearly two 
decades after the end of the war. "We writing men, especially we war 
correspondents, had something to say after our last despatches had been 
written. It was to put in all that the censor or our self-imposed 
censorship, had omitted ... It was our bounden duty to tell the truth, 
however terrible.,,85 
By this stage, of course, telling the terrible truth would not achieve the 
same impact; for a journalist, there must have been a sense of futile 
atonement about disclosing the true face of the war long after his last 
despatches had been written. Gibbs' tone of regret suggests that the 
status of the exalted "special correspondents" was in crisis by the end of 
the First World War. For Gibbs, becoming a war correspondent was 
"the crown of journalistic ambition and the heart of its adventure and 
romance.,,86 Other reporters admired and envied the 'specials'. Gibbs 
describes one of the most famous journalists in Fleet Street at the turn of 
the century, Charlie Hands of the Daily Mail. Hands had made his name 
during the Boer War. "There was something in him, his dead honesty of 
mind, his whimsical humour, his gift for comradeship with all manner of 
men, which made friends for him in many ports and cities ... ,,87 Hands 
84 Ibid p 226 
85 Ibid p 242 
86 Philip Gibbs: Adventures in Journalism (William Heinemann, London 1923) p 179 
87 Ibid P 41 
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had won for himself a measure of freedom from editorial direction 
which was the distinguishing mark of the special correspondent and 
which other reporters craved: "Harmsworth had an affection for him 
and gave him more rope than he would have allowed any other man." s~ 
The notion of the special correspondent as a journalist given more 
licence than others is echoed in another sketch of Hands by Tom Clarke, 
an editor at the Mail. In his memoir of working for Lord Northcliffe, 
Clarke describes how Charlie Hands was "worshipped by the younger 
folk as the greatest of special correspondents of world wide experience 
and reputation ... [he] had won a pedestal for himself which placed him 
well beyond the clatter of the crowd."s9 
Gibbs too had succeeded in rising above the common run of journalists 
but he recognised that such eminence was insecure and that there was a 
fine line between the glamour and freedom of the special correspondent 
and the "clatter of the crowd." His memoirs paint an extraordinarily 
candid portrait of life on Fleet Street - especially frank for a trade and a 
genre given to myth-making. In his autobiography he describes 
journalism as a "bacillus" and compares the lure of Fleet Street to a spell 
which makes the journalist addicted to the illusion that he is a privileged 
observer of the machinery of power. "Away from it he feels exiled and 
outside the arena of life. As a journalist, and especially as a special 
correspondent, he sees behind the scenes of the whirligig and is one of 
its recorders.,,9o He begins one account of his career by warning 
young people that a life in journalism is not "a primrose path" but a job 
88 Ibid 
89 Tom Clarke: My Northcliffe Diary (Victor Gollancz, London 1931) p 42 
90 Philip Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 71 
61 
little different to other kinds of white collar industrial labour. "It is of 
uncertain tenure because no man may hold on to his job if he weakens 
under nervous strain or quarrels on a point of honour with the proprietor 
who pays him or with the editor who sets his task." The young reporter; 
according to Gibbs, is "the Slave of the Machine" and he sets out to 
disabuse his readers of any notions of idealism. "I have known the 
humiliation of journalism, its insecurity, its never-ending tax upon the 
mind and heart, its squalor, its fever, its soul-destroying machinery for 
those who are not proof against its cruelties ... The young reporter has to 
steel his heart against these disappointments. He must not agonize too 
much if, after a day and night of intense and nervous effort, he finds no 
line of his work in the paper, or sees his choicest prose hacked and 
mangled by impatient sub-editors, or his truth-telling twisted into 
falsity.,,91 One of the thrills is to hear the news before it is published, 
another to become close to historic events. On more than one occasion 
he likens journalism to a peep show: in The Pageant of Years he writes 
of how a press credential takes its owner to "the front seats of the peep-
show.,,92 And in Realities of War he describes his daily trips to the 
frontline as an official war correspondent "going to another little peep-
show of war." 
Gibbs was not the only journalist of high reputation to be seduced by the 
illusion of proximity to great events. One of the most famous liberal 
journalists of the era was Henry Wood Nevinson who had managed to 
establish a reputation as a special correspondent independently of the 
91 Gibbs: Adventures in Journalism op. cit. p 1-2 
92 Ibid P 72 
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newspapers which employed him. Gibbs described Nevinson, a veteran 
of crusades and campaigns, as "a hater of war, though a lover of liberty, 
passionate in his championship of the little nations and the underdogs 
everywhere.,,93 Nevinson began his career at the Daily Chronicle 
(Gibbs' paper) and in his memoirs describes how journalism for him 
was a reluctant calling. "Like most people outside the profession 1 
thought of 'mere journalists' with mingled curiosity and contempt. 
Drawing a sharp line, like most people, between 'journalism' and 
'literature' 1 was all on the side of literature. What was worse, like 
most people, 1 regarded a journalist as a man without convictions - a 
conscienceless person who would write equally willingly for any 
opinion or cause, provided he were paid. Like most people, in my 
ignorance 1 did the profession insufferable wrong, but my ignorance was 
profound.,,94 Nevinson, like Gibbs, describes the deepest satisfaction of 
a journalistic career as the opportunity to feel part of history. He reflects 
that he might have been a literary man and confesses admiration and, 
perhaps, a touch of envy for those who spin stories from their 
imagination. But he decides that the price of this more exalted life of 
the mind was an absence of adventure and impoverished experience. "I 
can say: 'I have lived.' 1 have seen much, suffered much, known many 
noble characters, and in the affairs of this actual, though transitory, 
world have been given the opportunity of playing some part.,,95 
During the Boer War Nevinson had remained in Ladysmith during the 
famous siege, enduring daily shelling and watching one of his 
93 Philip Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 94-95 
94 H.W.Nevinson: Changes and Chances (Nisbet & Co., London 1923) p 183 
95 Ibid P 183-184 
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colleagues die of typhoid fever. But just as Gibbs and Clarke describe, 
the machine-like quality of the newspaper organisation could still bear 
down on even the most distinguished special correspondent. Despite his 
heroic and death defying performance in-Ladysmith Nevinson 
discovered at the end of the siege that there was no telegram of 
congratulation, only "sneers, taunts and complaints" from his new 
editor. "I began to realise the distinction between one editor and another 
and to understand that the greatness of a paper depends upon its editor 
alone.,,96 Nevinson contrasts the life of a war correspondent before the 
Great War with the new sense of the value of controlled reportage from 
the frontline in France. During the Boer war "a correspondent with the 
British army had to look after his own supplies and transport and the 
task, as a rule, occupied about half his working time." But as an 
officially accredited correspondent in France fifteen years later "the 
Staff motor appeared at the door exactly at the appointed time; a friendly 
Staff officer accompanied me to whatever part of the line or advance 1 
wished to visit. .. food appeared, falling like manna from heaven without 
any stir; servants appeared when required, like slaves in the 'Arabian 
Nights."m 
Both Nevinson and Gibbs give an important account of what it was to be 
a special correspondent for British newspapers in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century. The tension between a sense of autonomy and 
submission to the controlling hand of the organisation; the sense of 
adventure and participation in key moments of history; the licence with 
96 Ibid P 260--261 
97 Ibid P 229-230 
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language and the sense of having some influence on politics will all 
come into play in the consideration of the work of the correspondents 
sent to Ireland to cover the War of Independence. The upheaval in 
Ireland affected both their careers in different ways. 
Nevinson describes how he first visited Ireland in August 1897 finding 
"an excess of beauty that was overwhelming.,,98 Returning in the spring 
of 1899 to investigate a riot in Co. Cork he began to make connections 
among literary and political circles in Dublin, and then visited Ireland so 
often that it became "hard to avoid confusion of impression if not of 
events.,,99 Seventeen years later Nevinson, now nearing sixty, was 
recovering in the Chiltems from an illness which developed during his 
reporting in the Dardanelles, Salonika and Egypt when he heard the 
news of the Easter Rising. "I could only learn from the papers how the 
Rising was suppressed, and many of my Irish friends were executed, not 
at once in the hot blood of vengeance, but in batches morning after 
morning, the lists being served up to the English breakfast-tables with 
the bacon, eggs and marmalade."lOo Nevinson had met the leaders of the 
Rising; he had visited Patrick Pearse at his school and spoken from the 
same platform as James Connolly. 101 In the months after the rising he 
campaigned unsuccessfully for a reprieve for Sir Roger Casement, the 
former British diplomat and human rights campaigner who was hanged 
in August 1916 for helping to import arms from Germany. 102 In the 
following years Nevinson would be one of the British correspondents 
98 H.W. Nevinson: Changes and Chances op. cit. p 181 
99 Ibid P 206 
100 H.W. Nevinson: Last Changes, Last Chances (Nisbet & Co., London 1928) p 87 
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covering what he called "the Black and Tan terror."I03 
Gibbs resigned from the Daily Chronicle "and the best salary I had ever 
earned in Fleet Street" in 1919 in protest against Lloyd George's policy 
in Ireland. The Chronicle had been bought by a syndicate acting on 
behalf of Lloyd George in 1918. 104 The paper's new Irish policy was to 
support the despatch to Ireland of the gendarmerie known as the Black 
and Tans. Gibbs felt he could no longer work for the Chronicle because 
"it seemed to me shamefuL .. that after a war which was supposed to be 
for liberty and the self-determination of peoples, we should hire a lot of 
young thugs and let them loose upon the Irish.,,105 
There was another dimension of professional shame felt by Gibbs and 
his colleagues which provides a crucial context for understanding the 
coverage of the Irish revolution. The emergence of propaganda as a 
mobilising force during the war and the eagerness with which the press 
had collaborated with the censorship exposed reporters to vilification. 
Norman Angell described the press as "an almost insuperable obstacle to 
the truth becoming known", the very opposite of the myth that 
journalists cherished. 106 This disillusionment was, as we have seen, 
shared by the correspondents themselves. Hamilton Fyfe believed that 
journalists had lost pride in their craft and the failures of the press during 
the war caused it "to be jeered at and distrusted, created around it an 
103 H.W. Nevinson: Changes and Chances p 212 
104 James Curran and Jean Seaton: Power without Responsibility op. cit. p 54 
105 Philip Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 266 
106 Norman Angell: The Press and the Organisation of Society op. cit. p 69 
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atmosphere of suspicion.,,107 The Viennese satirist, Karl Krauss, had 
denounced the newspaper reporters, holding them responsible for the 
"impoverishment of the imagination which makes it possible for us to 
fight a war of annihilation against ourselves ... [they] now implant in us 
the courage in the face of death which we need in order to rush off into 
battle ... [Their] abuse of language embellishes the abuse of life." 1 08 
Krauss's critique finds a curious echo in Gibbs' post-war estimation of 
the correspondent as a conduit for politicians. "It is he who brings them 
alive to the public and takes down the words they speak on great 
occasions - words of wisdom maybe or words of folly, or words of 
doom which pronounce sentence of death on masses of youth who go 
willingly to sacrifice because of their leadership or their lies.,,109 
As we shall see in the following chapters, the correspondents who went 
to Ireland declared repeatedly that their mission was to expose the 
government's lies about the real nature of the campaign to crush the 
rebellion. As Alice Goldfarb has argued, the confluence of news and 
propaganda during the First World War had "permanently debased the 
coinage of public dialogue" but at the same time "disillusionment also 
laid the foundation for a new scepticism ... ,,110 The unity of the political 
elite during the Great War attenuated the range of legitimate dissent: "if 
a large paper went right against the national will .. .it would be 
107 Hamilton Fyffe: Sixty Years of Fleet Street op. cit. p 172 
108 Quoted in Niall Ferguson: Pity of War op. cit. p 240-241 
109 Philip Gibbs: The Pageant of Years op. cit. p 72 
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ruined."]]] But as we shall see, Ireland was different and it gave the 
British press an opportunity to re-vindicate itself. 
J J J Hilaire BelIoc: The Free Press, George Allen & Unwin, London (1918) p 29 
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CHAPTER 2 
Correspondents versus Black and Tans 
In the previous chapter we saw how events in Ireland during the Great 
War led to the ascendancy of the separatist movement and the collapse 
of constitutional nationalism as a political force. The erasure of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party from the political map was all but complete in the 
General Election of December 1918 when Sinn Fein won seventy-three 
seats and the parliamentary party just six: Sinn Fein had campaigned on 
securing recognition for Ireland as an independent republic and the 
election result signified that "the separatist option had ... replaced the 
Home Rule compromise."] In this chapter I will begin to examine how 
British correspondents covered the newly assertive Ireland and the first 
signs of what rapidly became the Irish revolution. The defining moment 
of this new era was the convening of Dail Eireann in Dublin on January 
21,1919. Dail Eireann, a Gaelic term meaning "assembly of Ireland", 
was the fulfilment of a dream of the separatist leader Arthur Griffith 
who argued that instead of taking their seats in Westminster, Sinn Fein 
MPs should gather in Dublin to proclaim their own national parliament 
and behave as if they had the power to legislate for their own nation. I 
will look at how this key event - the opening act of the rebellion which 
followed - was portrayed by newspaper correspondents sent to Dublin 
to cover it. 
The Sinn Fein MPs who assembled in Dublin on January 21, 1919 to 
establish their own Republican parliament instead of taking their seats in 
I R.F. Foster: Modern Ireland op. cit. p 489 
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the House of Commons attracted a great deal of attention from the 
world's press. The Daily News reported that there were fifty British and 
foreign journalists present in the Mansion House for the inaugural 
session.2 This meant that reporters- outnumbered politicians by a ratio of 
two to one, since all but twenty-seven of the seventy-three Sinn Fein 
MPs were interned or imprisoned. The News described the setting for 
this public act of defiance - the Round Room of the Mansion House in 
Dawson Street, the very heart of colonial Dublin - as "a dingily ornate 
pavilion in the Regency style which was built in a hurry for the 
entertainment of King George IV when he visited Dublin in 1821.,,3 
The correspondent for the Manchester Guardian noticed a further irony 
in the timing of the first session of the separatist assembly: through 
"one of those coincidences which only happen in Ireland" soldiers from 
the Dublin Fusiliers, just returned from France, had been lunching in the 
Mansion House just before the historic inauguration of Dail Eireann. 
"As they walked out to the tune of 'God Save the King' , the 
Republicans walked in. ,,4 
The ceremonial opening of a parliament is an event that would usually 
produce an enactment of the press ritual which Philip Elliot has noted is 
a response reserved for "stories which reflect on the stability of the 
social system by showing it under threat, overcoming threat, or working 
in a united consensual way." 5 The treatment of such occasions is 
characterised by "considerable emphasis ... on the symbolic significance 
2 Daily News January 22,1919 pI 
3 Ibid 
4 Manchester Guardian January 22,1919 P 5 
5 Philip Elliott: "Press Performance as a Political Ritual" in Harry Christian (ed): The Sociology of 
Journalism and the Press (Sociological Review Monograph 29, University of Keele, 1980) p 142 
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or interpretation of events.,,6 But the assembly established by Sinn Fein 
in Dublin in 1919 did not provoke a familiar response among the 
correspondents who arrived from London: it perplexed them. Dail 
Eireann may have had the form (and even, to the extent that it was· 
composed of elected representatives chosen in a British General 
Election, the substance) of an event of established symbolic significance 
but its legitimacy was contested: it was not a sanctioned ceremony of the 
kind which would allow the correspondents to reach for their stock 
phrases and pour their prose into the readymade mould demanded of 
time-honoured ritual. Therefore, a tone of incongruity was maintained 
in many of the correspondents' reports. The solemnity of the occasion 
was both underlined and undermined. 
"On the whole it was a very interesting and notable function but one can 
hardly say it was impressive", wrote the Daily Mail correspondent.7 The 
Manchester Guardian was no less begrudging: "[Dail Eireann] 
solemnly proclaimed Ireland's independence, appointed ambassadors to 
the Peace Conference, where they have not yet been bidden, passed an 
address to the free nations of the world and made some pretence of 
framing orders for its domestic procedure. Despite its importance, the 
session was not thrilling."s But The Times was most damning of all. 
"History will probably date the definite decline of the Sinn Fein 
movement from the day when the National Assembly was opened in 
Dublin ... One may say indeed that the whole of Ireland has a new 
6 Ibid 
7 Daily Mail January 22, 1919 P 5 
8 Manchester Guardian January 22, 1919 P 5 
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consciousness today of the utter barrenness of a policy which won 
nearly half a million votes at the General Election." 9 
A persistent theme was the incomprehension displayed by the MPs and 
the public as they were addressed from the platform in Gaelic. The 
Daily Mail correspondent noted that the Irish language was delivered by 
the speakers "with varying degrees of fluency and the audience, at least 
those near me, understood with even wider variations of 
comprehension."l0 And the Guardian correspondent thought it wise to 
sketch in the anthropological background to explain the significance of 
the use of a foreign tongue: "The Irish patriot suffers one galling 
disadvantage: that is an ignorance of his native tongue. Off the shores 
of the Atlantic, not one in a hundred can do more than pass the time of 
day in Gaelic ... But however convenient it would, of course, have 
gravely offended the national spirit to carry on the debates of the 
national assembly in the language of the Sassenach, and the result was a 
self-denying ordinance which kept some of the members quite silent and 
even reduced others to mere French."}} 
The document promulgated by Dail Eireann that day was the 
Declaration of Independence in which the MPs declared "foreign 
government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we 
will never tolerate" and demanded "the evacuation of our country by the 
English Garrison." But this foundation text for a new Irish Republic 
also acknowledged the context of the First World War: "We claim for 
9 The Times January 23, 1919 P 11 
10 Daily Mail January 22, 1919 P 5 
11 Manchester Guardian January 22,1919 P 5 
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our national independence the recognition and support of every free 
nation in the world, and we proclaim that independence to be a condition 
precedent to international peace thereafter.,,12 This attempt to link the 
cause of Irish nationhood to the sweeping redrawing of the map of 
Europe was even more overtly stated in an accompanying "Message to 
the Free Nations of the World". This statement laid claim to special 
status for Ireland in international relations: 
Internationally Ireland is the gateway of the Atlantic. Ireland is the last outpost of Europe towards the 
West: Ireland is the point upon which great trade routes between East and West converge: her 
independence is demanded by the Freedom of the Seas: her great harbours must be open to all 
nations, instead of being the monopoly of England. 
Specifically, there was an attempt to join Ireland's case to President 
Wilson's espousal of self-determination as an end in itself: 
Ireland to-day reasserts her historic nationhood the more confidently before the new world emerging 
from the War, because she believes in freedom and justice as the fundamental principles of 
international law, because she believes in a frank co-operation between the peoples for equal rights 
against the vested privileges of ancient tyrannies, because the permanent peace of Europe can never 
be secured by perpetuating military dominion for the profit of empire but only by establishing the 
control of government in every land upon the basis of the free will of a free people ... 13 
Such rhetorical grandeur cut little ice with the British correspondents in 
Dublin; the tone of many of their despatches was sarcastic or whimsical. 
The general conclusion was that the whole exercise was futile. Thus the 
Daily Mail reported that the gathering in the Mansion House could 
easily be mistaken for "a meeting to found a new musical society or 
12 Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan 0' Halpin (eds): Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy Volume 1, 1919-1922 Royal Irish Academy (Dublin) 1998 pI 
13 Ibid P 2 
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something of that kind.,,14 This analogy was an echo of a phrase which 
appeared in the Guardian's preview of the occasion: officials from the 
Irish administration regarded Dail Eireann as a "debating society" 
reported the Guardian. There was no- question of preventing -the meeting 
from going ahead because the assembly would be sure to turn out to be 
"a tame business.,,15 At this stage, the officials in Dublin Castle were 
taking the optimistic view that Sinn Fein's act of defiance was so much 
bluster and that the dramatic pageantry of Dail Eireann would fade into 
inconsequence if ignored. Shortly before the ceremony in the Mansion 
House, the Viceroy of Ireland, Lord French, had expressed just such a 
view to the cabinet in London. Lord French wrote with some assurance 
that "the end of it will be that these seventy-three devils will very soon 
go bag and baggage over to Westminster.,,16 Clearly the similarity 
between this official view and the interpretations of the correspondents 
visiting Dublin demonstrated that they were responding to the lead given 
to them by Dublin Castle. Two days after Dail Eireann' s inaugural 
session, The Times correspondent in Dublin declared that "the Irish 
Government's decision to tolerate the assembly is shown to have been 
wise.,,17 
The optimism among officials in the Castle that the new generation of 
Irish nationalists could be contained and controlled is reflected in 
another theme running through the despatches from Dublin after Sinn 
Fein's landslide election victory. The correspondents stressed that Sinn 
J 4 Daily Mail January 22, 1919 P 5 
15 Manchester Guardian January 21,1919 P 5 
16 Lord French to Walter Long, January 12,1919 quoted in Eunan 0' Halpin: The Decline of the 
Union: British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1987) p 180 
17 The Times January 23, 1919 p 11 
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Fein's success would expose its leaders to moderating influences. The 
Times reported in early January that the more moderate Sinn Fein 
leaders "appear to be anxious to do nothing which might alienate 
middle-class opinion in the United States.,,18 Around the same time the 
Manchester Guardian reported that responsibility had sobered Sinn Fein 
leaders and led them to revise their timetable for delivering Irish 
independence: "years" could elapse before the Republic arrived and in 
the meantime the masses had to be educated. "From playing the 
conqueror, Sinn Fein must undertake the part of missionary and not until 
the unity of the faith is established may we expect the fulfilment of the 
promises of the days of conflict.,,19 Similarly the Daily Mail 
correspondent in Dublin reckoned that Sinn Fein leaders realised "that 
having captured the great bulk of the emotional voters, it is now 
necessary to make a favourable impression on the substantial business 
class.,,2o 
The emphasis in many despatches on the possibility of Sinn Fein leaders 
eventually doing business with the government was not far off how the 
cabinet in London and the Irish Administration in Dublin hoped that 
things would tum out. With the Irish question no longer overtly divisive 
at Westminster, "bipartisanship, supported by military force was (it was 
hoped) a means of bringing nationalist Ireland to accept the reality of 
Home Rule as defined by the British.,,21 At a cabinet meeting in 
February, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, Ian Macpherson, argued 
18 The Times January 8,1919 
19 Manchester Guardian January 6, 1919 P 4 
20 Daily Mail January 20, 1919 P 3 
21 D.G. Boyce: The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1996 (Macmillan, London, 1996) p 
67 
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in favour of releasing Irish political prisoners using precisely the same 
analysis of Sinn Fein as was appearing in the press. Macpherson 
confided to his colleagues that he had been in touch with some Sinn Fein 
repr-esentatives and knew that "certain leaders, if released, would be 
valuable to the Government of Ireland and would prove a moderating 
influence" because they were "terrified of the responsibility their 
colleagues were taking and were very anxious to rescind from it.,,22 
But this apparent confidence co-existed in the official mind with an 
unfocused anxiety that events in Ireland might take a different course - a 
lurch towards revolution rather than accommodation. This strain of 
anxiety is also reflected in the correspondents' interpretations of 
developments in Ireland. When McPherson referred to the terrifying 
responsibility which the elected Sinn Feiners had taken on he was 
identifying the possibility that a movement dedicated to overthrowing 
the existing constitutional order might eventually be outflanked by its 
violent wing, the Irish Volunteers. By 1919 the Volunteers - a minority 
of whom had led the Easter Rising in 1916 - were "independent, 
organised and determined".23 The government was aware of the threat 
they posed, Lord French advising the cabinet that the Volunteers were 
"a Republican secret society in the worst and most dangerous sense.,,24 
Just as Lord French could be both optimistic that Sinn Fein's star would 
fizzle out and at the same time fearful of a full scale insurrection, the 
reports in the London press betrayed a vague concern about an 
22 Quoted in 0' Halpin: Decline of the Union op. cit. p 187 
23 Charles Townshend: The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921 (Oxford University Press, 
1975) . P 14 
24 Ibid 
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unpredictable tum of events. Thus, just before the first meeting of the 
Dail, the Manchester Guardian's correspondent reckoned that if words 
and resolutions did not bring an independent Republic any nearer "the 
danger will again arise that the activists who are prepared to stake 
all ... to realise their ideals, will again offer a sacrifice to their cause.,,25 
After the Mansion House gathering the Guardian correspondent again 
warned of dangers lurking in the background. "There must come a time 
when the National Assembly will get tired of twiddling its thumbs at the 
Mansion House. Unless it is to be dismissed as a mere pantomime, it 
will have to do something sooner or later, and, circumscribed as it is, 
any action would seem to imply violence.,,26 Similarly, The Times 
adverted to "darker forces" behind the idealists of the national assembly 
which were "quite prepared to sweep it out of existence when the time 
comes.',27 And paradoxically, after finding much to mock in the 
inaugural meeting of the Dail, the Mail worried that "the Irishman's 
proverbial fear of ridicule" might provoke the separatists to more 
extreme measures.28 
Most of the correspondents were unable to provide readers with any 
informed explanation of the relationship between the idealists in Dail 
Eireann and the "darker forces" readying themselves to come out of the 
shadows. However, one of the reporters who early on showed some 
inclination to delve deeper was Hugh Martin, a correspondent for Daily 
News. After the Sinn Fein election victory many of the papers published 
25 Manchester Guardian January 6,1919 P 4 
26 Manchester Guardian January 23, 1919 
27 The Times January 23, 1919 
28 Daily Mail January 23,1919 
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articles assessing the state of Ireland but Martin was the only 
correspondent to distinguish between Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, the conspiratorial group behind the rebellion in 1916. 
- Before Dail Eireann convened Martin went to the west of Ireland to try 
to find out what was meant by those in Dublin who lamented that "the 
provinces are getting out of hand." In a despatch on January 16 he set 
out to explain the history of support for political violence in rural areas. 
The left wing of the Sinn Fein movement, he wrote, was threatening to 
take charge of affairs through the violent methods used by the Fenians in 
the rebellion of 1867. "Fenianism has never died out in Connaught. 
Down here, the physical force men, few in numbers but resolute in 
temper and supremely contemptuous of the main body with its 'moral 
force' programme, still press their secret doctrine as they have been 
preaching it this fifty years. They are never in the ascendant except at 
times of extraordinary national emotion. Such a time, it is only too 
plain, we are rapidly approaching now.,,29 
Less than a week later, on the same day that Dail Eireann met in Dublin, 
two police constables were shot dead in an ambush in Co. Tipperary. 
This incident is now regarded as the beginning of the Anglo-Irish war.30 
The policemen were transporting gelignite by horse and cart from 
Soloheadbeg quarry in Co. Tipperary when they were set upon in mid 
afternoon. A council employee accompanying them gave evidence that 
the masked men had shouted "Hands up!" before shooting the constables 
29 Daily News January 16, 1919 P 5 
30 F.S.L. Lyons Ireland Since the Famine op.cit. p 408-409 
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and then making off with their rifles and the gelignite.31 Generally, the 
British press separated their accounts of the ambush from the reports on 
the meeting of Dail Eireann. The Manchester Guardian reported on 
January 24 that the Sinn Fein leaders in Dublin were shocked by the 
murders in Tipperary. "They do not talk freely to the English journalists 
but English people will misunderstand the situation entirely if they think 
that these casual and cold blooded murders form any part of the official 
Sinn Fein policy. On the contrary, they are utterly repudiated and 
detested in Harcourt Street [the Sinn Fein headquarters]. ,,32 For the 
Guardian correspondent the evidence suggested the killings in 
Tipperary appeared to be a private act of assassination. But even so he 
concluded that "all the same, with a so-called central authority which 
has repudiated all the laws of the realm, and which inferentially has 
invited nearly half a million electors who called it into being to defy the 
existing order by every means in their power, it might easily assume the 
form of an epidemic ... " Once again it was Hugh Martin who was able to 
point up a larger significance for the ruthless attack on the police 
constables. 
The day after the incident Martin described the police murders as the 
only clue to the possible future direction of events. "They show what 
has been so clearly evident all along: that a central gathering of well 
meaning idealists such as the 'Dail Eireann' is utterly unable to control 
31 Daily News January 22 and January 23 1919 P 5 & P 3; Daily Mail January 22 and January 23 
1919 p5&p5 
32 Manchester Guardian January 23,1919 P 6. In a book published more than twenty years later, 
Desmond Ryan, a journalist sympathetic to Sinn Fein bore out the Guardian's insight: "Even the 
Dublin volunteers, that is to say the more militant section ... criticised Soloheadbeg sharply ... they 
believed the capture of arms and gelignite could have been made without loss of life ... " Desmond 
Ryan: Sean Treacy and the Third Tipperary Brigade IRA (Anvil Books, Tralee 1945) p 59 
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the physical-force men in the provinces. These men, as I wrote recently 
from Sligo, hold Dublin meetings of mere talkers about moral force in 
the utmost contempt. It is probably not too much to say that the 
coincidence of the murders with the opening of the assembly was no 
mere accident, but a message deliberately sent...to the 'talking shop' in 
the capital. The secret movement in Ireland is forever working below 
the surface of the open movement, striving to control it and force its 
hand. Dail Eireann, formidable as its organisation of passive resistance 
may possibly prove, is less important than it looks. It has the 
appearance of power while the reality lies in the hands of men who hold, 
in spirit of all past experience, that the salvation of Ireland is to be found 
in gelignite and revolvers.,,33 Gradually, over the next six months, Hugh 
Martin's view that the real power was in the hands of the gunmen gained 
credence in other British press reports. It was represented as a relentless 
and disturbing threat to peace, though at the same time its agents 
remained shadowy and nameless; in most reports the origins of the 
violence were rarely subjected to scrutiny. The perception that order 
was breaking down was based on a series of incidents around the 
country and a sense of unease among the correspondents' informants in 
Dublin. In early May the Daily Mail, in an article about the anger 
provoked in loyalist circles by the arrival of an Irish American 
delegation, referred to "the flood of sedition and disloyalty inundating 
the country.,,34 The previous day The Morning Post reported the 
discovery of 260 bombs buried beneath the kitchen floor of a house in 
33 Daily News January 24,1919 
34 Daily Mail May 7, 1919 p6 
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Cork.35 On May 12, the Post2 the Mail and the Daily News all carried a 
report of a raid by seventy to eighty masked men on Ballyedmond 
Castle in Co. Down, the residence of a former officer in the Ulster 
Volunteer Force. TheMail reported that the raiders "bound and gagged 
all belated wayfarers they met near the castle, to which they drove up in 
motor cars ... ,,36 It was "beyond doubt", the Morning Post correspondent 
reported from Belfast, that the raiders had come from the south marking 
" ... the first time Sinn Feiners outside Ulster have invaded the province 
for their nefarious work. ,,37 The Chief Secretary himself told the House 
of Commons a little more than a week later that although Ireland was 
more prosperous than any other country in the world revolutionary acts 
were growing steadily in force?8 
It is from about this time - the summer of 1919 - that one can detect a 
growing impatience among the correspondents with the ineffectuality of 
Irish policy and a steady drift towards a more adversarial framing of 
events. Partly this is expressed as exasperation with the frequency of 
violent incidents and the breakdown of order (not surprisingly, a tone 
particularly noticeable in the unionist Morning Post). But there was also 
a growing sense that an opportunity for a settlement had been 
squandered, that the violence was a consequence of the British 
government not taking Ireland and Sinn Fein seriously. Consumed by 
the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George regarded 
Ireland as a low priority and "for most of 1919 [the cabinet] showed no 
35 The Morning Post May 6, 1919 P 7 
36 Daily Mail May 12, 1919 
37 The Morning Post May 13, 1919 P 7 
38 Daily News May 15, 1919 P 2 
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interest in getting to grips with the problem.,,39 Left to his own devices 
in Dublin, the Irish Secretary, Ian Macpherson, was allowed to translate 
this inertia into a policy of refusing to engage with Sinn Fein and an 
indiscriminate determination to repress "disorder". This negative 
policy increasingly became a target for criticism by the correspondents 
in Ireland. At the end of May Daily News published a long article by 
Robert Lynd about his recent visit to Ireland. Lynd was the paper's 
assistant literary editor, a Belfast Presbyterian who had become a 
nationalist and was already the author of a pamphlet, "The Ethics of 
Sinn Fein".40 He noticed that in some Dublin shops rosary beads were 
on sale stained in the Sinn Fein colours: orange, white and green. He 
wrote of meeting a journalist who had come to Ireland "to see the marks 
of the iron heel." Lynd's own conclusion was that there was "no 
denying that the military occupation of the country is more thorough and 
more threatening than it has ever been in history ... The huge policeman 
that you see walking in the streets of Dublin with a revolver in his belt is 
but an image of what is now being offered to Ireland as a substitute for 
freedom." But Lynd reported that Sinn Feiners were phlegmatic about 
coercion. "They have a theory that whatever happens cannot but end in 
favour of Ireland. They seem to have a paradoxical belief that England 
cannot injure them without terribly injuring herself. They do not believe 
they could defeat the armed forces that might be sent against them but 
they believe that they could defeat the purpose of those who make use of 
the armed forces." 41 
39 0 , Halpin op. cit. p 191 
40 Laffan: The Resurrection of Ireland op. cit. p 218 
41 Daily News May 30, 1919 P 4 
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One way to defeat the purpose of the British government was to subvert 
the normal attitudes of the community to violence. On Sunday 
September 7th a party of soldiers from the Shropshire Light Infantry 
regiment were on their way to a Wesleyan church in Fermoy, Co. Cork, 
carrying rifles without ammunition. As they approached the church they 
were attacked by a group of armed men who had driven up in cars. One 
soldier was shot dead, another seriously wounded. The assailants 
gathered up the soldiers' rifles and made off.42 As they sped along the 
roads outside Fermoy, trees were felled by sympathetic local people to 
hinder pursuit by the police and military.43 At the inquest into the death 
of the soldier killed in the raid the jury refused to describe his death as 
murder; the foreman of the jury said it was their opinion "that these men 
came for the purpose of getting rifles, and had no intention of killing 
anybody.,,44 A few hours after this verdict some two hundred soldiers 
from the Shropshire Light Infantry and the Royal Field Artillery 
regiments took to the streets of Fermoy smashing shops and houses in 
the town square and two of its main streets. The jewellery shop owned 
by the foreman of the inquest jury was destroyed.45 Led by an officer in 
mufti blowing a whistle they looted drapery stores and shoe shops; 
" ... soldiers were seen marching back to barracks swinging boots and 
shoes in their hands.,,46 The troops were followed by a band of women 
42 The Morning Post September 8, 1919 P 8; Daily News September 8, 1919 P 1 
43 The Morning Post September 9, 1919 p7 
44 The Times September 9, 1919 p 12 
45 Daily Mail September 10,1919 p 5; Daily News September 10, 1919 P 5; The Times September 
10,1919 P 10 
46 Daily News September 10, 1919 P 5 
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who took some of the loot themselves.47 It was the first military reprisal 
noted in the British press. 
In an editorial the Manchester Guardian described the military riot as "a 
very ugly incident, explained, but not at all excused, by the fact that it 
appears to have been begun as an act of retaliation." It suggested that 
there was no reason to suppose that acts of violence such as the attack 
on the soldiers outside the church were approved by the leaders of Sinn 
Fein. "It is bad enough that these acts of violence should be committed 
by ignorant and exasperated peasants but it is far worse when the forces 
which are there to represent law and order begin to take a hand in the 
game. Violence of course tends to breed violence and the whole 
wretched business goes to show how essential it is that wise and 
courageous statesmanship should step in to put an end alike to the cause 
and to the consequences of disaffection.,,48 The editor of The Times, 
Henry Wickham Steed, had already described the cabinet's Irish policy 
as "hopeless,,49; now the paper reacted to events at Fermoy with a 
combination of repulsion and anger. Although suggesting that the 
inquest jury had been intimidated into returning its hostile verdict, an 
editorial condemned the soldiers' riot, believing it would "increase the 
feeling of disgust with which all classes here have read the recent news 
from Ireland." The Times despaired of the government's policy: "Are 
we never to get farther in Ireland than a state of deadlock, in which 
government negation of all policy is based upon existing disorder, and 
47 The Times, The Morning Post, Daily News September 10,1919 
48 Manchester Guardian September 10, 1919 P 4 
49 Quoted in D.W. Hayward: The British Press and Anglo-American Relations With Particular 
Reference to The Irish Question 1916-1922 (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Manchester 
1960) p 163 
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that disorder - growing by the day - can be used to justify inaction and 
to relegate policy to a future always more remote.,,50 
The early months of 1920 in Ireland saw a significant escalation in 
attacks by the Volunteers on the Royal Irish Constabulary. The strategy 
was to drive the police out of their isolated rural barracks, capture 
weapons and stretch their resources to breaking point. In the capital a 
special group of agents recruited by Michael Collins had begun 
systematically assassinating detectives of the Dublin Metropolitan 
Police whose job was to collect political intelligence.51 The Irish police 
- established in the mid nineteenth century as a semi-militarised force to 
head off insurrection - were the most visible face of the Crown in 
Ireland but their role was ambiguous: they were at once "a foreign 
importation" 52 and, at the same time, a force made up overwhelmingly 
of Catholic Irishmen.53 Thus, the humiliating epitaph of "traitors" and a 
policy of cajoling neighbourly rejection of local police officers enabled 
the eventual military assault to be all the more effective. Over time the 
effort to soften up the RIC by turning it into a pariah force proved highly 
effective. After the Easter Rebellion in 1916 a police inspector in one 
county observed that it took nearly six months for people to become less 
friendly towards the local police; in another few months they were 
regarded as enemies. 54 This collective froideur would fatally 
50 The Times September 10, 1919 P 11 
51 F.S.L. Lyons: Ireland Since the Famine op.cit. p. 411-413 
52 Charles Townshend: Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) p 67 
53 Charles Townshend: "Policing Insurgency in Ireland" in David M. Anderson and David 
Killingray (eds): Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police 1917-65 
(Manchester University Press, 1992) p 25 
54 David Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life op. cit P 8 
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compromise the RIC's crucial function as an intelligence service for 
Dublin Castle, a role which required a village police constable to 
possess skills of "observation of human character no less exact than that 
expected of a novelist.,,55 
By 1920 the more daring and better organised of the Volunteer units, 
now equipped with their captured armoury, were prepared to undertake 
operations that struck at the heart of British authority in Ireland. 
Eighteen police officers were killed during the last eight months of 
1919. During the following twelve months 176 officers were killed and 
another 251 wounded.56 The writer, Darrell Figgis, himself a Sinn 
Feiner, recalled that wherever one travelled in Ireland after Easter 1920 
one saw the roofless walls of burned out police stations, sandbags still 
piled in the windows.57 In August a military intelligence officer wrote to 
his superiors that "Anyone passing a police barrack with its locked doors 
and seeing the constables looking out through barred windows will at 
once realise that no body of men could preserve its morale under such 
conditions.,,58 The separatists matched their military achievements with 
political success, winning municipal elections and setting up their own 
courts to bypass the official magistrates who dispensed local justice. 
They also managed to establish harmonious co-ordination between the 
politicians in Dail Eireann, a labour movement that was broadly 
sympathetic to nationalism, and the Volunteers who held the guns. In 
summary, the movement had turned into "a classic prototype of guerrilla 
55 Ibid P 4 
56 Ibid pA12, 417 
57 Darell Figgis: Recollections of the Irish War (Ernest Benn, London 1927) p 282 
58 Townshend: "Policing Insurgency in Ireland" op. cit. p 36 
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action across the whole face of society."s9 Significantly, it was in 1920 
that the Irish Volunteers adopted the title Irish Republican Army.60 
Yet however much the rebels defined the intensifying campaign as a 
war, the British government refused to do so. At a meeting with his Irish 
officials in Downing Street at the end of April 1920 Lloyd George 
declared that the rebellion in Ireland had to be crushed whatever the 
cost. "If there were a truce", he said "it would be an admission that we 
were beaten and it might lead to our having to give up Ireland." The 
Viceroy, Lord French, asked the prime minister if he would go so far as 
to declare war and Lloyd George replied: "You do not declare war 
against rebels.,,61 Practically, this meant the government relied on the 
increasingly demoralised police force to fight the guerrillas. When more 
and more policemen buckled under the strain and resigned, the 
government came up with the idea of reinforcing the Royal Irish 
Constabulary by recruiting an "emergency gendarmerie" in Britain 
which would become a branch of the RIC.62 These two paramilitary 
divisions came to be known as the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries.63 
Part of the rationale for introducing English recruits with hardly any 
experience of Ireland was an attempt to supersede the vulnerability of 
the Catholic and Irish constables to pressure from their neighbours. 
Foreigners would also have fewer constraints about being ruthless. The 
59 Charles Townshend: The British Campaign in Ireland op. cit. p.59 
60 Ibid p.60 
61 Notes of a conversation at Downing Street, April 30, 1920, CAB 23/21162 
62 See conclusions of conference at Downing Street, May 11, 1920 CAB 23/211141 
63 R.F. Foster: Modern Ireland op.cit. p.497-498. A lack of police uniforms forced the new 
recruits to combine the black RIC jackets with khaki - hence the nickname "Black and Tans" after a 
famous hunt in the south of Ireland. 
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Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries represented "a 'stiffening' element 
which implied that the reliability of the main body of the force was on a 
par with other colonial police forces.,,64 Winston Churchill tried to 
suggest that the new recruits were an elite, declaring that they had been 
chosen "from a great press of applicants on account of their intelligence, 
their character, and their records in the war.,,65 But a historian has more 
dispassionately described them as "for the most part young men who 
found it hard to settle down after the war, who had become used to a 
career of adventure and bloodshed, and who were prepared to try their 
luck in a new sphere for ten shillings a day all found.,,66 By the time 
these recruits had arrived in numbers by the middle of 1920, the 
republican forces " ... held the initiative at many levels across most of 
Ireland and the King's writ had ceased to run ... British authority, as 
distinct from mere power, was broken and ... any future British policy in 
Ireland could only be implemented by coercion.,,67 The only question 
was what form that coercion would take. With the British government 
reluctant to accept that a state of war existed and declare martial law 
across Ireland, it was left to the RIC and the new gendarmerie to 
respond to the furtive, unexpected attacks by the guerrillas with their 
own brand of terror. 
Despite all the signs of declining morale the RIC maintained its 
discipline during the early stages of the guerrilla campaign. For 
instance, Robert Kee points out that although fourteen policemen were 
64 Townshend: "Policing Insurgency in Ireland" op cit p 26 
65 Quoted in Richard Bennett: The Black and Tans (Barnes and Noble, New York, 1995 edition) p 
37 
66 Lyons op. cit p. 415 
67 Townshend op. cit. p. 69 
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killed between December 1918 and January 1920 there had been no 
retaliation by officers who, given an intense professional solidarity made 
all the more powerful by being subject to a widespread social boycott, 
were painfully aware of the sufferings of their colleagues.68 Despite one 
isolated riot by police after the shooting of a constable in Thurles, Co. 
Tipperary69, the telling symptoms of the corrosive effect of attacks and 
intimidation were increased resignations and a growing difficulty in 
finding new recruits.7o The Thurles riot might have remained an isolated 
case but for the arrival of ex-servicemen from England. Contrary to 
Winston Churchill's rosy appraisal of their competence, the former 
veterans had little training and many of them had been unemployed 
since the end of the First World War: "Their only service experience 
had been in trench warfare which had a brutalising rather than ennobling 
effect. .. ,,71 They had no experience of Ireland or the day to day routine 
of a rural barracks and the constant engagement with local communities 
that was the main task of policemen trying to keep the peace. "Plunged 
into the boredom of rains wept rural Ireland, and frustrated by the 
harassing operations of a near-invisible opponent, too many of them 
took refuge in drink."n Within months the higher ranks of the RIC 
were despairing of their effect on discipline; one officer tactfully 
reported that "the character of the force is changing a good deal" under 
the influence of the ex-servicemen. And long after the war was over 
68 Robert Kee: The Green Flag: A History ofIrish Nationalism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 1972) p 667 
69 Kee op. cit. p 667 
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other RIC veterans recalled the Black and Tans as "all English and 
Scotch people ... very rough, f-ing and blinding and boozing and all.',73 
There is some evidence that the Black and Tans were equally at odds 
with the civilian Unionist population they were meant to defend from 
Sinn Fein. The writer Brian Inglis, in his memoir of a Protestant 
upbringing, describes how his grandmother's distrust of the Black and 
Tans was greater than her distaste for Sinn Fein. "This dislike had been 
shared by many of her unionist apolitical friends. At least with the 
rebels, their argument ran, you had known where you stood, whereas the 
Black and Tans, recruited by dubious methods - the riff raff of 
demobilised regiments, the sweepings of British jails - did not know a 
Unionist from a Republican and hardly bothered to make the 
distinction." 74 
The conflict in Ireland developed in 1920 into a pattern of tit for tat 
violence between the newly assertive volunteers and the more fiercely 
combative and militaristic police force. "Spontaneous outbreaks of 
rioting and vandalism by policemen or soldiers gradually gave way to a 
more deliberate and habitual use of arson ... Reprisals mushroomed as 
the guerrilla war escalated through the summer of 1920.,,75 Through the 
work of the correspondents of the main London papers this vicious cycle 
of violence did not escape the notice of the British public. "From March 
1920 routine killings of both Crown servants and - by one party or 
73 Quoted in Peter Hart: The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-
1923 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p 82 
74 Brian Inglis: West Briton (Faber and Faber, London 1962) p 31.1t is noteworthy that Inglis uses 
classic Sinn Fein terminology - "the sweepings of British jails" - to present the views of his family's 
Protestant friends. 
75 Hart op cit p 80 
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another - ordinary citizens began to appear in the newspapers with a 
monotony which was soon to dull the senses.,,76 Coverage of this 
unacknowledged war of reprisals was marked by a profound shift in how 
the story of the troubles in England was framed by the British 
correspondents. The main threads of explanation up to then - despair 
over disorder, optimism about the possibility that some compromise 
could be reached by reasonable men on both sides and a desire of the 
reform of the Irish administration - were all distilled to a question of the 
legitimacy of the British government's methods in Ireland. Some 
historians who have acknowledged this critical coverage seem to believe 
it only began in response to particularly egregious acts of reprisal or 
after a prolonged series of incidents. Thus, Jon Laurence, writing about 
Ireland in the context of general perceptions of brutalisation after the 
Great War, asserts that "The war in Ireland made little impact on the 
British public until September 1920, when a series of high profile 
reprisals by government forces received extensive coverage in the 
British press.,,77 And Peter Clarke devotes much attention to J.L. 
Hammond's work for the Nation in 1921, referring to "his passionate 
exposure of British police".78 But the evidence I have amassed here 
shows steadily growing disillusionment in British press coverage of 
Ireland that predated the arrival of the Black and Tans and was not 
confined to just a few reporters. It is true that, as Laurence points out, 
coverage of the reprisals starts to make a greater impact in the autumn of 
76 Kee op cit p 668 
77 Jon Laurence: "Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-
First World War Britain" in Journal of Modern History 75 (September 2003) p 577 . 
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1920 but, as we have seen earlier, British correspondents were writing 
about the behaviour of the security forces well before then.79 
A useful starting point for tracing this process is the work of Hugh 
Martin of the Daily News. Although well disposed towards Sinn 
Feiners in 1919 he was convinced that there was "every reason to 
believe that [they] would jump at the chance of helping to work a sound 
measure of Home Rule within the Empire."so By late 1920 he had 
begun to see the Black and Tans as the enemies of moderation. He 
travelled the country to report on atrocities, filling his reports with 
testimony from local people and rarely mentioning the official versions. 
The Irish-American journalist, Francis Hackett - whose work we will 
look at more closely in a later chapter - observed Martin in the summer 
of 1920 interviewing the Mayor of Limerick (who was later shot in his 
bed). Hackett found Martin's forensic questioning "rather trying", 
describing him as "a neat, precise, slender man in black and white with 
good small features but the severity of a moral accountant. His 
profession has taught him the need of cautiousness, but his cautiousness 
implied mistrust, a sort of high Liberal mistrust of the well meaning but 
impulsive natures with which he had to deal."Sl General Sir Nevil 
Macready, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Ireland, wrote 
to Martin's editor complaining that he seemed "determined to get only 
79 Laurence does acknowledge that there were "many incidents of reprisal before Balbriggan hit the 
news." "Forging a Peaceable Kingdom" op. cit. p 577, n. 92. 
80 Daily News January 16, 1919 
81 Francis Hackett: "The Price of Being Irish", The New Republic, March 23,1921, P 94. Hackett 
reported that after Martin left, the Mayor's wife declared that "he's a nice man and you can trust him 
but he's an English Liberal and he won't face the truth." 
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one side of the story.,,82 Martin's work was influential among his 
colleagues and frequently cited in the House of Commons by critics of 
the government's Irish policy - as we will see in the next chapter. 
Arriving in Dublin for a lengthy reporting tour, Martin often took his 
cue from what was appearing in the Irish press to travel to the scene of 
the latest atrocities. This must have alarmed the authorities, for at the 
beginning of 1919 the Irish censor, Lord Decies had advised his 
colleagues that "practically every provincial correspondent for the 
Dublin newspapers is a Sinn Feiner" and that all of them were disposed 
to write up any incident of military discipline in the most unfavourable 
terms possible. "This pollution of news sources will be a lasting 
trouble", Decies warned prophetic all y. 83 
In October 1920 Martin went to investigate shootings in villages in Co. 
Tipperary where two young members of the IRA had been shot dead 
after being dragged from their beds. Witnesses he interviewed 
corroborate each other's description of the assailants. 
One who acted as an officer wore a cap and had a khaki coloured muffler tied round the lower part of 
his face. The others were dressed in long coats similar to those worn by the police, and soft hats. 
They had on "white masks and handkerchiefs fastened so as to conceal every feature but the eyes." 84 
Martin's reporting became heavily sarcastic about the official line. He 
challenged the government in London, frequently addressing himself 
directly to the Irish Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood. A report by 
82 Macready quoted by Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary for Ireland in the House of Commons, 
November 4, 1920; Hansard Fifth Series, Vol 134 Col 720 
83 Lord Decies: Report on censorship for December 1918, CO 904/167/370-371 
84 Daily News October 28, 1920 p.3 
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Martin on a series of floggings of local people in Galway by the security 
forces began with an ironic prologue. 
By the usual methods of beleaguered governments, whether in Ireland or in Russia, a fairly complete 
and accurate list of active revolutionaries has been secured. With this as a chart, the police 
methodically set to work, more than a month ago, not as Sir Hamar Greenwood puts it, to prevent and 
detect crime and to arrest the criminal, but to strike terror with so savage a hand into the heart of the 
whole community as to force it to evacuate, so to speak, its "bad men." ... Part of my time has been 
occupied with interviewing the young men whom the police have been whipping, kicking and 
otherwise instructing in the elements of British citizenship ... 85 
Back in Dublin three days later Martin left his hotel to investigate a 
police raid in the street outside, and was threatened by an Auxiliary 
cadet with a revolver. 86 In early November he went to Tralee in Co. 
Kerry where the police were terrorising the townspeople after two 
officers were kidnapped by the rebels. A notice pinned to the wall 
threatened "reprisals of a nature not yet heard of in Ireland" if the 
kidnapped officers were not returned safely. When Martin and a 
colleague approached a group of policemen standing in the deserted 
main street of the town, they told him they were looking for a 
correspondent called Hugh Martin of the Daily News in order to kill 
him. Martin pretended to be another journalist from a different 
newspaper and escaped to Dublin.87 News of the threat to Martin was 
carried by the other London papers and in the foreign press.88 Pursued 
in parliament, the new Irish Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood conceded 
an interview to the News in order to reassure the public that the 
85 Ibid October 21, 1920 p. 3 
86 Ibid October 25, 1920 p. I 
87 Ibid November 3 & 4 p. I 
88 See the despatch of a French correspondent reprinted in the Daily News November 5, 1920 
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government still believed in freedom of the press. Somewhat 
disingenuously, Greenwood declared that the government believed that 
what Ireland suffered from was a lack of publicity and argued that it 
was trying to help, not hinder, correspondents who wanted to 
disseminate the truth about the conflict. 89 In a reply published the 
following day, Martin absolved the British government of any 
responsibility for the threats made against him but his explanation could 
hardly have been the type of publicity that Greenwood desired. Martin 
wrote that the " ... discipline among the forces of the Crown is so lax that 
a journalist who endeavours to report truthfully how those forces are 
behaving has not been able to do so lately without danger to his personal 
safety.,,90 
Martin had not been alone in putting reprisals at the centre of debate 
about Ireland. Correspondents from the Manchester Guardian had 
accompanied him to scenes of random shootings of civilians, burnt out 
creameries, and streets of wrecked and looted shops in Sligo, Tipperary, 
Kerry and Longford. Accounts of the increasingly undisciplined 
behaviour of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries also appeared in 
The Times. Henry Wood Nevinson travelled the country in search of 
atrocities. In his diaries he describes coming to Dublin on a boat full of 
young Black and Tan recruits91 and driving to Balbriggan where the 
Black and Tans had burnt down a factory and thirty-five houses.92 The 
following month he came over to tour Tipperary, Cork and Kerry and 
89 Daily News November 4, 1920 
90 Ibid November 5, 1920 
91 H.W. Nevinson Journals, October 5-6,1920 in Papers of Henry Wood Nevinson, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford e62114 
92 Ibid, October 8 
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Limerick, noting burned creameries and talking to priests and local 
people (including a man who said his house had been burned down 
because he gave an affidavit to Hugh Martin).93 In Co. Clare he met a 
niece of Matthew Arnold - "very cultivated and intellectual" - who 
"gave us a private lecture on reprisals as the only means of avenging 
murders since law will not work.,,94 
Collectively, the correspondents resisted attempts by the government to 
portray them as dupes of Sinn Fein propaganda. A Guardian editorial 
elevated the British correspondents in Ireland to the status of sole 
purveyors of truth. 
The correspondents of the English newspapers are neither terrorised nor misled nor corrupted. They 
have furnished the most trustworthy and the only trustworthy account of the horrible condition into 
which the Government has allowed Ireland to sink. With Sinn Fein issuing propaganda on the one 
hand and Dublin Castle on the other, they are the only means of enlightenment that the public have 
and the only means by which, if at all, the Government can be forced to do its duty.95 
The editor of the Guardian, C.P. Scott, had long stood for a form of 
patriotism which embraced a willingness to criticise the state or the 
government of the day. Mark Hampton has pointed out that during the 
Boer War, Scott was as much perturbed by the threat posed to free 
speech by jingoism as by the conduct of the campaign against the 
Boers.96 And, Hampton argues, this position made Scott and his 
colleagues even more scrupulous about an honest factual portrayal of 
93 Ibid, November 13-18 
94 Ibid, November 19 
95 The Manchester Guardian October 23, 1920 p.8 
96 Mark Hampton: "The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C.P. Scott, The Manchester 
Guardian, and the Boer War, 1899-1902" in Historical.Tournal, Vol. 44, No.1 (2001) P 187 and p 
189 
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events: "since the Guardian's opposition to the war hinged as much on 
the threat war posed to public discussion as on the immorality of the war 
itself, it could not afford to compromise the 'sacred' nature of the 'facts' 
upon which discussion was based.',97 Thus the-editorial defending all the 
British correspondents in Ireland can be read as an attempt to assert the 
authority of the public sphere for judging events. But the Guardian's 
editorial is more than that again; it is a restatement of the classical 
liberal theory of the press, with the journalist cast as a beacon of 
enlightenment in a murky sea of competing claims. How different this 
is from Sir Edward Cook's appraisal of the press during the Great War 
(cited in the previous chapter) as the ever-willing propagator of official 
policy and a crucial force for sustaining morale. Thus, critical coverage 
of the campaign in Ireland provides an opportunity for the most 
prestigious organs of the British press to rally around the myth of their 
own tainted heroism. 
As he prepared to return to London on the eve of Armistice Day, Hugh 
Martin reflected on how he had arrived in Ireland a few months earlier 
intensely sceptical about stories of reprisals coming from Irish sources. 
"Three months ago, the world 'reprisals' merely recalled the later stages 
of the Great War. Today, to the whole of the English-speaking world it 
means one thing and one thing only - the method by which Great Britain 
is waging war upon Ireland. It has been my duty to watch at close 
quarters the unfolding of this drama ... And now as I leave the theatre for 
a little while to share in my own country's celebration of the victory of 
the idea of freedom, what else can I, as an Englishman, do except bow 
97 Ibid p 189 
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my head in shame?,,98 Martin's feelings of mortification arose from 
how the war in Ireland undermined his sense that Britain stood for 
justice and fair play. The idea that the British government was betraying 
its own ideals in coercing Ireland is repeatedly evoked by other 
journalists in reportage and commentary during this period. Mark 
Hampton noted a similar theme in the Manchester Guardian's coverage 
of the Boer War: "the desirability of fighting the war in accordance with 
traditional English notions of honour and decency.,,99 But these ideas 
had acquired even greater force by the time of the Irish rebellion 
because Britain had defined the war against Germany as a struggle 
between civilisation and barbarism, morality and militarism. 
The proof of this thesis for British propagandists was provided by 
outrages committed by the German army during its occupation of 
Belgium. The official British report on German atrocities in Belgium, 
written by Lord Bryce, was translated into ten languages and thousands 
of copies circulated around the world. lOO Until then it was assumed that 
European armies would never stoop to the cruelties considered a unique 
trait of the methods of warfare deployed by inferior nations. 101 
Revulsion at the terrorism described in the Bryce report "gave voice to a 
radical idea, that warring nations could not break the law with impunity 
and must pay.,,102 At the end of the war the British Attorney General, 
Lord Birkenhead stressed "the importance of using British standards to 
98 Daily News November 11, 1920 p.3 
99 Mark Hampton: "The Press, Patriotism and Public Discussion" op. cit. p 191 
100 Larry Zuckerman: The Rape of Beigium: The Untold Story of World War I, (New York 
University Press, 2004) p 132 
101 Ibid P 23 and p 121 
102 Ibid P 120 
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judge German war criminals.,,103 Thus the rhetoric of universal idealism 
deployed to distinguish British civility from Germany inhumanity 
during the First World War rebounded twice over against British policy 
in Ireland. Firstly, it became a powerful touchstone for judging the 
British government and a ready point of ironic comparison for 
journalists describing the suppression of the rebellion in Ireland. And it 
also created expectations that it was right to hold violators of the 
honourable norms of warfare to account and seek sanction against them 
in international law. As Philip Gibbs reflected, "civil law was abolished 
in Ireland, at a time when English idealists were pleading for its 
extension to international affairs as a nobler method of argument than 
that of war.,,}04 
Germany justified its methods rather than concealed them: 
schrecklichkeit, or "frightfulness", was openly proclaimed as official 
policy in the parts of Belgium under the control of the German army. 105 
The word became synonymous with barbaric cruelty; it crops up 
repeatedly in the reports from Ireland of the activities of the Black and 
Tans accompanied by the highly charged label "Prussian.,,106 In his 
book about the war in Ireland Hugh Martin describes Lloyd George's 
policy as "Potsdam ruthlessness.,,}07 The dangers of "Prussianism" 
appearing in Britain were raised by liberal commentators several years 
earlier during the First World War. In Questions of Peace and War, 
103 Gary Bass: Stay the Hand of Vengeance op.cit. p 73 
104 Philip Gibbs: The Hope of Europe, (William Heinemann, London, 1921) p 70 
105 Modris Eksteins: Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, (Mariner 
Books, New York, 2000 edition) p 158 
106 For examples see "The Proclamation of Anarchy" in The Nation, October 2nd, 1920, p 4--5 and 
Robert Lynd in the Daily News, November 16,1920. 
107 Hugh Martin: Ireland in Insurrection, (Daniel 0' Connor, London, 1921) p 42 
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published in 1916, L.T. Hobhouse predicted that "the self-contained, 
disciplined, military State is the political entity of the coming future.,,108 
And, according to Peter Clarke, the introduction of conscription in 1918 
appeared to l.A. Hobson as "the kernel of the system of Prussianism 
which was being established.,,109 It was Ireland which provided tangible 
evidence to support these auguries. 
A curious feature of the reporting from Ireland was the uncertainty 
among the correspondents about how to view the agents of the policy 
they identified as a strain of Germanic "frightfulness". Save for hostile 
exchanges like those described by Hugh Martin there were no interviews 
with the ordinary ex-servicemen who made up the regular Black and 
Tans or the ex-officers of the Auxiliary Division. British ministers 
defended these men as the heroes of the Western Front and, at first, even 
critics avoided questioning their characters, blaming the government for 
encouraging them to carry out reprisals. 1 10 Later, when their deeds had 
become notorious, even the house journal of the Milner imperialists, the 
Round Table, was describing them as "soldiers of fortune ... fitted for 
little but fighting."] 11 Certainly the correspondents treated them with 
extreme wariness. For Henry Wood Nevinson distaste was leavened 
with class prejudice. He recorded how he was pleased to hear from 
officers in the regular British army in Ireland that they refused to accept 
that most of the Auxiliaries had ever been officers at all and he himself 
concurred, offering that "neither the accent of many among them, nor 
108 Peter Clake: Liberals and Social Democrats op. cit. p 177 
109 Ibid. P 181 
110 Jon Laurence: "Forging a Peaceable Kingdom" op.cit. p 578-579 
III Ibid P 580 
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their language, nor their conduct, is such as I have been accustomed to 
among officers during my thirty-five years' knowledge of the British 
Army.,,112 But for one of the Manchester Guardian's correspondents, 
Donald Boyd, these men were merely more damaged versions of every 
man who had endured the nightmare of the trenches: "One of the 
wretched things was that the Auxiliaries were men like ourselves, who 
had just come out of the war ... They weren't strangers; they were 
ourselves askew."I13 
Just as coverage of the Black and Tans peaked in the autumn of 1920, 
two dramatic episodes of the war were partly enacted as spectacles on 
the streets of London, literally bringing the conflict home to a British 
audience. The first of these was the death on October 24, 1920, of the 
Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence McSwiney, a leading republican who 
had been on hunger strike for seventy-four days to protest against the 
establishment of military courts under the Restoration of Ireland Act. 
Significantly, McSwiney's death occurred in Brixton Prison and his 
funeral, which entailed his body being carried in a procession through 
London to Euston Station for its return to Ireland, brought the charged 
emotion of a distant conflict to the central streets of the metropolis. 
Crowds gathered on the footpaths as the procession passed. A 
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian remarked how "the 
. . f . f h k" 114 F mtensity 0 expressIOn 0 t e mourners struc everyone present. or 
many, the Guardian reported, it was the first time they had seen the Sinn 
112 H.W. Nevinson: "The Anglo-Irish War" in The Contemporary Review, Vol 120, July, 1921, P 
22-23 
II3 Quoted in David Ayerst: The Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper (Collins, London, 1971) p 
423 
114 The Manchester Guardian October 29, 1920 p. 7 
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Fein flags of green, white and orange. But, the correspondent noted, the 
attitude of the crowd was one of deep respect even among those who 
had been condemning the dead Lord Mayor. 115 
Elsewhere in the paper, in a regular, informal column called "Our 
London Correspondence", a writer reflected on how the procession had 
caused "a good deal of wonder" among the many foreign correspondents 
who had come to London to watch it: 
The circumstances were very extraordinary and it is difficult to imagine a parallel of them in any 
other country. The Lord Mayor of Cork was an officer of the Irish Republic, which declared itself at 
war with England. Here was all the assistance of the police and the city authorities to carry through a 
great demonstration, with rebel flags and rebel uniforms and the whole greeted with respect by the 
English people. 116 
Describing the procession in the Daily News Robert Lynd noted that 
McSwiney's funeral in London had all the appearance of the funeral of a 
prince. "Hawkers in the street with Cockney voices were selling 
mourning cards with prayers for the dead man's soul, paper 
handkerchiefs with a programme for the day's events, green flags with 
gold harps and Republican rosettes." For Lynd, Terence McSwiney's 
funeral was an animated history lesson that was eagerly absorbed by the 
crowds that lined the streets of London. 
The windows along the route were filled with work-girls, photographers, families and their 
friends ... for the most part it was a silent crowd - a crowd a little bewildered perhaps at finding itself 
the spectator of a chapter of history. London, I think, learned more Irish history yesterday than it 
had ever learned before. Only half-learned it perhaps. But it bared its head before the tragedy of it. 
lIS Ibid 
116 Ibid p.6 
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The funeral that London saw yesterday was no isolated or rare event. It is a funeral that is being 
repeated in Irish town after Irish town and in Irish village after Irish village ... What London saw 
yesterday is an image of all Ireland. 117 
The second event which impressed the British mind with the horror of 
the Irish conflict concerned the deaths of young men closer to home. In 
November 1920 the IRA carried out one of the most ruthless operations 
of its campaign when eleven British officers identified by the IRA 
Chief of Staff Michael Collins as intelligence agents, were shot dead in 
a couple of hours on a Sunday morning in central Dublin. Some of the 
officers were shot as they awoke from sleep in the presence of their 
wives. 118 For British correspondents used to reporting the deaths of 
Irish policemen the swift and brutal extension of casualties to their own 
countrymen was shocking. The Daily News described the assassinations 
as "the worst massacre of British officers since the India mutiny.,,1l9 
the Morning Post was driven to link the Irish rebellion with the triumph 
of Bolshevism in Russia, concluding, in an editorial that the future of 
civilisation itself was threatened by the IRA and that unless the rebels 
were crushed their example would be copied elsewhere: " .. .in all parts 
of the Empire conspirators are watching the drama of Ireland and 
waiting for the sign which will definitely tell them that they can ring up 
the curtain with confidence and call the world's attention to their 
PO stage." -
117 Daily News October 29, 1920 p. 1 
118 The killings, on November 21, and the reprisal which followed that afternoon when Auxiliaries 
fired into a crowd at a football match killing eleven spectators and one of the players, are described in 
Lyons op. cit. p. 418-419 
119 Daily News, November 22, 1920 p. 1 
120 The Morning Post November 22, 1920 p.6 
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The accounts of the funeral of the officers shot in Dublin betray an acute 
sense of perplexed horror at what the conflict in Ireland was coming to 
mean for Britain. The Manchester Guardian described the cortege in 
Dublin as "the strangest of funeral processions." 
All the solemn ceremony that the army has evolved for the honouring of its dead was observed, yet 
the troops moved in a formation that might have been appropriate during a march through an enemy 
country. Before the real procession came in sight one saw first a patrol of six steel-helmeted soldiers 
who carried rifles at the trail, then an armoured car with machine-guns peering from its turrets ... Great 
crowds assembled along both banks of the river and on the bridges. They were reverent and 
quiet...one failed to observe any man who did not take off his hat and stay uncovered until the gun-
carriages had passed. From other sources one hears that it was not like that everywhere and that a 
great many hats and caps were forcibly removed from the heads of their wearers by Auxiliaries and 
thrown into the Liffey. 121 
The writing repeatedly points to a disconcerting untrustworthiness in the 
visual evidence: the "solemn procession" turns out to be a dangerous 
march; loyal Ireland is revealed as "an enemy country"; the reverent 
crowd is silently but pointedly disrespectful. This is a remarkable 
passage, describing a scene that could have been cinematically arranged 
to provide a snapshot of historical change. It also serves as a coda for 
the press coverage of the whole period, illustrating a key political 
moment when "events which are normally signified .. .in a negotiated 
way begin to give an oppositional reading.,,]22 
This sense of dissonance is also present in two accounts of the same 
funeral procession when it arrived in London en route to Westminster 
121 The Manchester Guardian November 26, 1920 p.9 
122 Stuart Hall: "EncodinglDecoding" in Stuart Hall et. al: Culture, Media, Language: Working 
Papers in Cultural Studies (Hutchinson, London, 1980) p 138 
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Abbey. The Times reported that the massed bands of the Irish Guards 
occupied the centre of the procession 
... but not their music nor the crepe-bound colours so sharply stirred the crowds in the street, perhaps, 
as did the presence in the cortege of a detachment of Auxiliary RIC, the "Black and Tans". They 
wore khaki uniforms with black or khaki Balmorals and all were heavily armed. Near them marched 
men of the RIC carrying sidearms outside their long black overcoats. 123 
In Westminster Abbey another Times correspondent noted that "a stir of 
bewilderment passed through the congregation who saw marching 
upwards from the west door a body of armed men in a dark uniform 
strange to London." 
For a moment a comer of the veil of mystery that covers Ireland was lifted: these grim-featured 
carbineers were not soldiers but policemen of the civil garrison which Great Britain maintains in 
Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary. These were the men whom the tragedies of the last two years 
have made famous, the stem instruments of justice, and the immediate victims of revenge. 124 
The Morning Post correspondent also noticed the impression made by 
the "grim featured carbineers" from Ireland. 
Extreme interest was aroused by firing parties of the "Black and Tans" and the Royal Irish 
Constabulary; for who could resist the thought that every man of them is fighting, with imminent 
peril by day and night, the battle in which so many gallant gentlemen fell last Sunday? .. Young men 
and men a trifle older, wearing officers' khaki uniform, black "Kilmarnock bonnets", armed with 
rifles, bandoliers round their chest, and heavy revolvers slung from the waist, they looked a 
determined and fearless band, very adequate for the grim work on which they are engaged. 125 
123 The Times November 27, 1920 p. 10 
124 Ibid 
125 The Morning Post November 27, 1920 p. 7 
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For the correspondents and the general public the appearance of these 
bizarre figures in London is fascinating and horrifying in equal measure. 
Their reaction is heavy with a foreboding that the war in Ireland would 
have more profound consequences for England tha.'1 had yet been 
imagined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Crusading Press Restored 
The ceaseless coverage of the reprisals in the latter half of 1920 
gradually put the government on the defensive. Lloyd George and the 
Irish Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, spent much of their time in the 
House of Commons unconvincingly deflecting questions about Black 
and Tans on the rampage, questions informed by the detailed 
despatches from rural Ireland in the London papers. One way of tracing 
how the correspondents were able to influence the political argument is 
to follow the debates in the House of Commons where the government 
was held directly accountable for its policy in Ireland. The coalition 
government established by Lloyd George dominated the Commons; 
independent liberals - whose figurehead was the former Prime Minister, 
Herbert Asquith - had only twenty-six seats. And although the rest of 
the opposition was composed of fifty-nine Labour MPs, the Coalition 
was in no danger of being defeated in a vote. However, as D.G. Boyce 
has noted, the lack of a threat in simple votes was "compensated by the 
vigour with which the parliamentary Opposition attacked the 
government over the conduct of its Irish policy. The independent 
Liberals were effective in debate, and, with the Labour members, plied 
the government with embarrassing questions about the behaviour of the 
Crown forces in Ireland."l As we shall see, much of the evidence on 
which these embarrassing questions were based came from the reports 
of the British correspondents in the London papers. This often led to 
1 D.G. Boyce: Englishmen and Irish Troubles op.cit. p 61 
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explicit criticism of the journalists by government spokesmen and the 
widening of the debate on Irish policy to include a dispute over the 
veracity of the press. Further, the terms in which the government's 
opponents framed their critique of Irish policy echoed the interpretation 
of the newspaper correspondents that the tactics being used to put down 
the rebellion in Ireland were a significant departure from the standards 
of British political morality. 
"Reprisals" became a major political issue in Britain in the autumn of 
1920, largely because of the coverage of the activities of the Black and 
Tans and the Auxiliaries in the British press. The word appears for the 
first time in the index to Hansard in Volume 133, covering a period 
from August to October. Up to then there had been several revenge 
attacks by British forces on civilian targets, many of them described in 
the pages of the British press. One incident in the town of Balbriggan, 
about twenty miles north of Dublin, crystallised outrage over these 
assaults. Following the shooting dead of two local officers from the 
Royal Irish Constabulary, their comrades took revenge by killing two 
local Sinn Fein leaders and burning property, including the hosiery 
factory which was its main source of local employment. An editorial in 
the Manchester Guardian likened the destruction in Balbriggan to the 
sacking of the Belgian town of Louvain by German forces during the 
First World War.2 A month later Herbert Asquith made the same 
comparison in the House of Commons) This was an early example of 
how the interpretations of the newspaper correspondents in Ireland made 
2 The Manchester Guardian, September 22, 1920 
3 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 133 Col 946 
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their way into political debate in London (although, as we have seen in 
relation to "Prussianism", this popularisation of conceits was 
circulatory). Indeed, many of the debates about the Black and Tans in 
parliament tum on whether the information in the public domain is 
trustworthy and whether the portrayal of the war in Ireland offered by 
the correspondents - both from Britain, the US and Europe - can be 
believed. 
Over months criticism of the government's policy was pressed by the 
same handful of MPs: Asquithian Liberals, "high-minded Tory 
aristocrats"4 and the few remaining Irish nationalists MPs. Each group 
had its own motivations and interests (which sometimes overlapped) but 
what is striking is the extent to which these MPs relied on the reports of 
the newspaper correspondents in Ireland for the evidence they used to 
argue their case against the government. A typical exchange took place 
in the Commons on October 25 th, 1920, when Hamar Greenwood was 
asked by ToP. 0' Connor, the Irish Nationalist MP for Liverpool, 
"whether in view of the statements of the English correspondents in 
Ireland of responsible English journals that they themselves saw 
convincing evidence of the wounding and flogging of men in the 
villages in the West of Ireland by officers of the Crown, the right. Hon. 
Gentleman persists in the denial that such outrages have occurred."5 
When Greenwood protested that there was not enough time to answer 
the question another Nationalist MP from Belfast, Joe Devlin, 
interjected: "Did you not see it in this morning's papers? It could have 
4 Robert Skidelsky: Oswald Mosley (Macmillan Papermac edition, 1981) P 93 
5 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 133 Col 1326-1327 [October 25, 1920] 
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been read there."6 After complaining about the difficulty of gathering 
official information, Greenwood declared that he had "no convincing 
evidence of the flogging and wounding of several men in the West of 
Ireland" and concluded: "I believe the world is horrified at the murders -
of policemen and soldiers in Ireland and I do not believe the world 
accepts the malignant untruths suggested in the question."7 Devlin then 
intervened again: "Does the Right Hon. Gentleman assert that the 
representatives of the Manchester Guardian, The Times and other 
English newspapers are enemies of the British Empire?" 
Greenwood: I do not say it and I do not assert it. 
Mr Devlin: May I ask if the Right Hon. Gentleman is aware that clear, precise and specific charges 
of this character have been made by these English representatives of the great English journals and 
they have been published in this country; therefore if he states that all who make these charges are 
enemies of the British Empire, does he declare that these gentlemen are enemies of the British 
Empire? 
Greenwood: I have answered that.8 
Throughout the debates on reprisals the press reports are cited by critics 
of the government as an independent source of information; by relying 
on what the newspapers are publishing about Ireland these critics are 
advertising their own lack of partisanship. Joe Devlin - the only MP 
representing an Irish constituency who regularly spoke in parliament -
often presented himself as a neutral, speaking against the powerful state 
on behalf of those who found themselves caught between the two sides 
6 Ibid Col 1327 
7 Ibid Col 1327-1328 
8 Ibid Col 1328 
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in the war in Ireland. He accused Greenwood of waging war on innocent 
men: "You make the lives of non-combatants impossible. It is for these 
people that I plead and who I am here to defend."9 Devlin argued that 
having recourse to the reports in the British press further bolstered his 
claim to impartiality. He countered Greenwood's dismissal of his 
statement that the town of Templemore in County Tipperary had been 
wrecked by pointing out: "Of course, I get my information from English 
papers. I am not in touch with Sinn Fein."lo An argument stressing the 
independence of the press also underpinned Asquith's contribution to 
the debate on November 24th• 1920, to discuss the events of Bloody 
Sunday, three days earlier. Asquith concentrated on tracing the 
accumulation of evidence over the previous few months that the 
activities of the police in Ireland were sanctioned by an unacknowledged 
reprisals policy. In Asquith's terms, the detail in the charge sheet 
against the government was provided by the journalists' reports on the 
Black and Tans. He exalted the foreign correspondents who had gone to 
Ireland - and not only those from Britain - as a source of untainted 
truth. 
We have evidence, not from Sinn Fein sources, or anybody connected with that movement but of a 
vast body of absolutely independent, impartial [men], representing the great organs of the Press not 
only of this country but of America, France and other parts of the civilised world ... who, without any 
prepossession or prejudices were sent there (HON MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!) ... We have the 
evidence of these men who have been on the spot, and who are thoroughly qualified by experience, as 
well as by honesty and judgment, not to distort the facts.11 
9 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 135 Col 658 [November 24, 1920] 
10 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134 Col 700 [November 4, 1920] 
II Hansard Fifth Series Vol 135 Col 489 [November 24, 1920] 
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Similarly, T.P. O'Connor held up the press as the only way of 
penetrating the deceit of the government: "We have one last refuge 
against the conspiracy of silence, of evasion with regard to these events 
in Ireland."12 He is full of praise for Hugh Martin in particular, 
describing him as "one of the most admirable and able journalists we 
have today, and Ireland owes to him, as to many another English 
journalist and English politician, a debt of gratitude which she can never 
adequately repay." It was Martin who had exposed the conduct of the 
British forces in Ireland and the policy of reprisals that Hamar 
Greenwood and the British government refused to acknowledge. 
The Chief Secretary, in that Garden of Eden innocence, in that role of young and maidenly innocence 
in which he poses ... knows nothing about the destruction of creameries. Mr Hugh Martin tells us all 
about it. He knows nothing about the execution of men by the Black-and-Tans. Mr Hugh Martin tells 
us all about it. He is one of the men who have held up the liberty of Ireland and the honour of 
England and of the English Press to which he belongs. I 3 
The threats against Martin described in the previous chapter were raised 
in the Commons by the Liberal MP, Lieutenant Commander J.N. 
Kenworthy, who asked Hamar Greenwood if he would "give immediate 
orders that in no circumstances are any journalists in Ireland, British or 
foreign, to be attacked or punished by the police except under due 
process of law." Greenwood replied that he had no information about 
the threat Martin had reported but he promised that the government 
would "take every step in their [sic] power to prevent any attack on any 
journalist in Ireland" adding that "Ireland is the freest country in the 
12 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134 Col 687 [November 4, 1920] 
13 Ibid Col 687 
112 
world - for journalists."14 Later, when pressed by other MPs about 
Martin's case, Greenwood expressed surprise that any reporter in Ireland 
should believe himself to be in danger, noting acerbically that "it is not 
an unpopular thing in Ireland to pretend to be in danger, and, therefore, 
become a hero."15 Greenwood assured MPs that Martin was secure in 
Ireland no matter how controversial his reports: 
"I can assure Mr Hugh Martin that he can sleep every night in any bed he likes in Ireland. He said 
mean and inaccurate things of the police, but they will stand guard over him, and they will let him say 
what he likes about them. He is as safe in Ireland as he would be in Fleet Street, no matter what he 
says; and Mr Martin or any other pressman will be welcome to Ireland, whatever his own political 
views on the policy or views of the paper he represents.16 
What is significant about this passage is how Greenwood tried to 
undermine Martin's authority by implicitly denying that anything he had 
published was a fact. Martin, according to Greenwood, said "mean and 
inaccurate things" about the police. Thus his writings express opinions 
which do not demand contestation or refutation as facts would; they may 
be irritating or annoying but the police "will let him say what he likes 
about them." Here Greenwood was asserting that the reporting from 
Ireland - far from being a reflection of reality - was merely a political 
argument advanced by those opposed to the government or by 
journalists whose work was, of necessity, dictated by the politics of their 
newspaper. This line of attack was potentially damaging because, at this 
time, the provision of untainted information and the affirmation of 
formal independence from political parties was an essential feature of 
14 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col 359-360 [November 3, 1920] 
15 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col719 [November 4, 1920] 
16 Ibid Col 720-721 
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newspapers' claim to legitimacy in the political arena. 17 And indeed, as 
we have seen, this was the basis for the authority which the 
government's parliamentary critics attached to the newspaper accounts 
of reprisal&. Greenwood tried to advance his case even further by 
suggesting that the journalists reporting from Ireland were not just 
giving vent to anti-government views (either their own or those of their 
proprietors) in place of collecting facts: they were also prepared to 
have their scripts written for them by Sinn Fein. 
Greenwood introduced this charge during a debate on a censure motion 
proposed by the Labour Party in October 1920. He asserted that a 
minority of British newspapers were prepared to accept the word of the 
Sinn Fein propagandists who said "everything that can be said, 
regardless of fact, to besmirch the name of the United Kingdom and of 
the British Empire and to besmirch the names of loyal servants of the 
Crown ... "18 Other journalists - presumably more hostile towards the 
rebels - had had their lives threatened and had been forced to leave 
Ireland (although when pressed the Chief Secretary couldn't supply the 
House with their names.)19 In November Greenwood returned to this 
theme: "[The Sinn Fein propagandist] has a most elaborate system of 
dealing with pressmen. He goes so far as actually to prepare what he 
likes them to say, and hands it out to them."20 This formulation, 
expressed as if it were a revelation, depends for its impact on the 
presentation of Sinn Fein's dealing with the press as a departure from 
17 See Jean Chalaby: The Invention of Journalism op.ciL p 79 and p 110 
18 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 133 Col 935-936 [October 20, 1920] 
19 Ibid. Unlike Hugh Martin these unamed journalists were apparently not pretending to be heroes. 
20 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col 719 [November 4, 1920] 
114 
the norm, as if journalists had never been used like this before. In fact it 
seeks to exploit the post-war disillusion with propaganda on the 
principle that "those with purposes produce propaganda; those whose 
only purpose is to reflect reality produce news."21 Later in November, 
responding to Asquith's encomium for the correspondents in Ireland, 
Greenwood combines his charge that they are merely peddling their own 
opinions with the accusation that the correspondents' despatches were 
being elaborated with the help of Sinn Fein. The Chief Secretary directly 
challenged Asquith's assertion that the journalists were honest recorders 
of the facts. He argued that - especially in the case of the Americans-
the reporters were the puppets of Sinn Fein. "I do not look [favourably] 
upon the opinions of certain American correspondents who, enjoying the 
hospitality of the murder gang itself in Ireland, traversed that country 
and sent their newspaper matter to America to weaken the Anglo-
American friendship that happily exists, and to do their best to condemn 
the British Empire."22 Accounts of reprisals in the press had only the 
appearance of being a narrative of facts according to Greenwood; these 
despatches were tendentious, often sent from remote areas of Ireland 
where the veracity of their detail was beyond scrutiny. "It is when you 
get a murder in the far West of Ireland, from which a correspondent can 
send the news that suits his paper- [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Yes, 
that is the usual case on which a reprisal charge is founded."23 
21 Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester: "News as Purposive Behaviour: On the Strategic Use of 
Routine Events, Accidents and Scandals" in American Sociological Review Vol 39 (1970) P 105 
22 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 135, Col 497 [November 24, 1920] 
23 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 135, Col 502 [November 24, 1920] 
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Yet, for all his denunciation of the press Greenwood was never able to 
act on his criticisms. He could accuse Hugh Martin of being biased and 
untrustworthy and even of contriving his own notoriety by claiming that 
his life was endangered. But the Chief Secretary was constrained from 
barring Martin from visiting Ireland or subjecting him to the same 
censorship as Irish newspapers. On the contrary, such was the 
contemporary esteem for publicity among politicians that Greenwood -
at the very same time as he denounced reports of reprisals as mere 
fabrications - had to present himself as a friend of the press. Thus the 
Chief Secretary protested that "I have myself gone out of my way to 
provide motor cars and facilities of every kind for the Press of all parts 
of the world to see Ireland as it is, because I believe ... the more publicity 
Ireland gets from people who visit it, the stronger and more united will 
be the support, not only of this country but of civilisation, behind the 
British Government."24 
The disingenuousness of Greenwood's pleading that the government 
welcomed honest reporting of events in Ireland was pinpointed by the 
Tory, Lord Robert Cecil. "In the minds of some Hon. Members", Cecil 
declared, "there is no such thing as a reputable newspaper unless it 
supports the Government." He noted reports in reputable papers that 
reprisals had been authorised by Ministers. Despite Greenwood's 
fulminations about the coverage from Ireland Cecil observed that there 
was no sign of any challenge by the government to the facts appearing in 
the press; instead "speech after speech is delivered by Ministers of the 
24 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col 719 [November 4, 1920] 
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Crown and there is no denial."25 Of course Greenwood knew that the 
Black and Tans were committing reprisals but he could not stop or 
control the coverage of the war in Ireland by British and international 
correspondents. He could only try to discredit the reporters, a strategy 
undermined from the beginning by the simultaneous enthusiasm with 
which he welcomed publicity and further weakened by the sheer volume 
of articles describing reprisals. Greenwood's uncomfortable dilemma 
was highlighted by a question put by the Labour MP, l.R. Clynes: If the 
government could prove that the reporters were distorting the facts, he 
asked, why did it not submit events in Ireland to an impartial inquiry by 
members of the political establishment? 
I marvel at the light-hearted way in which the Chief Secretary reproved the journalists of this and 
other countries. What purpose can these men have to serve other than that of going to Ireland and 
reporting the facts that they see? Is there any journalist representing a newspaper on the side of the 
Government who could materially dispute, or who has attempted to disprove, any of these statements 
made by representatives of papers which happen to be opposed to the Government? The fact that 
these crimes have taken place, that civilians have been killed, that property has been destroyed and 
burned, has attracted to Ireland correspondents from various parts of the world, and, without wishing 
to do any damage to our reputation or the level of our credit, these men have told the truth.26 
The government failed to impugn the integrity of the correspondents or 
discredit the wielding of their despatches with rhetorical flourish in 
parliament to condemn its Irish policy. The sheer weight of the press 
interest in Ireland, not just from Britain but from the rest of the Empire, 
the United States and Europe, created a stream of bad publicity that none 
25 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col 726 [November 4, 1920] 
26 Ibid Col 517 
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of Greenwood's evasions and denunciations could counter. In February, 
1921, when Captain Anthony Wedgwood Benn moved a motion 
declaring that the government's Irish policy had failed and "involved the 
officers and servants of the Crown in a competition in crime with the 
offenders against the law" he could cite the continuing bad publicity for 
British conduct just as Asquith had three months previously.n 
Wedgwood Benn surmised that American sympathy was beyond 
retrieval and continued: "In France the newspapers are full of Ireland. I 
could quote statements of newspapers of very different opinions all 
condemning the Irish administration. In Italy every paper is full of news 
from Ireland, with pictures of the happenings there and accounts of the 
anarchy and disorder."28 The Independent Liberal, J.N. Hogge, noted 
that the journalists were defining how history would regard the period. 
"The facts are being recorded under one headline, 'The Irish 
Revolution' ."29 
Hamar Greenwood, as the parliamentary defender of the government's 
Irish policy, could affect a weary insouciance when confronted with the 
supposed calumnies of the press. But behind the scenes the cabinet was 
anything but indifferent towards the correspondents' reports. In July 
1920 Austen Chamberlain wrote to his sister after a cabinet discussion 
on Ireland which he found "puzzling and most distressing." 
Chamberlain worried about the resolve of his colleagues: "A 
sensational Press upsets their nerves & makes them impatient, first 
27 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 136 Col 603 [February 21,1921] 
28 Ibid Col 606 
29 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 134, Col 692 
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clamorous for stern measures & then screams itself into hysterics when 
it sees what stern measures mean in practice."30 There is plenty of 
evidence in the cabinet minutes of this acute sensitivity to the press 
coverage of Ireland. On August 13 th, 1920, the minutes recorded that 
"strong measures would be required to put down ... the extremists" but 
worries were expressed that "there might come a point when public 
opinion would desert the Government."3! Later that month, according to 
Thomas Jones, the Irish minister, Edward Shortt made a case for 
releasing the Lord Mayor of Cork Tom McSwiney from Brixton Prison, 
partly on the grounds that "practically the whole press" supported his 
release and that this represented public opinion.32 
What is really significant is how what was appearing in the press about 
Ireland was affecting those pushing for a hard line as much as those 
seeking a compromise with Sinn Fein. The Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson - an Irishman and 
intransigent Unionist - was not someone easily moved to haunting doubt 
by anti-militarist sentiment. He had little sympathy for civilian scruples, 
contemptuously referred to politicians as "frocks" and lampooned the 
premise of the Versailles treaty as "All 'Peoples' love each other, 
therefore have a League of Nations."33 But on Ireland throughout 1920 
- as the British correspondents served up stories of atrocities and 
30 Robert B. Self (ed): The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Correspondence of Sir 
Austen Chamberlain with his sisters Hilda and Ida 1916--1937 Volnme 5, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) p 138-139 
3! Cabinet minutes for August 13th , 1920, CAB 23/22/116 
32 Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary Volume 1: 1916--1925, (Oxford University Press, 1969) p 
36--37 
33 Major-General Sir C.E. Callwell: Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries Vol 
II (Cassell & Co, London 1927) p 256 
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outrages committed by the Crown forces - Wilson's relationship with 
Lloyd George became increasingly strained because of his opposition to 
encouraging or at least ignoring unauthorised reprisals. Wilson noted in 
his diary the Prime Minister's "amazing theory that someone was 
murdering two Sinn Feiners to every loyalist the Sinn Feiners 
murdered ... he seemed to be satisfied that a counter-murder association 
was the best answer to Sinn Fein murders. A crude idea of 
statesmanship, he will have a rude aWakening."34 On September 29th he 
wrote: 
I had 1 liz hours this evening with Lloyd George and Bonar Law. I told them what I thought of 
reprisals by the 'Black and Tans' and how this must lead to chaos and ruin. Lloyd George danced 
about and was angry but I never budged. I pointed out that these reprisals were carried out without 
anyone being responsible; men were murdered, houses burnt, villages wrecked .. .1 said that this was 
due to want of discipline, and this must be stopped. It was the business of the government to govern. 
If these men ought to be murdered, then the Government ought to murder them. Lloyd George 
danced at this, said no Government could possibly take this responsibility.35 
The striking feature of Wilson's opposition to reprisals is his sense that 
they were futile because people in Britain were either ignorant of the 
strategy or opposed to it. In August, Wilson recorded in his diary that 
he had had a visit from Lord Riddell, the proprietor of the News of the 
World, who asked what message he should give to his three and a half 
million readers. "I replied 'Let the Cabinet give up whispering in 10 
Downing Street and come into the open. Let them hoist the flag of 
England and rally England round them. With the English behind us 
there is nothing we can't do, and without England there is nothing we 
34 Ibid P 251 
35 Ibid P 263 
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can dO."36 A month earlier he had - according to his diary - told a 
confidant that "if he [Wilson] was in the House of Commons he would 
march down to Lloyd George and say: 'Y ou have two courses open to 
you. One is to clear out of Ireland and the other is to knock Sinn Fein on 
the head. But before you do this latter you must have England on your 
side, and therefore you must go stumping the country explaining what 
Sinn Fein means. '''37 
In early 1921 H.A.L. Fisher warned his cabinet colleagues that the 
longer the war went on "the more certain does it become that great 
bodies of opinion in this Country will swing over to the Republican 
side."38 By May, during a discussion of a possible truce, Churchill- the 
original champion of the Black and Tans - was advising that it was "of 
great public importance to get a respite in Ireland" because the news 
from there was damaging "the interests of this country all over the 
world; we are getting an odious reputation; poisoning our relations with 
the United States ... "39 Fisher himself now estimated that the war was 
"degrading to the moral life of the whole country" and even Balfour, 
arguing against concessions to Sinn Fein, accepted that "naturally we 
should wish to end this uphill, sordid, unchivalrous, loathsome conflict -
we are sick of it."40 Lloyd George agreed that "the country is a little 
unhappy. That is because nobody is informing the country."41 But as we 
36 Ibid P 255 
37 Ibid P 253-254 
38 "The Position in Ireland: Note by the President of the Board of Education", March 1, 1921, CAB 
24/120/CP 2656 
39 Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary Volume 1 op.cit. p 69 
40 Ibid P 66 
41 Ibid P 68 
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know the press was informing the country, though not in the way Lloyd 
George would have wished. 
The concern for the press - both in parliament and around the cabinet 
table - was not just a function of Lloyd George's well attested obsession 
with publicity. Both contemporary observers and historians since have 
argued that the First World War, aside from placing a premium on 
propaganda, allowed the press to become a powerful voice in 
parliamentary politics because of the wartime truce between the major 
parties. The press was credited with helping to engineer the downfall of 
Asquith in 1915 with "editors and leader-writers ... unusually well placed 
not only to catch and reflect, but indeed create, a widespread mood of 
dissatisfaction with the existing order of things, government above 
all."42 Some contemporaries argued that it was "government by 
journalism" with the press becoming "a substitute for parliament."43 
The elaboration of this argument depends on dissecting the intimate 
relationships between proprietors, editors and politicians in "the 
concentric circles of political society"44 But, as I argued in my 
introduction, there is a need - especially in the case of the Irish 
revolution - for shifting the perspective away from the kingmaking 
manoeuvres of press barons in Westminster and the practice of high 
politics at Whitehall dinner parties towards the work of journalists on 
the ground, particularly the special correspondents. It was the reports 
42 1.M. McEwen: 'The Press and the Fall of Asquith" in The Historical.Tournal, Vol 21, No.4 
(1978) P 865 
43 George Boyce: "The Fourth Estate: the reappraisal of a concept" in George Boyce, lames Curran 
and Pauline Wingate (eds): Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present 
Day, (Constable, London, 1978) p 27-28 
44 Stephen Koss: The Rise and Fall of the Political Press op.cit. p 712 
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written by these correspondents - rather than the representations made 
by proprietors - that unsettled politicians in London. 
It was not just reporting from Ireland that was having an impact on 
parliament or the cabinet. In her study of how the British government 
tried to manage the news from India, Chandrika Kaul found that, by the 
early twentieth century, the press was the primary source of knowledge 
about the empire for most people in Britain. "The influence of the 
quality papers on the decision-making elite, as well as the popular press 
on more general readers, helped to create the climate of opinion within 
which Parliament and Government functioned."45 Just as Hamar 
Greenwood felt he must publicly encourage journalists to visit Ireland 
(even though he despised their critical coverage), the Secretary of State 
for India, Edwin Montagu, identified the provision of facilities to help 
the press obtain news as one of his departmental priorities. Chandrika 
Kaul points out that "for Montagu, a Government, even an imperial one, 
could not govern without explanation and needed to promote its policies 
through active publicity."46 She characterises parliamentary and press 
opinion on India as "interdependent," a diagnosis which could easily 
describe the relationship outlined earlier between parliament and the 
press coverage from Ireland.47 With party structures weakened during 
the war48 and no strong parliamentary counterweight to Lloyd George's 
coalition, it was no surprise that the correspondents in Ireland were 
45 Chandrika Kaul: Press and Empire: The London Press, Government News Management and 
India circa 1900-1922, (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1999) p 92-93 
46Ibidp114 
47 Ibid P 93 
48 Bill Schwarz: "Conservatism and 'caesarism', 1903-22" in Mary Langan and Bill Schwarz (ed): 
Crises in the British State 1880-1930, (Hutchinson, London, 1985) p 47-48 
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enlisted by the government's critics. At the time the absence of a major 
opposition party in the House of Commons was noted by the American 
political scientist A.B. Lowell; he cited the government's Irish policy as 
an example of what he called an "atrophied" public opinion: without an 
alternative governing party to oppose the government "[the] English 
people were in somewhat the position of a jury without counsel to 
present the evidence in systematic order and argue their respective sides 
of the case."49 It was the correspondents in Ireland, through their 
newspapers, who initially stepped into this role.50 
On the surface British newspaper correspondents made unlikely critics 
of the government coercion in Ireland. As we have seen already, the 
reputation of the press was low in 1918 after its willing collaboration 
with government propaganda during the First World War. H.G. Wells 
summed up a widespread view when he wrote in 1921 that "there has 
been a considerable increase of deliberate lying in the British press since 
1914, and a marked loss of journalistic self-respect. .. a considerable 
proportion of the [news] is rephrased and mutilated to give a misleading 
impression to the reader."51 The government had depended on the co-
operation during the war. Lloyd George had frankly acknowledged to 
C.P.Scott that "if people really knew [how horrible it is] the war would 
be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don't and can't know. The 
correspondents don't write and the censorship would not pass the 
49 A.B. Lowell: Public Opinion in War and Peace, (Harvard University Press, 1923) p 260-261 
50 It was later taken up by the Labour Party and the cross-party campaigning group, the Peace with 
Ireland Council (secretary, Oswald Mosley). 
51 Quoted in Mark Hampton: Visions of the Press op.cit. p 147-148 
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truth."52 This was clearly a case of where the press became, in Philip 
Elliott's phrase, the "self-appointed script writer to the national 
morale."53 Why was it that the press did not perform similarly in the case 
of Ireland? 
The key difference was that, although there was no large and effective 
opposition in the House of Commons, the British political elite were 
deeply split over the future of Ireland; during the four years of the Great 
War there had been public agreement among the major political parties 
on the principle of fighting the war. Given the symbiotic relationship 
between journalism and politics these different circumstances would 
have a profound effect on the capability of journalists to express dissent. 
In his study of the American media during the Vietnam war Daniel 
Hallin found that journalists were sensitive to the state of debate among 
politicians in Washington. "In situations where political consensus 
seems to prevail", Hallin concluded, "journalists tend to act as 
'responsible' members of the political establishment, upholding the 
dominant political perspective and passing on more or less at face value 
the views of the authorities assumed to represent the nation as a whole. 
In situations of political conflict, they become more detached or 
adversarial, though they normally will stay well within the bounds of the 
debate going on within the political 'establishment' and will continue to 
grant a privileged hearing, particularly to senior officials of the 
executive branch."54 
52 Quoted in Phillip Knightly: The First Casualty op.cit. p 93 
53 Philip Elliott: "All the World's a Stage" op. cit. p 143 
54 Daniel C. Hallin: The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam, (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1986) p 10 
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This insight is wholly applicable to British press coverage of the Irish 
revolution. As we have seen, in parliament and public debate, Lloyd 
George's Irish policy was assailed by Tory dissenters, the Labour Party 
and not least Asquith, who, in Peter Clarke's phrase, spoke with "the 
authority of the premiership."55 We have also examined the divisions in 
the cabinet where some ministers were even arguing that Sinn Fein had 
the moral support of the Irish people.56 The split in the cabinet was also 
reflected in Dublin Castle. A new group of talented civil servants was 
sent over from London in 1920 after Sir Warren Fisher had condemned 
the previous administration in an official report as "almost woodenly 
stupid and quite devoid of imagination."57 The views of the newcomers 
were "fundamentally in tune with the idea of Irish self-government 
within the Empire."58 The career in Ireland of one of them was later 
described by a colleague as "a long struggle against militarism."59 And 
echoing the arguments of opponents of coercion inside the cabinet, 
another of the new Castle administrators confided to his diary that the 
price paid in dignity for tolerating the methods of the Black and Tans 
was "grievously heavy."60 So not only could correspondents in Dublin 
set their reports in the context of the views of anti-government 
politicians in London but they would also be aware of the views of 
55 Peter Clarke: Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990, (Allen Lane, London, 1997) p 98-99 
56 John McColgan: British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22 (Allen & Uynwin, 
London, 1983) p 2 
57 Ibid P 8 
58 Ibid P 14 
59 G.c. Duggan ("Periscope"): "The Last Days of Dublin Castle" in Blackwood's Magazine, 
August 1922 P 152 
60 Michael Hopkinson (ed): The Last Days of Dublin Castle: The Diaries of Mark Sturgis, (Irish 
Academic Press, Dublin, 1999) p IOJ 
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officials on the ground who were, to varying degrees, opposed to the 
policies they were meant to be implementing. Thus the correspondents 
in Ireland who wrote critically about the military campaign were not 
intervening from the margins but contributing to a sanctioned national 
debate which had engaged the most powerful politicians in the land. 
They could also draw on a belief firmly established in British liberalism 
in the nineteenth century which held that states allowing freedom of 
expression were superior to those who denied it. 61 Indeed, the belief in 
the innate capacity of the British public sphere to cope with debates 
which would be dangerous if allowed to flourish amongst lesser peoples 
was attested during the great Irish famine when "Irish journalists were 
censored, prosecuted and transported for what they wrote" while British 
journalists "probed and commented on issues that had been agonized 
over for generations, alternately sympathetic and irate as circumstances 
altered."62 During the Crimean War it was The Times which 
aggressively advanced the argument that the mark of the "self-respecting 
races" was a free press: "There is only one rule for improvement and 
success, whether in peace or in war, and that is to be found in publicity 
and discussion."63 The post-war critique of the press alluded to earlier 
sprang from this tradition of legitimate dissent. The war in Ireland was 
one case where it was difficult to trump this argument by appeals to the 
greater good of national unity, especially as the establishment of mass 
61 Olive Anderson: A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean 
War (Macmillan, London, 1967) P 70 
62 Melissa Fegan: Literature and the Irish Famine: 1845-1919 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002) 
p 35 
63 The Times, June 10, 1854, Ibid 
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democracy in 1918 had introduced "a new imperative" to seek 
consensus on government policies.64 Nearly seventy years after forging 
its myth of fearless rectitude in defence of free speech and full 
disclosure during the Crimean war, The Times was able to mOliTIt the 
pulpit again to denounce Sir Hamar Greenwood's lies and prevarications 
about the conduct of the Black and Tans in Ireland: "The country does 
indeed desire to know the truth in far larger measure than it has yet 
heard it; but it will strongly resent the idea that it is being told only what 
the Irish Government may consider good for it. It wants the facts, all the 
facts, clearly stated ... It is ... the unwelcome duty of the Press to record as 
best it can a situation of every-increasing gravity.65 
This kind of editorial and its reporting from Ireland provoked a strong 
reaction to a paper still "regarded by the governing classes as a sort of 
oracle."66 Readers wrote in to say they were transferring to the Morning 
Post and circulation fell; the editor, Henry Wickham Steed, was sent 
threatening letters and received an offer of police protection (which he 
declined).67 Lord Northcliffe did agree to an armed escort after a 
photograph of him with a bullet hole through the forehead was delivered 
to Printing House Square.68 In May 1920 Northcliffe was passed a 
letter by his fellow proprietor, John Walter, which he had received from 
a friend who had just returned from India. "I believe your family 
64 Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff: A Social History of British Broadcasting Volume 1, 1922-
1939: Serving the Nation, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991) p 11 
65 The Times, March 21, 1921 
66 F.W. Hirst: The Six Panics and Other Essays (Methuen & Co., London, 1913) p 156 
67 Henry Wickham Steed: Through Thirty Years 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative, (William 
Heinemann Ltd, London 1924) p 351-352 
68 J Lee Thompson: Northdiffe: Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922, (John Murray, London, 
2000) p 341 
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founded The Times", the letter began. "All honour to them. They did 
much to build up our great Empire by their Patriotism. And The Times 
today is trying to destroy that Empire by its want of Patriotism." It was 
-- soon clear that the coverage of Ireland had played its part in the collapse 
of confidence in the circles in which Walter's correspondent moved. 
"Much Indian unrest, Egyptian unrest and Irish unrest, to say nothing of 
American self-satisfaction is due to the want of patriotism of your 
paper. .. Set Patriotism ever before you Sir, and return to Empire 
building, not petty squabbling and fault-finding."69 
By December 1920 Walter ceased to make his points indirectly. He 
wrote to Northcliffe: "Is not the present a favourable opportunity for the 
paper to reconsider its attitude towards Ireland? I allude not so much to 
its policy as to its tone, which has been creating an impression for some 
time past that we are more anxious to damage Lloyd George than to 
achieve a settlement with the Irish. I believe that this attitude is losing 
the paper its authority as well as its readers."70 Northcliffe lent his 
support to Steed, though, as The Times official historians put it, "without 
conviction."7! In mid-December The Times correspondents immediately 
described the burning of the centre of Cork city as a reprisal: "Lorries 
drove rapidly around the principal streets, and their occupants 
discharged their rifles at short intervals. There was a scene of panic and 
people fled in all directions ... Before the curfew hour of 10 0' clock the 
city was deserted by the ordinary public and incendiaries were going 
69 Letter from John Walter to Lord Northcliffe enclosing "letter from a friend", May 19, 1920; 
Northcliffe Papers, British Library, Add. 622391 ff 51-54 
70 WaIter to Northcliffe, December 1, 1920; Northcliffe Papers Add. 622391 ff 78-79 
7! The History of The Times Vol IV, Part 2 (The Times, London, 1952) p 523 
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about burning and looting, removing valuables in portmanteaux."n The 
lack of hesitation in publishing such a damning report drew the 
condemnation of the Morning Post which charged that The Times "used 
at least to wait for evidence when something injurious to a British cause 
was alleged." In March 1921, Steed had to fend off the commander of 
the British forces in Ireland, Nevil Macready, who wrote complaining 
about the "unreliability" of The Times correspondents in Ireland. Steed 
replied with a revealing explanation of the correspondents' attitudes: "I 
have sent from time to time to Ireland men who constantly risked their 
lives during the war as accredited correspondents in recording the deeds 
of the British and Allied forces in France and in other theatres of war. 
But though they naturally went with feelings of loyalty and admiration 
for the Forces of the Crown, they returned filled with loathing at the 
manner in which operations in Ireland are conducted on both sides."73 
Significantly, The Times and the other British newspapers were able to 
withstand criticism of their adversarial reporting from Ireland because 
the intense debate at the heart of the British government meant that it 
was difficult to impugn the patriotism of the correspondents; as we saw 
in the last chapter, C.P. Scott even defined criticism itself as a patriotic 
act. The campaign in Ireland was a limited war in which, as with the 
early days of American war in Vietnam, there was "a high premium on 
appearances."74 Reprisal was never admitted publicly as a policy or a 
72 The Times, December 13, 1920 P 12 
73 Ibid P 573 
74 Philip Geyelin: "Vietnam and the Press: Limited War and an Open Society" in Anthony Lake (ed): 
The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy, 
(New York University Press, 1976) p 169 
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tactic. The authority of the correspondents for filing despatches 
highlighting the brutality and ill discipline of a militarised police force 
fighting a covert war was underpinned by opposition to this counter-
guerrilla strategy at the highest levels of the British political system. The 
special correspondents were able to use their status to directly challenge 
the government in the knowledge that, when attacked by the 
government's official spokesmen, they would be supported by 
influential public figures and further protected by the private views of 
senior politicians and civil servants. 
Even though the influence of the reports from Ireland on political 
opinion in London appeared to resonate with a similar burgeoning 
sensitivity to the news from India, nevertheless the war in Ireland 
attracted far more notice than other imperial adventures. Small colonial 
wars may not have been as obscure to metropolitan publics as they were 
in the nineteenth century but they still merited little attention at this 
time, whichever empire was fighting them. Max Boot has written how in 
the United States - where the idea of empire still possessed novelty 
value -"few Americans paid attention to what their troops were doing on 
the periphery of empire."75 When news did reach the metropolis it was 
hardly timely. In the first seven months of 1920 when accounts of 
reprisals in Ireland were prominent in the pages of the London dailies, 
the RAP bombed villages in Iraq twenty-five times to punish tribes 
resisting the imposition of taxes. A revolt against British rule spread 
across the whole country in June and two divisions of British and Indian 
75 Max Boot: The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, (Basic 
Books, New York, 2002) p 340 
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troops were deployed to suppress it. But the English public had little 
idea of operations in Iraq until mid-July when questions were asked in 
parliament. 76 And in the case of one of the most notorious episodes of 
British rule in India, the Amritsar massacre in Apri11919, a combination 
of distance and censorship meant it took eight months before anything 
more scandalous than the official telegrams appeared in the London 
press, when the findings of the Hunter Committee hearings were first 
published by the Express. 77 In general, as one study of British 
counterinsurgency concluded, up until the early twentieth century 
"[even] when colonials were subjected to excessive force, Victorian 
racial attitudes ensured that there was likely to be little outcry over the 
brutalization of non-Europeans" so that scorched-earth campaigns were 
regularly undertaken without debate or censure. Crucially "[the] 
absence of intense media coverage removed yet another inducement to 
moderation."78 Despite the carnage in Europe, the peace-loving 
Victorian liberal caricatured by George Dangerfield - "he liked his wars 
to be fought at a distance and, if possible, in the name of God" - could 
still remain untroubled in 1920, at least in relation to colonial 
policing.79 
The Irish revolution was about to intrude itself on this state of wilful 
ignorance. Bill Schwarz has argued that "Ireland condensed the 
76 Mark Jacobsen: "'Only by the Sword': British Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 1920" in Small Wars 
and Insurgencies Vol 2, No.2 (August 1991) p 323,335 and 338 
77 Chandrika Kaul: Press and Empire op. cit. p 175. On April 19th, six days after the massacre, The 
Times reported that: 'Troops came into collision with the mob, and there were 200 casualties among 
the rioters.' Ibid p 165 
78 Thomas R. Mockaitis: British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (Macmillan, London, 1990) p 17 
79 George Dangerfield: The Strange Death of Liberal England, (Paladin edition, London, 1970) p 
21 
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anxieties about Britain's imperial position as no other could ... "80 And 
in the sense of holding the line against insurgencies and emerging 
nationalist movements this is true: in an effort to demonstrate how 
ludicrous was Lord Milner's recommendation in 1920 that Egypt be 
granted independence, Churchill suggested leaving out the word 
"Egypt" and substituting the word "Ireland", a small change that would 
"make perfectly good sense and would constitute a complete acceptance 
of Mr de Valera's demands."81 But I want to argue here that Ireland 
provoked anxieties beyond the obvious concerns of imperial defence. 
The intense press coverage of the Black and Tan campaign in Ireland 
exposed to public view tactics of colonial repression that normally lay 
concealed. And this at a time when someone like Edwin Montagu - who 
prided himself on his public relations skills - was trying to re-package 
the empire as an association dependent on good will rather than 
coercion.82 Derek Sayer has argued that the controversy over General 
Dyer's conduct at Amritsar was "a thinly coded discussion of Ireland." 
But I would argue that, equally, the assiduous coverage of the war by the 
foreign correspondents visiting Ireland made such an impact in British 
politics because the controversy it provoked represented a thinly 
disguised discussion of the normal but usually unseen methods of 
colonial warfare. 83 
80 Stuart Hall and Bill Schwarz: "State and Society, 1880-1930" in Langan and Schwarz (eds): 
Crises in the British State 1880-1930, op. cit. P 13 
81 Quoted in John Gallagher: "Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922" in Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol 15, No.2 (1981) P 362 
82 Addressing the House of Commons on the Amritsar scandal, Montagu asked the members: 'Are 
you going to keep your hold upon India by terrorism, racial humiliation and subordination, and 
frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon the goodwill, the growing goodwill, of the people of 
your Indian Empire?" Quoted in Chandrika Kaul: Press and Empire op. cit. p 153 
83 Derek Sayer: "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920" in Past and Present, Vol. 
131 (May 1991) p 153 
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A common reaction to the Amritsar massacre among politicians once it 
became a matter of public controversy was that it was a grotesque 
aberration. Churchill told parliament it was "an episode ... without-
precedent or parallel in the modern history of the British Empire ... an 
extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in 
singular and sinister isolation."84 It was certainly not the British way of 
doing things. "Frightfulness is not a remedy known to the British 
pharmacopoeia" he concluded.85 Such rhetoric was appropriate because 
at this time the common belief was that British military missions in 
foreign lands were conducted to the highest standards and for the best 
motives. By 1914, Glen Wilkinson has written, the British soldier was 
seen at home as "disciplined, regulated and orderly" and "had come to 
be equated with ideals of advancement and to be perceived as a 
harbinger of civilization. British troops took law and order with them to 
the far reaches of the Empire ... "86 
The brand of law and order brought by British ex-servicemen to Ireland 
jarred massively with this myth. Oswald Mosley, who left the Coalition 
benches and joined the opposition when his speeches against reprisals 
were jeered, wrote that "every rule of good soldierly conduct" was being 
disregarded in Ireland.87 Another Conservative, Lord Robert Cecil-
Mosley's mentor - repeatedly warned that the universal validity of 
84 Ibid P 154 
85 Ibid P 159 
86 Glenn R. Wilkinson: Depictions and Images of War in Edwardian Newspapers, 1899-1914, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003) p 39 
87 Quoted in Jan Dalley: Diana Mosley, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2000) p 105 
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British notions of justice was being undermined by the government's 
policy in Ireland.88 Reprisals, Cecil argued, subverted a basic principle 
of British law: "The experience of the world shows it is vital not only 
for conscience but for mere prudence to take care you only punish the 
guilty, and our law, the greatest system of law and order in the world, 
has shown no characteristic greater than the enormous precaution it 
erects around the innocent man to prevent him being brought into peril. 
This is lawlessness; reprisals are the very negation of law."89 For Cecil, 
Britain's worldwide prestige was being ruined by the news of atrocities 
spreading around the globe from Ireland: a scandalous departure from its 
own legal norms exposed the empire as predatory, vindictive and 
unheroic. 
I am confident that the British Empire stands only on the basis of justice and equity and freedom. 
Anything that attacks justice, equity and freedom attacks the whole basis on which the British Empire 
stands. That is really the issue in this matter, for it is the supremacy of the law that is the guarantee of 
freedom ... There is nothing more valuable than the supremacy of the law, which, as this country has 
taught the world, is the great secret of freedom.90 
Just as with Churchill's denunciation of the Amritsar massacre, the 
behaviour of the Black and Tans in Ireland is set against an otherwise 
irreproachable imperial record in which coercion never featured. In this 
view, Ireland had been turned into a sinful comer of the Garden of Eden 
by a malevolent but inexplicably capricious display of official cruelty. 
The connection was never made between collective punishments 
88 Joseph Devlin noted that "one of the curious paradoxes of modern British life that the highest 
moral note has been sounded for freedom by Tories." Hansard Fifth Series Vol 138 Col 664 
[February 21 1921] 
89 Ibid Col 675 
90 Ibid Col 679 
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dispensed in India - a wedding party flogged because it was judged to 
be an illegal gathering, men whipped in front of prostitutes for visiting a 
brothel during curfew - and similar medicine being dispensed in Ireland, 
such as the public floggings witnessed by Hugh Martin.91 Perhaps such a 
connection was deliberately or, at least, subliminally avoided. No doubt 
the revulsion against the methods of the Black and Tans voiced by many 
people was genuine, but the terms in which denunciations were 
formulated presented these tactics as an extraordinary departure from 
cherished national ideals. Sometimes this idea was pressed to excess. 
Philip Gibbs - who, as we saw earlier, resigned from the Daily 
Chronicle because of Lloyd George's Irish policy - regarded the 
campaign in Ireland as terrorism. He believed Britain's global 
supremacy depended on its reputation for fair dealing rather than the 
power of its guns: 
Not deliberately, or without an immense amount of argument in self-justification, can we, as a people, 
accept a policy of brutality or tyranny. There is an inexhaustible store of generous feeling among 
English folk, amounting almost to weakness, in regard to smaller people than themselves, to all 
helpless and little things and to all under-dogs. That generosity can only be overwhelmed by a wave 
of passion, or blinded by ignorance that tyranny is at work or injustice established.92 
Gibbs did not come up with any examples of the display of British 
'weakness' towards peoples smaller than themselves, but he did attempt 
an intriguing explanation as to how the reprisals policy was allowed to 
take shape in the first place. English newspapers, he alleged, were 
forced into a conspiracy of silence. Until a year after the war in Ireland 
ended, "[only] by rumours, by tales told privately, in whispers, by seeing 
91 For India see Derek Sayer: "British Reaction to Amritsar" op. cit. p 141 
92 Philip Gibbs: The Hope of Europe op.cit. p 71 
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smoke and suspecting fire, was the average Englishman aware of any 
dirty work which might besmirch our honour in the world."93 Later in 
the same memoir he acknowledges the work of Hugh Martin and others 
in thrusting "ugly facts ... through the screen of silence."94 But the 
contradiction is instructive: the average Englishman could only 
countenance repressive colonial policing in circumstances where he was 
unaware of it. 
For politicians the most discomforting feature of events in Ireland was 
that tactics of imperial repression usually concealed were now being 
documented and described in the daily press. Explaining the scale of 
denunciation to which Lloyd George was subjected, Garry Peatling has 
written that "British critics of government policy in Ireland were moved 
to a hysterical pitch of indignation because they could not reconcile 
visible policies of coercion in nationalist Ireland - in spite of their 
moderation compared to policies elsewhere in the British Empire - with 
their patriotic faith in Britain's uniqueness."95 It was the press reporting 
from Ireland which made these policies visible. Some clearsighted 
commentators did not need recourse to the language of exceptionalism 
to recognise what they were seeing. In a letter to Lady Gregory in 
November 1920 George Bernard Shaw questioned the need for further 
corroboration of the stories of atrocities appearing in the press. "What 
need have we of witnesses?", Shaw wrote. "The Daily News, The 
Manchester Guardian, The Times, and all the anti-Coalition papers are 
93 Ibid P 73-74 
94 Ibid P 124-125 
95 G.K. Peatling: British Opinion and Irish Self-Government1865-1925: From Unionism to 
Liberal Commonwealth (Irish Academic Press, Dublin 2001) P 180 
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publishing enough news of burnings and slaughterings to make Timour 
the Tarter tum in his grave ... " But even on the anti-government side, 
Shaw jeered, "everybody prefers to go on screaming and clamouring for 
more telescopes to enable the English ... to see the sun at noon."96 
There are some obvious reasons why a war in Ireland would receive 
more extensive coverage in the British press than operations in Iraq -
geographical proximity being one. In the next chapter we will examine 
why the Irish rebel cause acquired such legitimacy among the 
correspondents sent to Dublin. What the war highlighted was that -
however hard the government might try to co-opt the press - in certain 
circumstances, where dissenting voices were compelling, the press could 
not be relied upon to reflect the official line. Chandrika Kaul has pointed 
out how the coalition ministers felt it increasingly necessary to include 
editors and journalists in the formulation of policy for India even though 
this desire was overshadowed by the ambivalence that "the London 
press was a free press at the heart of an imperial system of coercion."97 
Ireland was a warning of what could go wrong from the official point of 
vIew. 
We have seen in this chapter that the newspaper reporting from Ireland 
was the fabric from which the government's critics wove their 
condemnation of Irish policy in the House of Commons. Detailed 
96 Dan H. Laurence (ed): Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, Volume 3: 1911-1925, (Max 
Reinhardt, London, 1985) p 697 
97 Chandrika Kaul: Press and Empire op. cit. pIll 
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quotation from the correspondents' despatches built a powerful mosaic 
of indiscipline and brutality by the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries 
which the government's main spokesman - the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland, Hamar Greenwood - was rarely able to rebut. Mostly he took 
refuge in evasion and prevarication. When this failed he attacked the 
credibility of the journalism from Ireland. Out of public view ministers 
were highly sensitive to the press coverage, as the cabinet minutes later 
revealed. In the absence of a powerful parliamentary opposition, the 
correspondents' despatches from Ireland acquired special authority for 
politicians. Partly this was because the publicity was now deemed 
essential for the successful running of the empire. Managing the press 
was a particular concern in India policy. Nevertheless, Ireland 
commanded more attention than other small wars in the empire. News of 
atrocities in Ireland arrived in London with far greater regularity than 
descriptions of repression in Iraq or India. Thus, as a result of the work 
of foreign correspondents, the activities of the Black and Tans gave the 
British public and people in the rest of world a glimpse of how the more 
remote comers of empire were subdued. This led politicians to denounce 
reprisals by the security forces in Ireland but excuse them as aberrant. It 
was the work of the foreign correspondents which created a debate 
about the normal standards of British colonial rule. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Propaganda War 
In August 1921 a correspondent for The Times, Maxwell H.H. 
MacCartney, recently returned to London from a reporting trip in 
Ireland, wrote a chatty letter to Sinn Fein's Director of Publicity, 
Desmond FitzGerald, "I was quite the blue-eyed boy when I got back to 
the office" MacCartney gloated, "and must take this opportunity of 
thanking you and your office for much of such success as I have 
apparently managed to score in the eyes of The Times."l MacCartney 
was only one among many journalists whose reporting from Ireland was 
aided by Sinn Fein's publicity department. Many of them followed his 
example in finding the rebels' propaganda operation more alert, more 
persuasive and more attuned to their needs than the efforts of the 
government's spokesmen in Dublin Castle. Over time, the propaganda 
successes of the revolutionaries multiplied in inverse proportion to the 
impact of the government's attempt to define the crisis. As Sinn Fein's 
public relations campaign blossomed in scale and sophistication the 
officials in the Castle appeared more uncertain and increasingly 
overawed by the pace of events. In this chapter I will try to explain 
why, in the competition to win over the correspondents, Sinn Fein won 
and Dublin Castle lost. 
I Letter from Maxwell H.H. MacCartney to Desmond FitzGerald, August 19, 1921 in Desmond 
FitzGerald Papers, Archives Departm~nt, University College Dublin, P80/43 
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The first point to bear in mind is that for the Sinn Fein leaders the 
presentation of their case for nationhood to the rest of the world was not 
a sideshow or a distraction but a central part of their strategy to force the 
British government to grant Irish independence. Their efforts were 
focussed initially on the Paris Peace Conference where national self-
determination, thanks to President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen 
Points", was exalted as a panacea to protect the world from a repeat of 
the carnage seen on the Western Front. The Sinn Fein leader Arthur 
Griffith - one of those MPs absent from the Mansion House because he 
had been arrested - wrote to his followers from Gloucester Prison the 
day after the inaugural meeting of the Dail urging them to "above all 
concentrate on the Peace Conference ... " Griffith warned them not to 
dismiss Wilson: "It is a mistake in tactics to suggest that Wilson is not 
sincere. If he is not the suggestion will not help Ireland, and if he be it 
will dishearten him. Our attitude should be that Wilson is a sincere man 
striving to give effect to his programme of freedom for all nations and 
struggling against all the forces of tyranny, imperialism and lusty world 
power which are seeking to dominate the Peace Conference.,,2 A Sinn 
Fein delegation was sent to Paris to try to get Ireland's case onto the 
main agenda. They tried to get themselves taken seriously by the major 
players who were drawing up the map of a new world order. In this 
post-war context "global recognition of Irish sovereignty remained the 
goal by which true independence would be measured.,,3 But securing 
the sympathy of the delegates in Paris was only one objective of the 
Sinn Fein emissaries sent to the Peace Conference. At least as much 
2 Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dennot Keogh and Eunan 0' Halpin (eds): Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy op.cit. p 3--4 Faith in Wilson turned out to be misplaced (see Chapter 7). 
3 Donal Lowry: "New Ireland, Old Empire and the Outside World" op. cit. p 166 
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effort was directed into cultivating newspaper correspondents. When the 
attempts to win official recognition floundered, persuading the press to 
take an interest in Ireland became all the more important, as we shall see 
later. 
Hundreds of journalists came to Paris for the conference and the French 
government established an extravagant press club in a house owned by a 
millionaire.4 In March 1919 one of the Irish delegates wrote back to 
Dublin from Paris reporting a significant response to the circulation of a 
document setting out the Irish case: "Practically every journalist who 
called on me during the ensuing week had the same story for me - about 
the excitement in diplomatic quarters ... For a week or ten days after I 
had no time for any work outside press work. I was receiving journalists 
and visitors of all sorts and conditions from early morning till late at 
night - not leaving my room except for meals." 5 This encouraging 
progress report (which subtly hinted at self-sacrifice for the cause) was 
accompanied by a plea for more money. "What I want is a few thousand 
pounds - don't be too greatly shocked by the light way I speak of it - for 
the purpose of smoothing a passage to the presence of the great men 
... and of securing the ear of the press. You can get nothing whatsoever 
done otherwise. They all expect it ... and whether they are politicians or 
journalists or even statesmen ... 1 must say they are very frank in letting 
you know their point of view in the matter." 6 
4 Margaret MacMillan: Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War 
(John Murray, London, prbck edition 2002) p 65 
5 Ronan Fanning, Michael Kennedy, Dermot Keogh, Eunan 0' Halpin (eds): Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy op.cit. p 8 
6 Ibid P 10 
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Further evidence that the press came to be seen by Sinn Fein as its main 
hope of a breakthrough came in May when Eamon De Valera - the 
President of the self-declared Republic - wrote to the delegation in Paris 
telling them that copies of all documents handed to delegates at the 
Peace Conference should also be distributed to the press. De Valera 
expressed himself in the language of an eager public relations agent: 
"We must keep the Irish Question continually hot now before the public. 
This is the time for beginning our 'big push' everywhere.,,7 
The reality was that the Irish delegation was finding the French press 
unsympathetic, inclined, in their estimation, to be frightened of 
offending the British by writing about Irish separatism. But the mere 
experience of trying to cajole and persuade the correspondents to pay 
attention to Ireland was an education in journalistic practice. An Irish 
delegate wrote from Paris on June 22nd : "The only way to do effective 
propaganda is to get personal introductions to well-known and 
influential people and to get French writers interested in this way, for a 
paper will publish from a recognised correspondent a great deal that we 
would never get in otherwise ... the only publicity you can count on here 
is what you can get through personally friendly writers and 
journalists ... ,,8 This lesson was well learned: cultivating personal 
relationships with journalists and writers who came to Ireland was 
crucial to sympathetic coverage of the national struggle. This form of 
ingratiation was not limited to merely political argument. When the 
delegation in Paris informed Dublin that an eminent French 
7 Ibid P14 
8 Ibid P 32 
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correspondent showed an interest in writing a series of articles about the 
Irish question, it was arranged that a copy of Yeats' poems be sent out to 
Paris for him. 9 
As hopes that the Irish delegation could get themselves an audience at 
the full conference began to fade, the attention of the Sinn Fein 
diplomats turned to making use of the contacts made in Paris to keep 
Ireland in the public eye. With money available from supporters in the 
United States it was suggested from Dublin "that a small number of 
select American Journalists together with representatives of the French 
and Italian Press should be invited to visit Ireland and see for themselves 
the conditions obtaining here." The headquarters staff insisted that they 
be carefully vetted: "You will realise the desirability of selecting these 
gentlemen carefully as it would not do to invite gentlemen here at our 
expense who could be got at by our friend the enemy."l0 The work of 
the Irish delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was the embryo of an 
international publicity campaign that would flourish as the war 
developed. By the time of the truce in 1921 official Irish press bureaus 
had been established in Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Geneva and the United 
States. II 
The fact that a small independence movement was able to achieve such 
wide reach was largely due to the leadership of two English-born men, 
both connected to a wider network than other Irish revolutionaries, who 
9 Ibid P 18 & 34 
]0 Ibid P 38 
]] Keiko Inoue: "Propaganda II: Propaganda of Dail Eireann, 1919-21" in Joost Augusteijn (ed): The 
Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (Pal grave, London, 2002) p 88 
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shaped Sinn Fein's publicity strategy throughout this period. The first 
head of the Propaganda Department of Dail Eireann was Desmond 
FitzGerald, an Imagist poet, born in London in 1888 and brought up 
there. 12 Until adulthood he only visited Ireland twice, once as a child 
and then when he was 21. In 1911 he married Mabel McConnell, the 
daughter of a prominent Belfast protestant businessman who had 
become an Irish nationalist. She had worked as a secretary for George 
Bernard Shaw and was friendly with Robert Lynd, the Belfast journalist 
who wrote regularly for the London press about Ireland. The couple 
came to live in Ireland in 1913 and it was then that FitzGerald began to 
work for the separatist movement in earnest. His son Garret FitzGerald 
(the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1973 to 1977 and Taoiseach 
between 1982 and 1987) suggests that his father's attraction to Ireland 
can be attributed at least in part to his admiration for Yeats. 13 But it 
soon became clear after Desmond FitzGerald's arrival in Ireland that he 
had not come from London in search of poetry. At the end of 1914 he 
was expelled from Kerry by the police because of his activities in 
organising the Irish Volunteers; in 1915 he was sentenced to six months 
imprisonment for seditious speech. He was in the General Post Office in 
Dublin throughout the Easter Rising in 1916. After being arrested after 
the failed rebellion he spent a year in prison in England. 14 
12 Lawrence Ginnell was in the post for a few months when he was arrested in May, 1919 
13 Interview with Garret FitzGerald, Dublin, January 20, 2003. He recalled that when he was in 
the European movement, agitating for Irish membership of the EEC in the early 1960s he would 
brief foreign journalists and take them to meet the Irish prime minister, Sean Lemass. Some of the 
older journalists told him they had been briefed by his father in the Shelbourne Hotel. They said the 
waiters would always warn if the Black and Tans were coming. 
14 "Notes on Desmond FitzGerald", Desmond FitzGerald Papers, Archives Department, University 
College Dublin P8011453(l) 
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When Desmond FitzGerald took over the Propaganda Department in 
May 1919 he worked from No.6 Harcourt Street in central Dublin, an 
address that was to become familiar to foreign correspondents covering 
Ireland. He retained the air of an upper-class bohemian. A colleague 
described him entering the office in a grey lounge suit, dust-coat open 
"with mincing step and supercilious air. .. a cigarette going and a 
magnificent pearl grey velours trilby ... set a jaunty angle on his crispy 
light-brown hair." But she concluded that "these affectations, however, 
masked an exceptionally brave character.,,15 FitzGerald's demeanour 
attracted other disapproving comments from his fellow (Irish) 
revolutionaries: one young activist recounted many years later coming 
across FitzGerald when they were both interned in the Curragh camp 
and being surprised by his "drawling English accent" as he discussed 
French literature with a professor. "I never dared to speak to FitzGerald 
as I quickly gathered that he was in the category of people satirised by 
the epigram: 'My name is George Nathaniel CurzonII am a most 
superior person.",16 However, a personality so off-putting to a rank and 
file volunteer from Dublin could win the admiration of foreign 
journalists and writers. After FitzGerald's death in 1947 a columnist in 
The Irish Times recalled seeing him walking into the Shelbourne Hotel 
to meet journalists with a yellow-backed French novel sticking out of his 
pocket. "Desmond FitzGerald was an intellectual revolutionary. He 
always had the greatest contempt for the sans culottes, and, in some 
respects, almost might be described as a reactionary ... [But] he made 
quite a success of his job and his easy manner helped to convince 
15 Kathleen Napoli McKenna: "Wielding Words and Other Weapons for the Cause" in The Irish 
Times, Monday, December 24, 1979, p 10 
16 Todd Andrews: Dublin Made Me: An Autobiography (The Mercier Press, Cork, 1979) p 177 
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foreigners that the Sinn Fein movement was something more than a 
mere upsurge of the Irish proletariat.,,17 An obituarist in the Manchester 
Guardian pinpointed his success as a propagandist: "He had an 
admirable skill in directing [journalists'] movements by suggesting in 
such a way as to ensure without their knowing it that they would hear 
and see what he thought desirable and nothing else.,,18 
FitzGerald recruited another Englishman with a drawling accent to the 
Publicity Department. Erskine Childers, the author of a recently 
published and acclaimed spy novel, The Riddle afthe Sands, had already 
acquired a flamboyant reputation among Irish nationalists. In a famous 
incident before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, he had sailed to 
Germany on his yacht, the Asgard, and returned to Ireland with a 
consignment of arms and ammunition. The rifles were unloaded at 
Howth Harbour on the north side of Dublin and the Irish Volunteers 
marched away with them in an open act of defiance of the authorities. 
At first glance Childers had an unlikely CV for an Irish nationalist: born 
in London and educated at Haileybury school; a law graduate of 
Cambridge; British army officer in the Boer War; clerk in the House of 
Commons. His father was Professor of Oriental Studies at London 
University and a cousin of his father had been Chancellor in Gladstone's 
government. Childers' Irish connection came from his mother's side of 
his family. She came from a prominent Anglo-Irish family who owned 
land in Co. Wicklow since before Cromwell came to Ireland in the 
17 An Irishman's Diary by "Nichevo", The Irish Times, April 12, 1947: Desmond FitzGerald 
Papers P801 1452 (4) 
lH Unsigned obituary, The Manchester Guardian, April 10, 1947; FitzGerald Papers P801 14521 
(2) 
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seventeenth century.19 Childers appears to have become convinced of 
the justice of Home Rule for Ireland around the time when he resigned 
from his job in the House of Commons in 1910 to attempt to become a 
Liberal candidate for parliament. In a lecture in London in 1912, later 
published as a pamphlet, Childers set out his strategy for winning Home 
Rule for Ireland in a way that could stand as a prescription for his later 
work with journalists: "England cannot be forced to accept the Irish 
ideal which I have ventured to place before you to-night. But she can be 
made to understand it, and I believe that if she understood it she would 
sanction it." 20 
By 1919 Childers was offended by how the Irish nationalist cause was 
being represented in the international press. Ireland, he wrote, was 
portrayed unfairly "as a stab-in-the-back rebellious province which 
didn't help in the war."21 When he was first brought by FitzGerald to 
the Propaganda Department at No.6 Harcourt Street, Childers made an 
impression with the range of his contacts in London. One of 
FitzGerald's acolytes showed Childers an article from the Daily Mail as 
an example of the kind of journalism Sinn Fein was trying to counter. 
Childers told him he had just spoken to the editor of the Daily News 
before setting out from London and he was confident that he could get 
some articles favourable to Sinn Fein printed in that paper. 22 Later, the 
Sinn Fein leader Arthur Griffith told Brennan that Childers was a good 
19 Michael Mcinerney: The Riddle of Erskine Childers (E & TO' Brien, Dublin, 1971) p 18-25 
20 Erskine Childers: The Form and Purpose of Home Rule (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & 
Co., London, 1912) p 32-33 
21 Quoted in Jim Ring: Erskine Childers (John Murray, London, 1996) p 208 
22 Robert Brennan: Allegiance (Browne and Nolan, Dublin, 1950) p 244 
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man to have: "He has the ear of a big section of the English people." 23 
It was clear that Sinn Fein leaders realised early on that Childers' 
contacts in London "assured him access to necessary white space.,,24 
But as with FitzGerald's intellectualism, Childers' ascendancy 
background, his British army career and his air of superiority also 
provoked resentment. There was a lingering suspicion of him. One pro-
nationalist journalist remembered the gossip that dogged Childers: 
"[He] had fought for the British and written The Riddle of the Sands to 
save the British Fleet from the Germans ... he was a Major and a D.S.O. 
And Dublin laughed at his indignant letter to the Press after a military 
raid on his house, and some young pup in a second lieutenant's uniform 
had dropped a cigarette on his best carpet. J amey, was that all he had to 
vex him?" 25 
In May 1919 Childers was sent to work with the delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Like his colleagues who were already there he found 
it difficult to persuade journalists to write about Ireland; they were, he 
remarked, "nervous as old women about offending England.,,26 He was 
particularly scathing about the British delegation, people of his own 
class, graduates - like him - of public school and Oxbridge: he 
complained that they "paid court to him socially, and then poured ice-
23 Ibid P 244 
24 Tom Cox: Damned Englishman: A Study of Erskine Childers, 1870-1922 (Exposition Press, 
New York, 1975) p 108 
25 Desmond Ryan: Remembering Sion: A Chronicle of Storm and Quiet (Arthur Barker, London, 
1934) p 283-284 
26 Jim Ring: Erskine Childers op. cit. p 211 
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cold water on his burning ideals.,,27 The resentment he felt crystallised a 
self-conscious rejection of his origins and what he might have been in 
favour of the risky adventure of Irish nationalism: "Pressed, they care 
nothing about anyone's freedom in Europe and regard the whole thing as 
a means of curbing Germany. I have a kind of blind fury sometimes at 
seeing these cultured, cold-blooded, self-satisfied people making careers 
out of the exploitation of humanity and crucifying the Christs with a bon 
mot or a shrug.,,28 During his few months in Paris Childers judged that 
he made little headway in persuading the delegates to take the Irish 
cause seriously. But he was eventually persuasive in his dealings with 
the recalcitrant French journalists. In August 1919 Le Temps advocated 
a British withdrawal from Ireland and Childers was credited with this 
publicity coup. 29 He returned to London in August but by September he 
had moved his family to Dublin to begin work in the Propaganda 
Department. The move had not been an easy decision but the depth of 
commitment it entailed was revealed in a phrase used years later by his 
wife Molly to describe their steady conversion: "we gradually became 
ready to give ourselves to Ireland." 30 
Between 1919 and 1921 FitzGerald and Childers would between them 
mould Sinn Fein's propaganda department into the most effective 
operation of its kind yet seen. In early 1919 its main function was to act 
as a research office for the Sinn Fein leadership, providing data for 
speeches and statistics and background information for the statements 
27 Quoted in Andrew Boyle: The Riddle of Erskine Childers (Hutchinson, London, 1977) p 252 
28 Ibid P 253 
29 Arthur Mitchell: Revolutionary Government in Ireland op.cit. p 100 
30 Jim Ring: Erskine Childers op. cit. p 207 
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prepared for the Peace Conference. It also prepared articles for the Irish 
provincial press, election literature for the General Election of 1918, and 
pamphlets to be distributed abroad.31 A few months after taking over the 
Department, FitzGerald devised a type of news-sheet called the "Weekly 
Summary" to be distributed to the Irish and international press once a 
fortnight. It listed "acts of aggression" committed by British forces in 
Ireland concentrating on details of place and time. The "Weekly 
Summary" was the prototype for perhaps the most successful instrument 
of the Sinn Fein propagandists: the Irish Bulletin. It was a 
mimeographed sheet launched on November 11, 1919, the first 
anniversary of the armistice. That first edition was circulated to only 
thirty people; the offices of the Dublin newspapers and friendly foreign 
correspondents staying in local hotels?2 But within a few months the 
Bulletin was being read by political figures in London and by 
politicians, diplomats and journalists in Europe and the rest of the world. 
The Bulletin's success derived from the flair with which it described 
incidents in unconventional war developing in Ireland. In the words of 
Charles Townshend it "excelled in portraying an exchange of shots as a 
battle, the sniping of a police barrack as an assault or the breaking of 
windows by Crown Forces as the sacking of a town.,,33 But much of it 
was written in a more restrained, bureaucratic style which aimed to 
mimic the authority of official publications, categorizing incidents under 
headings such as "Arrests", "Armed Assaults" and "Raids" in the same 
way as a police inspector might write a report to headquarters. Often, the 
31 "Account of the Department of Publicity submitted by Desmond FitzGerald", August 1921, Ernest 
Blythe Papers, Archives Department, University College Dublin P24Jl9 
32 Kathleen Napoli McKenna: "The Irish Bulletin" in The Capuchin Annual (Dublin 1970) 
33 Charles Townshend: The British Campaign in Ireland op.cit. p 67 
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Bulletin's effect is achieved by the absence of the hyperbole that 
Townshend identifies as its hallmark. For instance, the following entries 
appeared in the Bulletin under the heading "Raids" in July 1920: 
Raids: The residence of Mr P Dineen, recently elected Republican Member of Skibbereen District 
Council, Co. Cork was forcibly entered and searched by a British police and military raiding party. 
British police and military raided the quarters of Mr P.J. Crowley, employee of the Dunmanway 
Union, Co. Cork. 
Murders: Richard Lumley, a day-labourer, aged 60 of Rearcross, Co. Tipperary was shot dead 
without warning by a British military and police patrol, whilst on his way home from a wake at 
Abbey Hotel, Rearcross on the morning of July 4th.34 
Desmond FitzGerald's colleagues recalled how he encouraged this pared 
down style. To Kathleen Napoli McKenna he was "a stickler for 
unembellished truth" who would upbraid Frank Gallagher for indulging 
in exaggerations?5 Ernest Blythe recalled that FitzGerald "resisted the 
pressure to which he was constantly subjected from most quarters in 
favour of painting outrages by British forces in a blacker hue than was 
justified by the facts and also the pressure in favour of accepting without 
investigation every report of an outrage which came in from the 
country." This for Blythe resulted in the Bulletin "having a reputation 
for reliability which few sheets of its kind can ever have enjoyed.,,36 
When FitzGerald travelled abroad to meet journalists the Bulletin 
34 "List of the Acts of Aggression committed in Ireland by the police and Military of the Usurping 
English Government, as reported in the Daily Press, for the week ending: Saturday, July 10th , 1920", 
Irish Bulletin Summaries 1919-21, National Library ofIreland. 
35 Napoli McKenna, "Wielding Words and Other Weapons" op cit. 
36 Ernest Blythe: Sunday Independent, April 13, 1947; Desmond FitzGerald Papers P801l452 (6) 
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became his calling card and it became a major source for those writing 
about Ireland. 
By 1920, as the guerrilla war intensified, the Sinn Fein Propaganda 
Department was regularly forced to move from one safe house to 
another. After curfew armoured cars carrying Black and Tan patrols 
would prowl through the streets. There were several near misses, raids 
on every house in the street save the one where the Bulletin was being 
produced. One house in the centre of Dublin was ransacked shortly after 
the Propaganda office had vacated it. For a while the Bulletin was 
compiled from a flat which FitzGerald had rented for his wife and newly 
born son.37 In October 1920 the offices moved to the first floor of No. 
11 Molesworth Street. A brass plate on the front door announced that 
the first floor was occupied by a company importing oil, a plausible 
business tenant in a smart neighbourhood. For Kathleen Napoli 
McKenna it was a case of hiding in plain sight. 
What could be more daring, yet, at the same time more secure ... than this respectable, aristocratic, 
snobbish Unionist street!' .. The Grandlodge of Freemasons, the Masonic Orphans' School, the 
Hibernian Church, the Molesworth Hall and the Church ofIreland Temperance Welfare Society were 
all neighbours of ours. In addition Messrs. James and James, the Crown Solicitors, occupied the 
halldoor flat, while in the flat above ours were installed two elderly, sourfaced, hoity-toity spinsters 
whom we surmised were engaged as librarians in Trinity CoIlege.
38 
One weekend the whole street was raided except for the first floor of 
No. 11. 
37 Napoli McKenna, "Wielding Words and Other Weapons" op cit. 
38 Ibid 
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On another occasion, when a cordon was established around 
Molesworth Street, Frank Gallagher pushed his revolver into a stack of 
filed newspapers before slipping away.39 A month later the offices were 
discovered during another weekend raid. All the newspaper files and 
printing equipment and the entire address list for recipients of the 
Bulletin were carried away by the police. The staff assembled in another 
underground office and produced a new Bulletin the following Tuesday. 
But readers were puzzled to receive two copies of the Bulletin that 
week: one was a fake issued by British intelligence and produced on an 
Underwood typewriter confiscated in the raid.4o 
By that stage Sinn Fein spokesmen had established an extraordinary 
degree of trust with foreign correspondents. The correspondents would 
regularly come to meet FitzGerald and others in a house on Leeson 
Street, just south of the centre of Dublin. 41 Frank Gallagher befriended 
Donald Boyd of the Manchester Guardian, writing to his fiancee about 
how much he liked him. One night Boyd invited Gallagher to the Abbey 
Theatre and then they both returned to Gallagher's flat. 
We sipped tea and then I got Boyd to tell me his war experiences. He was exceptionally good 
remembering all the little things that give you a real idea of what it was like. The war and its 
horribleness has made him a pacifist for life and his effort is to try and make it impossible for all 
time. He will of course not succeed, but it is indicative of good in him to have that as his great aim.42 
39 Kathleen Napoli McKenna: "A Battle of Wits for Publicity" in The Irish Times Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday, December 25, 26, 27, 1979 P JO 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Letter from Frank Gallagher to Cecilia Saunders, November 13, 1921 in Frank Gallagher 
Papers, Trinity College Archives, Dublin 132 
154 
Gallagher confessed to having rowed with Boyd but reported that their 
differences had been resolved after the journalist "reformed greatly." In 
any case, Gallagher wrote, the argument was of no consequence because 
Boyd" ... was always with us and was only getting fractious because he, 
like the rest of us, didn't understand much.,,43 The degree of trust 
established with some of the correspondents was shown by how, when 
Desmond FitzGerald was arrested in February 1921 and taken for 
interrogation at Dublin Castle, his wife got in touch with Boyd and Guy 
Moyston of the United Press news agency, "both excellent friends of 
ours, most sympathetic to our Movement and fond of Desmond in a 
personal way due to meeting him frequently ... " 44 They contacted Basil 
Clarke, the Publicity Officer at Dublin Castle and McKenna claims this 
saved FitzGerald some rough treatment.45 
With FitzGerald removed, Childers took over the Propaganda 
Department. The move to Dublin had radicalised Childers. Initially he 
supported Home Rule and even in early 1919 Childers -like many 
others in Sinn Fein - would have settled for Dominion status of Ireland 
within the British Empire, the same kind of autonomy enjoyed by white 
colonies such as New Zealand and Canada. But by late 1919, when 
guerrilla warfare had overtaken diplomatic manoeuvring, Childers did 
not back away: he moved in step with the militarists. In his propaganda 
work he did not try to evade acknowledgment of physical force tactics 
and he criticised those who equivocated: "Nothing struck me more, 
when I first got insight into the publicity department, than the failure of 
43 Ibid 
44 Napoli McKenna: "A Battle of Wits" op cit. 
45 Ibid 
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the political side to take definite responsibility for the Army and its 
work - a fatal failure because .. .it was only by insisting that it was 
waging a legitimate war of defence and by basing propaganda on that 
principle that one could meet the torrent of defamation." 46 
Childers set about this work with diligence. His diaries are a log of 
meetings with foreign correspondents occasionally interspersed by the 
mundanity of life in the Dublin suburbs. His record of May 14th, 1920 
reads: "To house with mother. To shops for wall-paper and linoleum. 
Weibel, Swiss journalist, spent evening.,,47 On June 3rd : "Took 11 train 
to Ennis. Travelled and lunched with Gregg of New York World. Lent 
him my SF Court cuttings.,,48 On August 29th : "21 callers! 
including ... Editor of Christian Science Monitor and correspondent of 
'Matin. ",49 And September 20th : "Coached McCarthy [Desmond] for 
interview with Castle official." 50 
Childers also visited London regularly to keep in touch with British 
politicians. For instance, he regularly fed material to Wedgwood Benn 
for use in questions in the House of Commons. In October 1920 he 
visited London for the opening of Parliament; his diary entry for 
October 20th serves to illustrate the range of his contacts in the British 
establishment. "On to lunch at Nat Lib Club with Hammond 
[J.L.] ... After saw J.A. Spender, Donald McLean. Walked with latter to 
46 Boyle op. cit. p 257 
47 Erskine Childers Papers, Trinity College Dublin Manuscripts 7811 Diaries p 43 
48 Ibid P 55 
49 Ibid P 69 
50 Ibid P 73 
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House of Commons ... Saw Asquith for half an hour. Urged same points 
as on Simon I think in vain."Sl 
In London Childers would also see Sinn Fein's representative -there, Art 
O'Brien, whose job was to distribute the Bulletin and introduce foreign 
correspondents who wished to come to Ireland. Reading the memos that 
passed between O'Brien in London and Childers in Dublin it is clear 
that Sinn Fein went out of its way to facilitate journalists who travelled 
to Ireland. Sometimes the consequences of this enthusiasm could be 
comic. In a memo to Childers in March 1921, O'Brien responds to a 
query for a payment of £20 to an "F. Morrell." O'Brien explains that 
the name is "Moller" not "Morell" and that he was a correspondent for a 
Norwegian newspaper. 
He called upon me about mid-October saying that he was crossing to Ireland the next night, that his 
paper had agreed to his going but had not sent him the necessary funds. He was himself low in cash 
and asked if I could advance him £20 until the end of the month. I advanced the amount and advised 
D.F. [Desmond FitzGerald]. The end of the month came but I did not see or hear from Moller. I then 
wrote to him. He called after some time, said that after all he had not been able to make the journey, 
asked for a further delay for repayment. He has been approached again twice since then, but he 
makes excuses. I am afraid we shall not see the £20 again ... 
S2 
Such rashness is indicative of O'Brien's zeal to promote the cause, an 
eagerness which also extended to making Childers aware of his opinions 
on the general thrust of propaganda. In one memo O'Brien questioned 
51 Ibid P 79 
52 Memo from Art O'Brien to Erskine Childers 29/3/21, Art O'Brien Papers, National Library of 
Ireland Archives MS 8421143 
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the labelling of casualties in the weekly summaries of incidents issued 
from Dublin. "It seems to me that the description 'Constabulary Killed' 
and 'Military Killed' are misleading to the foreign reader. It would be 
- advisable to preface the word 'English' in both cases or 'Enemy'. It is 
a great pity you continue to use the word 'Constabulary' and 'Police' 
because the foreign reader naturally comes to the conclusion that they 
are really 'Constabulary' and 'Police' whose only duty is to do the 
ordinary policy duty. That is of course exactly the impression which the 
English Government seeks to make on the foreign reader's mind.,,53 In a 
sign of how he increasingly sought to polarise the conflict Childers 
wrote back a few weeks later in agreement: "One of my changes was to 
eliminate 'police' from all publicity matter. But we cannot eliminate 
'Constabulary' because the sections of English forces have sometimes to 
be distinguished. ,,54 
0' Brien appeared barely satisfied by this response. By return post he 
challenges the use of the word "British" to describe the Crown Forces. 
"What does it mean? Who is our enemy? We have no direct quarrel 
with Australia, S. Africa, Canada, India etc. and they are part of the 
British Empire. So if the word 'British' is used in that sense it is 
obviously misleading. Nor have we a direct quarrel with Scotland or 
Wales, so that if the word 'British' is used to mean the people of Great 
Britain, it is equally misleading. Ireland has one enemy and one enemy 
in the world and that enemy is England. We should constantly make 
that plain to all the nations, whether they are in the British Empire or out 
53 Memo from Art 0' Brien to Erskine Childers April 19, 1921, Art O'Brien Papers MS 8421145 
54 Art O'Brien Papers MS8421/46 
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of it. It is one of England's traps to make it appear that Ireland is the 
sulky naughty child in the great bright happy nursery of the British 
Empire."ss In an extraordinary remark given Childers' background, 
O'Brien lays the blame for wrongheaded propaganda on years of 
ingrained Anglicisation: "Unfortunately even the best of our people 
have in some degree fallen a victim to the insidious poison of 
denationalising English education and we have to be constantly on the 
alert to guard against the effects of the poison.,,56 The contempt for 
British culture registered here by O'Brien is repeatedly evident among 
Sinn Fein leaders, and seems to have been unaffected by the sympathy 
displayed by British journalists and the increasingly adversarial 
coverage in the London newspapers of the government's campaign to 
crush the rebellion. It will be recalled that Childers himself believed 
that the Irish cause was subject to a torrent of defamation in the British 
press when he joined the Sinn Fein Propaganda Department in 1919. 
How could Sinn Fein so readily discount favourable treatment at the 
hands of British journalists? 
One reason the notion that Ireland was being incessantly defamed 
remained credible was its longevity: it had been a major theme of Sinn 
Fein propaganda in Ireland for several years. As the French historian 
Marc Bloch observed about atrocity stories during the First World War, 
"a false report is always born out of collective perceptions that exist 
before its birth."s7 Arthur Griffith, the Sinn Fein leader who had given 
55 Memo from Art O'Brien to Erskine Childers, May 3, 1921, Art O'Brien Papers MS 8421/45 
56 Ibid 
57 Quoted in Ian Ousby: The Road to Verdun: France, Nationalism and the First World War 
(Pimlico, London 2003) p 18 
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Childers the task of persuading English journalists that Irish aspirations 
were being brutally suppressed, had a very low opinion of the British 
press. Griffith was a tireless polemical journalist himself, described as 
"extraordinarily clever" by Augustine Birrell, the chief secretary-in 
Ireland at the time of the 1916 Rising.58 Much of his polemical writing 
in the leading Sinn Fein paper, Nationality, was devoted to denouncing 
the iniquity of British proprietors such as Lord Northcliffe and Sir 
William Hulton. 
Fleet Street proprietors occupied the attention of Sinn Fein 
propagandists partly because they wished to contrast the nobility of 
Irish life with the tawdry immorality of urban Britain. Northcliffe was 
reviled not only as the publisher of The Times and the Daily Mail but 
because he also published a stream of children's newspapers and 
magazines which found a ready market in Ireland. Sinn Fein writers 
condemned him as 'the Cromwell of journalese (sic)", an "evil genius" 
seducing people with "triviality or gross idiocy".59 One Sinn Fein 
journalist contrasted the ease with which tabloid scandal circulated in 
Ireland with the suppression of the separatists' wholesome advocacy of 
a new Irish nation: "The grossest, most brutal, and most insane 
immorality may be, and has been, propagated by British newspapers and 
the British censor 'winks the other eye. ",60 
58 Michael Laffan: The Resurrection of Ireland op.cit. p 16 
59 Ben Novick: Conceiving Revolution: Irish Nationalist Propaganda during the First World 
War (Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2001) p 167 
60 Ibid P 132-133 
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More specifically Sinn Fein was focussed on discrediting British atrocity 
propaganda during the war. The aim was to neutralise recruitment 
campaigns shaped deliberately to have an appeal in Ireland. Posters 
- ~ circulated by the recruiting sergeants played on Irish sympathies for 
Catholic Belgium; they also urged Irishmen to avenge attacks such as 
the sinking of the cruise ship the Lusitania off the southern Irish coast 
in May 1915 and tried to stir up fear of an invasion by the German 
army.61 Arthur Griffith blamed cowardly journalists on British papers 
for inventing scare stories. Commenting on reports of German soldiers 
attacking women and children in Belgium, Griffith wrote that the 
"factory for the manufacture of German atrocities" could be found in a 
pub in Fleet Street.62 He came up with the idea that Britain had erected a 
paper wall around Ireland: "on the inside she told Ireland what she 
wanted the Irish to believe about the world, and on the outside she told 
the world what she wanted to believe about Ireland.,,63 
The irony was that the British government could only wish that it could 
be as successful at isolating Ireland as Griffith made out. Once the 
Anglo-Irish war began, the paper wall - if it ever existed - was in tatters 
and by the end of 1919 the government appeared to have lost control of 
the press coverage of Ireland. Initially prepared to share the Irish 
administration's disdain for the de facto declaration of Irish 
independence by the Sinn Fein parliament in Dublin, the correspondents 
turned to urgent questioning of Irish policy as acts of violence 
61 Ibid: for Belgium see p 104-107; for the Lusitania p 72-76 and for the danger of a German 
invasion p 120--125 
62 Ibid P 107 
63 Arthur Mitchell: Revolutionary Government in Ireland op. cit. p 99 
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intensified. Correspondents who were in favour of self-government for 
Ireland bemoaned the use of military measures, the indecision among 
officials in Dublin Castle and the tendency of the government in London 
towards drift. 
How did this happen? The root of the explanation lies in Dublin Castle. 
A French visitor to Ireland described the Castle as "A world in itself, a 
city within a city. It is at once the palace of the viceroy, a military 
barrack, the seat of administration and the office of the secret 
police ... omnipotent and omniscient.,,64 The fulcrum of British rule in 
Ireland had changed little since the Act of Union in 1800. It was riven 
with sectarian intrigue, petty careerism and antiquated procedure.65 By 
1919 it was in a state of administrative paralysis: "The Castle was 
meant to run the country as well as to advise the British government on 
policy, and became a watchword for unaccountable and inefficient rule, 
criticised on every front for its top-heavy bureaucracy.,,66 In an article 
early in 1919 Hugh Martin had advised the new Chief Secretary for 
Ireland, Ian Macpherson, that he would find in Dublin Castle "the most 
bureaucratic system in Europe" dedicated to "a militarism more deeply 
entrenched than any in Whitehall". There was, Martin wrote, "no 
government machinery in good working order. .. no public opinion on 
which to play except a mass of confused resentments. In short 
64 Kieran Flanagan: "The Chief Secretary's Office 1853-1914: A Bureaucratic Enigma" in Irish 
Historical Studies Vol XXIV 1984-85 
65 Hopkinson: Irish War ofIndependence op. cit. p 3-10 
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[Macpherson] will find chaos upstairs, downstairs and in my Lady's 
chamber with Brute Force sitting in the drawing room.,,67 
Signs of this inefficiency are especially visible in the Castle's censorship 
regime. Wartime censorship had been introduced in Ireland in 1914, 
mainly directed at the flourishing crop of Sinn Fein newspapers and 
magazines such as those edited by Arthur Griffith. Newspapers were 
shut down and presses seized but with little lasting effect. "Press 
censorship managed to close newspapers, but propagandists always 
found a way to avoid regulations.,,68 After the Easter Rising in 1916 ad 
hoc measures were replaced by new, formal regulations based on the 
Defence of the Realm Act. The Chief Secretary, Augustine Birrell, told 
parliament it was imperative that "news should not reach the neutral 
countries and particularly our friends in America, which would be 
calculated to give them an entirely false impression as to the importance 
of what has taken place, important as that is.,,69 But the new measures, 
for all their judicial formality, were scarcely more successful than the 
old piecemeal approach. Although most of the Sinn Fein propagandists 
were imprisoned in the months after the Rising the "mosquito press" -
as the Official Censor, Lord Decies, referred to the nationalist papers -
began to thrive again soon afterwards.70 
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The real problem was that the officials in Dublin Castle were unable to 
reconcile a policy of banning seditious speech with the reality of politics 
in Ireland. Lord Decies' s tenure as censor in the years after 1916 is a 
r-ecord of bluster and uncertainty. A classic example of his lack of 
confidence is a letter he wrote to the Chief Secretary in January, 1917. 
Decies gives his views on a series of nationalist publications and then 
comments: "These observations lead directly to that most difficult 
question as to how far the discussion of the absolute independence of 
Ireland as a political theory, entailing, as it must, the development of 
anti-British feeling, is to be construed as "likely to cause disaffection". 
In dealing with this question I am most anxious to have guidance and if 
possible a definition.,,7! 
Indeed there is evidence that, unable to prevent the publication of 
nationalist propaganda, Decies real aim was to curb criticism of the Irish 
administration itself. In February 1917, he stopped a telegram from an 
Irish stringer to the Manchester Guardian about the latest wave of 
arrests of Sinn Feiners which concluded: "The trust of the man in the 
Irish street is gone with the snows of January. He reads everything to-
day as a possible move in a rather shabby game of chicane, and he is 
given to cynical thoughts when he reflects upon the high ideals of 
national liberty and free citizenship for which the Irish Divisions 
marched away to battle. Such is the atmosphere into which Irish affairs 
have drifted." Decies described the article as "most undesirable", 
drawing attention to implied criticism of government policy in the last 
71 Lord Decies to the Chief Secretary, January 17,1917: Press Censorship Records, Nat. Archives, 
Dublin 31722/4 (160) 
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sentence by underlining it.72 The argument that censorship was more 
about self-protection for the Castle rather than curbing sedition was 
taken up repeatedly by Unionist journalists. On July 20th , 1917, the 
managing editor of the Belfast Telegraph wrote to Decies that "In our 
view it is at the present time a great crime to mislead the British public 
by permitting them to form the conclusion that matters are happy and 
peaceful in Ireland, when some parts of the country are seething in 
sedition. Would it not be a more logical course for the Government to 
prevent the delivery of seditious speeches, and the writing of seditious 
articles? To withhold from the British public all knowledge of what is 
actually happening in this country is to mislead it. .. It turns the 
censorship into a political instrument. .. ,,73 
In December 1918 Lord Decies submitted his final monthly report for 
the year and attached to it a letter of resignation. His ambiguous 
observations betray a sense of failure. In his resignation letter he 
advocates that censorship be ended because although "fully justified as a 
war measure" in peacetime it had become "weakened in authority and 
altered in character." He has nothing but praise for the press who "have 
with hardly an exception endeavoured to help rather than hinder, and 
have conscientiously carried out those instructions which it was my duty 
to issue to them ... this very fact is in my judgment a strong argument for 
the discontinuance of censorship while yet it retains a measure of 
72 Memo from Lord Decies to Under Secretary for Ireland, February 26, 1917: Press Censorship 
Records, Nat. Archives, Dublin 3/722/3 (34) 
73 Letter to Lord Decies July 20th , 1917: Press Censorship Records, Nat. Archives, Dublin 3/722/3 
(146) 
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goodwill." 74 However, the same report contains a stark admission that 
censorship had failed to quell subversive journalism. "It may now be 
assumed that practically every provincial newspaper correspondent of 
the Dublin newspapers is a Sinn Feiner, and that incidents ... are 
deliberately reported in the light most unfavourable to the authorities. 
This pollution of news sources will be a lasting trouble.,,75 
As we have seen from the change in the tone of coverage by British 
correspondents in Ireland during 1919, Dublin Castle was left behind by 
the speed with which the press shifted its framing of the Irish story: 
increasingly in despatches the Castle itself was being identified as part 
of the problem, an obstacle to a fair settlement. When a new set of more 
able civil servants were sent from London to rescue the Castle 
administration in 1920 their fresh thinking about finding a way out of 
the crisis extended to relations with the press. The woeful reputation of 
the Irish Administration had enabled the special correspondents who 
came to Ireland for ever lengthier periods during 1919 and 1920 to 
become more detached and oppositional. Basil Clarke, who had been a 
correspondent for the Daily Mail during the First World War and then 
director of the Special Intelligence Branch at the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, was recruited to re-establish the authority of the Irish 
administration and arrived in Dublin Castle in August 1920.76 Clarke's 
mission was to inculcate a spirit of professionalism in handling the 
press. But within less than a year he was acknowledging failure. In a 
series of thoughtful memos he circulated among colleagues in 1921, 
74 Lord Decies: Report on Censorship for December 1918, Public Record Office, London, CO 
904/167/371-372 
75 Ibid CO 904/167/370-371 
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Clarke complains that the communiques written at the army press office 
were amateurish, adding that this was no surprise since they were 
soldiers first and handling the press "was as much a craft as paper-
hanging or horse doctoring.,,77 Clarke laments that he has been unable 
to persuade the military to accept his propaganda policy; they had 
"admitted quite frankly that they did not believe in that policy.,,78 In 
another undated memo, probably written around the same time, Clarke 
refers to a series of "mishaps" in which the Castle's credibility was 
seriously undermined when official accounts of major incidents were 
subsequently discredited. These mistakes, Clarke wrote, had been 
"deadly destructive of Government credit. I would say that these 
mishaps have in fact closed for us ... a broad avenue of propaganda 
. .. ,,79 
actiVIties. 
An example of the kind of "mishap" Clarke may have had in mind (and 
of the military mentality towards the press which he was trying to 
refine) was the hamfisted attempt to censor news of the executions of 
four men in Cork on April 28, 1921. The four had been convicted of 
levying war against the king after being captured during and after an 
ambush in Co. Cork, an area where martial law had been declared. 
Correspondents for the Irish national papers based in Cork were ordered 
not to report anything about the executions beyond the bare fact that 
they had happened. 80 A Daily News correspondent who went to Cork 
to investigate (but took the precaution of returning to Dublin before 
77 Basil Clarke memo, April 18, 1921, CO 904/168/832-836 
78 Ibid 
79 Clarke CO 904/168/841 
80 Daily News, April 29, 1921 P 3 
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telegraphing his despatch to London) found that "so haphazard is the 
method in which the censorship appears to be administered that. .. no 
prohibition had been put on the sending of messages ... to the English 
papers. Several were sent away before a military officer arrived at the 
post office to inquire about them.,,81 The local correspondents who had 
sent the messages were ordered to appear at military headquarters the 
following morning where they were told by an officer that they were 
forbidden to send reports which reflected on the conduct of his men or 
encouraged the rebels. "No charge of inaccuracy was brought against 
them ... but they were warned against describing such matters as the 
execution of rebels in a way which would be considered sympathetic to 
the victims" and threatened with expulsion if they defied the warning. 82 
This was one of several examples where the censorship was sloppy and 
self-defeating, where the attempt to suppress certain kinds of news 
ended up magnifying bad publicity for the Crown Forces. The day of 
the executions in Cork, a party of Auxiliaries entered the offices of the 
Freeman's Journal in Dublin and ordered the staff out at gunpoint. 
Several foreign correspondents who were on the premises were forced 
into a small room; Guy Moyston of the Associated Press was singled out 
and told to take the next boat back to America.83 The Daily News 
correspondent was among those subjected to rough treatment. They 
were asked by an intimidating officer if they personally had seen anyone 
81 Daily News, April 30, 1921 P 3 
82 Ibid 
83 Egon Larsen: First with the Truth: Newspapermen in Action (Baker, London, 1968) p 66-67 
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knocked about by Auxiliaries: "Among those who answered 'no' was a 
man who himself had been struck in the face with a revolver."s4 
Such incidents must have hastened the despair which Basil Clarke was 
giving vent to in Dublin Castle. But within a few months even he 
seemed to have given up any hope that the correspondents could be 
influenced or persuaded. In a revealing note sent in August 1921 to a 
Colonel Foulkes in the small press office that General Macready had 
established in army headquarters, Clarke explained how he had been 
trying to come up with some method of controlling the visiting 
correspondents. "I cannot think of any better way of meeting this 
problem than that of issuing licences to all newspaper men", Clarke 
wrote, "and giving neither facilities nor information to any that are 
unlicensed." He went on to suggest replicating the system that had been 
so effective during the First W odd War: a group of correspondents 
should be allowed to live with the Crown Forces, given housing, 
transport and telegraphic facilities (all of which they would pay for) and 
provided with guides who would also serve as disguised censors. "The 
effect of their being in so close (sic) contact with the Crown Forces 
would be to enable them to see problems and facts more intimately, 
accurately and probably, therefore, more sympathetically than would be 
the case if they were spectators from the outside."s5 All of these 
observations amount to an acknowledgment that the Castle had lost the 
propaganda battle the previous year. The news had been defined by the 
special correspondents and the only way Clarke saw of recovering the 
84 Daily News, May 2, 1921 P 1 
85 Basil Clarke to Colonel Foulkes, August 10, 1921, CO 904/168/577 
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initiative was to return to a system of control which, by that stage, would 
have been impossible to impose. 
In this chapter we have seen how gaining the confidence of the 
international press was a key objective of the Irish separatists. This 
strategy, set in motion at the Paris Peace Conference, was developed by 
Desmond FitzGerald and Erskine Childers, two highly talented literary 
figures with an impressive network of connections among foreign 
correspondents, Fleet Street editors and journalists, and key political 
figures in London. The flair and ingenuity of their efforts contrasted 
with the indecisive and leaden approach of officials in Dublin Castle. 
The censorship imposed by the Castle was irksome to those subject to it 
but ineffective in preventing coverage of Sinn Fein's rebellion. As 
disorder spread, visiting journalists gradually switched from taking their 
line from government sources to holding the government responsible for 
the state of Ireland. Despite this, Sinn Fein propagandists still 
maintained that their cause was given an unfair press. The reality was 
that foreign correspondents were about to become adversaries of British 
government policy in Ireland and effective instruments in its failure. 
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CHAPTERS 
American Correspondents in Ireland 
A recurring theme of this thesis has been how the rebellion in Ireland 
acquired an international dimension in the minds of the journalists sent 
to cover it. We have seen how British correspondents repeatedly 
lamented that the conduct of the war was affecting Britain's status in the 
world, corroding the moral leadership it was felt to have won in its 
victory in the First World War and undermining its authority as 
motherland of the empire. But the criticism of one particular spectator of 
the war in Ireland from outside the empire was picked out as potentially 
devastating for Britain's future role. Among politicians and journalists 
the reaction of the United States was feared to carry more practical 
consequences for the exercise of British power in the world than the 
mere loss of a liberal reputation, disabling though that was thought to 
be. 
By the end of the war the United States had come into it own as a major 
power. Where once it had been in debt to other nations it was now 
Europe's banker. 1 Its financial power was such that towards the end of 
1917 Lord Northc1iffe - in New York as head of the British War 
Mission - could send a cable to London describing the Americans as the 
"complete masters"; as he put it in his favoured cabelese, "if loan stops, 
war stopS.,,2 When the Germans finally surrendered, President 
1 Paul Kennedy: The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External 
Policy 1865-1980 (Fontana, London, 1985 edition) p 148 
2 J.Lee Thompson: Politicians, the Press and Propaganda: Lord NorthcIiffe and the Great War 
1914-1919 (Kent State University Press, Ohio, 1999) p 160 
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Woodrow Wilson saw the peace settlement as a moment of opportunity 
for American diplomacy. Instead of retreating from the world, the 
United States would attempt "nothing less than to restructure its 
affairs.,,3 Wilson defined his outlook against both the ancient European 
powers whose imperial rivalries were blamed for starting the war and 
the new revolutionary programme of Leninism: he envisaged the United 
States as "the historical agent of the world's transformation from chaos 
and imperialism to orderly liberal rationality.,,4 The White House legal 
advisor explained how the ravages of the war would guarantee the 
hegemony of Wilsonian idealism: "Europe is bankrupt financially and 
its governments are bankrupt morally. The mere hint of withdrawal by 
America by reason of opposition to her wishes for justice, for fairness, 
and for peace would see the fall of every government in Europe without 
exception ... ,,5 The expansion of American trade was to be synonymous 
with progress, a view Wilson conveyed to a conference of salesmen in 
Detroit in 1916, telling them: "[You] are Americans and are meant to 
carry liberty and justice and the principles of humanity wherever you go. 
Go out and sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and 
more happy, and convert them to the principles of America.,,6 A central 
tenet of Wilson's ideology was that American power could be projected 
without imperial conquest, that "the United States could somehow be a 
great power without behaving like any previous great power.,,7 This 
3 Walter LaFaber: The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 
1750 (Norton, New York, 1989) p 344 
4 N. Gordon Levin Jr.: Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and 
Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1968) p 5 
5 Margaret MacMillan: Peacemakers op.cit. p 18 
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was the context in which Britain now had to deal with the United States 
about Ireland. 
Britain was chiefly concerned about the political influence of the vast 
Irish diaspora in the United States, particularly in Wilson's Democratic 
Party. Certainly, after the executions of the leaders of the 1916 rebellion, 
Irish-Americans were able to interest a broad swathe of American 
opinion in reviling British rule in Ireland.8 But Americans were even 
more worried about German involvement with the Irish rebels.9 By 
1917, when the US had declared war on Germany, the police were 
suppressing meetings where anti-British rhetoric was heard. One senator 
declared in 1918 "'The time for hyphenated Americans is over and the 
cowards and disloyalists in our country have got to be weeded out and 
held up to the execration which they deserve.",l0 Even so, when Britain 
began dismantling its propaganda effort in the US in early 1919, the 
embassy in Washington advised that there was still a need for combating 
the anti-British propaganda of Irish extremists."ll 
By the time President Wilson arrived in Paris for the peace conference, 
Ireland was for American newspaper correspondents a key location on 
the troubled map of Europe. In the histories of American news agencies 
and the memoirs of contemporary American correspondents, 
deployments to Ireland are recounted as occasions for adventure, risk 
8 EM. Carroll: American Opinion and the Irish Question 1910-1923 (Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin 1978) p 55 
9 Ibid P 59 
IOIbid P 103-104 
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and professional fulfilment, fully absorbed into the romance of foreign 
po stings. For correspondents from Associated Press, the assignment to 
Ireland entailed working "under nerve-racking peril and difficulty in an 
atmosphere of ambushes, raids, killings and reprisals.,,12 A reporter from 
United Press International was driven blindfolded in a horse and 
carriage over bumpy roads to meet the Sinn Fein president, Eamon de 
Valera, and published an interview said to have enraged the British 
censors.13 In his memoirs, a Chicago Tribune correspondent recalled his 
time in Ireland as "a delight, an inspiration. Its people were wonderful, 
its fight against Britain was worth the sympathy of the world, its 
revolution was real.,,14 
On one conventional reading of the relationship between Ireland and the 
United States - framed by the supposed influence of the Irish-American 
diaspora - the empathy displayed in such comments is hardly surprising. 
American journalists would be expected to be cheerleaders for Sinn 
Fein, or at least susceptible to the romance of a rebellion in Ireland. But 
such a view would be inadequate to explain the actual practice of 
American journalists in Ireland. As we shall see in this chapter, an often 
symbiotic relationship between professional norms and political 
ideology did much more to shape the work of American journalists in 
Ireland than individual whimsy. For purposes of illuminating 
120liver Gramling: AP: The Story of News (Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1940) p 299 
13 Joe Alex Morris: Deadline Every Minute: The Story of the United Press (Doubleday, New 
York, 1957) p 114-115 
14 George Seldes: Tell the Truth and Run (Greenberg, New York, 1953) p 89. Seldes confesses, 
with vitriolic disillusion, that he later soured on Ireland's revolution, finding to his dismay that a 
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comparison I have chosen to examine in detail the work of two 
American journalists: one a well known literary journalist in 
Washington who was also a partisan Irish nationalist; the other a foreign 
news correspondent who was an archetypal exponent of the newly 
established professionalism of American journalism and who leaned 
heavily on British military and intelligence officials to explain Ireland to 
a US audience. Looked at together they reveal how occupational 
identity, different attitudes to sources of information and political 
conviction could produce two different readings of the Irish revolution. 
Francis Hackett, the distinguished literary editor of the New Republic, 
was a true believer in the Irish revolution. In 1920 Hackett - who was 
born in Co. Kilkenny and came to the United States when he was a 
teenager - told The American Commission on Conditions in Ireland (a 
panel of politicians, clergymen and journalists assembled by The Nation 
magazine in New York) that he had always sympathised with Sinn 
Fein's aspirations but never believed they were practicable until 1919.15 
Hackett himself was an oddity among the staff at the New Republic, 
most of whom were graduates of Ivy League colleges and appeared to 
John Reed as "aloof, calm and Olympian, removed from the world of 
factory and trench, picket line and caucus chamber, about which they 
wrote with such assurance." 16 By contrast, Hackett had never been to 
university and "could feel really at ease at a Socialist party convention 
15 Evidence on Conditions in Ireland: The American Commission on Conditions in Ireland 
(Bliss Building, Washington DC, 1921) P 141 
16 Robert A. Rosenstone: Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of .lohn Reed, Harvard 
University Press edition (1990) p 206-207 
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or a union strike meeting.,,17 Edmund Wilson recorded how Hackett 
regarded monarchy as "the most fatuous of human institutions.,,18 
Among his colleagues he acquired a reputation as an Anglophobe. 19 He 
clashed repeatedly with Walter Lippmann, particularly over the New 
Republic's support for the war.20 Hackett complained that he had never 
been consulted by the other editors about the decision and protested that 
he had backed Woodrow Wilson for the presidency because he thought 
he was the candidate most likely to keep the United States neutraL21 
In the pages of the New Republic Hackett usually confined himself to 
book reviews and literary essays. His political differences with his 
fellow editors were mostly evident when he wrote about Ireland. After 
the war in Ireland began, the New Republic's editors opposed coercion, 
advocating the withdrawal of British troops. Their position was that 
Ireland should be granted the Dominion status within the British Empire, 
an institution which commanded their admiration. "The existing 
relationship between the British Empire and its self-governing 
dominions is the most successful and instructive example of an 
essentially moral yet still effective tie among substantially independent 
peoples which history has to record. This is the novel ingredient of 
British Imperial politics and it is only by acting in the light of this 
admirable precedent that British statesmanship can prevent Ireland from 
remaining a source of weakness and demoralisation to the British 
J7 Charles Forcey: The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive 
Era 1900-1925, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1961) p 183 
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Commonwealth.,,22 But in contrast to Walter Lippmann and the other 
editors, Hackett held a much darker view of British imperial idealism. 
In a commentary on a statement by the British ambassador to 
Washington (published in the magazine as a letter, a sign of the 
distancing of Hackett's views from the official editorial line ) he 
dismissed the diplomat's protestations that British policy in Ireland was 
essentially noble and disinterested as "hackneyed formulae" which 
should not fool Americans. "The inspiration of British policy in his time, 
he tells us, is to bring order out of chaos, to extend the boundaries of 
freedom, to improve the lot of the oppressed, to increase the material 
prosperity of the world ... We know that Britain has extended the 
boundaries of oil territory as well as freedom, that it has inevitably been 
improving the lot of the oppressors as well as the oppressed." To accept 
the Ambassador's arguments (as his fellow editors at the New Republic 
appeared to do) would be to pervert American values. "[The 
ambassador] has taken the line that England's role in this generation is 
everywhere the high moral role. This has never been true of any country 
and is not true of England.,,23 
At the end of July 1920 Hackett and his wife Signe Toksvig, a Danish 
journalist, went to Ireland and spent eight weeks travelling around the 
country. Their mission, according to Hackett, was "not only to 
investigate the facts but to interpret them.,,24 In the months after his 
return he published a series of pieces in the New Republic describing the 
situation in Ireland. The question at issue, he asserted in his first piece, 
22 The New Republic, October 27, 1920 P 207 
23 The New Republic, April 28, 1920 P 283-284 
24 Evidence on Conditions in Ireland op. cit. p 140 
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was "fundamentally moral." Hackett described British policy under 
Lloyd George as illiberal and anti-democratic, reduced to reliance on the 
argument that holding Ireland was dictated by military necessity. In 
more than one sense, Hackett wrote, the war in Europe had left Britain 
too exhausted to deal with the rebellion in Ireland. "[Everyone] knows 
that tiredness is moral as well as mental. It is the moral conflict which 
Ireland excites that accounts for British khaki-mindedness, petulance 
and fatigue. Sinn Fein, on the contrary has no rat in its moral wainscot. 
Sinn Fein is calm, keen and cool. This difference in temper is deeply 
significant. .. ,,25 Having asserted the moral superiority of Sinn Fein, 
Hackett attempted to further establish its programme as a natural cause 
for American liberals. "Is it Bolshevism?" he asked rhetorically. "Is it 
syndicalism? Is it godlessness and irreligion? Is it anarchy? On the 
contrary, it is the most simple and elementary political proposal, about 
as wild as woman-suffrage." The demand that a nation have the right to 
legislate for itself was nothing new. "It involves an idea as old and as 
familiar, and as moss-grown, and as harmless, as the American 
Revolution of 1776.,,26 
The following week Hackett published in the New Republic a 
description of the workings of one of the local courts that Sinn Fein had 
established across Ireland as rivals to the Crown courts in an act both of 
usurpation and propaganda. Hackett begins his article with a description 
of "Mr W.", the Sinn Fein judge, selling sweets to children in his 
newsagents shop in an undisclosed location: "He was thin and worn, a 
25 The New Republic October 13,1920 P 161 
26 Ibid P 163 
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seamed and grizzled man whose appearance had absorbed something of 
his stooped and ill-lit establishment." We soon learn that the 
shopkeeper's health had been broken during a spell in prison in England 
after the 1916 rising. While Hackett talks to Mr W, customers 
continued to arrive and, like the image of the children buying sweets at 
the outset, each transaction noted by Hackett establishes a picture of 
normality: a policeman (who obviously had no fear of entering a Sinn 
Feiner's shop) bought a sports paper and was served with "perfect 
civility"; a young doctor - "well-conditioned"- paid for sweets and 
English magazines.27 An IRA man arrived to inform Mr W. that they 
were about to bring in a man who has been living rough in the woods 
and to ask if, in his capacity as judge, he could have an order ready to 
commit the tramp to the workhouse. Hackett gives no reason why the 
man in the woods had been "exiled by his family and had for several 
years been living afoot like a hunted thing, half naked and famished and 
afraid." But the effect of this story of rescue is to portray Irish 
revolutionaries as benevolent agents of social reform, a compassionate 
militia subject to the due process of law administered by civilians.28 The 
next day Hackett goes to a session of the Sinn Fein court in a local 
village hall, still decorated for a recently-staged play. The hall is 
crowded with people who~ like the customers in Mr W.'s shop, 
encompassed the broad base of Sinn Fein's support: "young men and 
old, shaw led women, grannies and boys ... artisans, labourers, publicans, 
farmers, shopkeepers. A late arrival was a curate who took his place in 
27 The New Republic, October 20, 1920 P 188 
28 Ibid P 189 
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our roW.,,29 Hackett is struck by the absence of formalities like oaths, 
constables and court attendants. When a row threatens to break out 
between a farmer and a shopkeeper who claimed his windows had been 
broken by the farmer's untended cattle, two IRA volunteers rise from 
the mass of people in the hall to gently enforce order. Later they restrain 
an enraged defendant but - in Hackett's telling - without crushing him. 
"The Volunteers held their ground with insistence, but they gave play to 
this fiery human nature - which is their own nature, but disciplined and 
responsible and dignified, the nature that has made these Irish courtS.,,30 
Aside from their undisguised partisanship Hackett's articles on Ireland 
for the New Republic are clearly literary. His declared purpose not only 
to collect facts but to interpret them, his treatment of people and events 
through a series of novelistic scenes and the revelation of his political 
convictions in argument are evidence of an intentional transgression of 
the boundaries of standard journalism. The fact that he was writing for 
an intellectual magazine and not a mass circulation newspaper only 
partly accounts for his suppressed disdain for conventional reportage.31 
Much more germane is the fact that Hackett, in all his years in 
journalism, never became a professional reporter. 
He had no formal training in journalism of the kind that was then 
becoming popular in the United States. Having arrived from Ireland in 
29 Ibid P 189 
30 Ibid P 190 
31 Some of this disdain was explicit in Hackett's wife's account of an interview they conducted with 
the editor of a Unionist newspaper in Belfast. The editor, she said, "thought we were typical 
American journalists, and he gave us what we considered to be the regular dope for American 
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1900 at the age of eighteen he came to the attention of an editor at the 
Chicago American, according to his colleagues, while selling neckties in 
the basement of one of the city's biggest department stores.32 Hackett 
-himself recounted how he was initially determined to succeed in the 
newsroom. "I was inexhaustibly keen as a reporter. It demanded direct 
contact with peopl~ in the throes of action.,,33 The action of interest to 
the Chicago American was "police news": dramatic human interest 
stories of crime and murder. Hackett struggled to deliver what was 
needed and was sacked because he refused to lie to get hold of a 
photograph of a murder victim.34 He managed to get himself a trial as a 
reporter on the Chicago Evening Post but after again failing to make an 
impression, concluded that he was only fit for writing editorials. "I was 
not cut out to be a reporter. On the local American scene I was 
befuddled about unfamiliar issues that made news, nor had I the 
audacity to extract details on the surface.,,35 This explanation hints at 
how around this time the job of the American reporter was becoming 
increasingly subject to formal procedures and defined as the pursuit of a 
discrete set of details about a narrow set of issues. 
At the time Francis Hackett was trying to make his way in Chicago 
newspapers, mainstream American journalism was abandoning its 
identification with literary bohemianism. "By the end of the nineteenth 
century the commercial popular press had transformed journalism into a 
business of news for the masses. A business model imposed on a craft 
32 Floyd Dell: Homecoming: An Autobiography, (Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1933) p 195 
33 Francis Hackett: American Rainbow: Early Reminiscences, (Liveright, New York, 1971) P 172 
34 Ibid P 176 
35 Ibid P 182 
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had changed its practices and ethics.,,36 Journalism had become "fact-
centred and news-centred rather than devoted primarily to political 
commentary or preoccupied with literary aspirations" - as Francis 
Hackett was.37 Rules were laid down in reporting manuals and new-
vocational courses (the first journalism school opened in Missouri in 
1908).38 President Woodrow Wilson himself encouraged journalists to 
move towards professional respectability, noting disparagingly that 
before 1900 every newspaper was a "law unto itself, without standards 
of either work or duty: its code of ethics, not yet codified like those of 
medicine or of law, had been, like its stylebook, individualistic in 
character.,39 The first journalism textbook (published in 1894) clearly 
laid out what the new collective nostrum would be: 'It is the mission of 
the reporter to reproduce facts and the opinions of others, not to express 
his own." 40 
Francis Hackett's early discomfiture in the city rooms of the big 
Chicago papers was clearly a struggle to grasp how much this dictum 
had taken hold in American journalism. But it was certainly clear to 
other foreigners. In his study of political parties published in 1902 the 
German political scientist Moisei Ostorgorski observed that the 
American newspaper "considers itself in the first place as a purveyor of 
36 Stephen J.A. Ward: The Invention of Journalism Ethics: The Path to Objectivity and Beyond, 
(McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2004) p 212 
37 Michael Schudson: The objectivity norm in American journalism' in Journalism Vol 2, No.2 
(August 2001) p 157 
38 Ward: The Invention of Journalism Ethics op cit p 209 
39 Ibid P 226 
40 Ibid p 210 
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.. 
facts, true, if such can be obtained, or otherwise ... ,,41 And perusing an 
American textbook in 1913 a British press critic was appalled by how 
American journalists were all expected to conform to the same strict 
conventions: "It conjured up in the mind's eye a vision of hundreds and 
hundreds of American towns, scattered over those vast States, producing 
similar newspapers on similar lines - hundreds and hundreds of 
newspapers training and sending out their professional journalists to 
carryon essentially the same work with the greater metropolitan papers 
- thousands and thousands of journalists migrating from newspaper to 
newspaper with the stamp of. .. reporter on their foreheads." 42 
This was not the kind of endorsement sought by Francis Hackett when 
he entered journalism; his repeated false starts in the Chicago 
newsrooms were largely a recoil against the kind of editorial regime 
which Michael Schudson has characterised as a form of "industrial 
discipline" .43 Hackett became literary editor of the Chicago Evening 
Post and later, before he joined the New Republic, the editor of a 
muckraking magazine.44 Muckraking journalists prized facts but not - as 
one American reporter believed the public desired them - "facts piled up 
to the point of dry certitude." 45 The muckrakers deployed facts against 
organised interests and corrupt politicians in the service of their 
reforming convictions and in the belief that journalists "had the potential 
- through the power of the press and public opinion - to overcome the 
41 Moisei Ostrogorski: Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties Volume II, 
(Macmillan and Co., London, 1902) p 321 
42 R.A. Scott-James: The Influence of the Press op.cit. p 255-256 
43 Michael Schudson: The objectivity norm in Americanjoumalism' op. cit. p 162 
44 Charles Forcey: The Crossroads of Liberalism op.cit. p 174 
45 Michael Schudson: Origins of the Ideal of Obejectivity in the Professions op. cit. p 168 
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weaknesses of political institutions.,,46 This was the sensibility that 
informed Hackett's articles on Ireland for the New Republic. How 
differently did "professional" American reporters treat the Irish 
-revolution? A useful way of examining this question is to tum to the 
work of a prominent American foreign correspondent for an influential 
East coast newspaper. 
Walter Lippmann placed Carl Ackerman of the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger on his list of first-rate foreign correspondents, "men who know 
their way about the world." 47 After graduating from Columbia 
University in 1913, Ackerman went to work for the United Press news 
agency in Washington covering the White House, the State Department 
and foreign embassies. In 1915 he moved to Berlin for UPI and during 
the war he covered both the eastern and western fronts (claiming to be 
one of the first American correspondents to fly over a battlefield in an 
army plane.) After the Russian Revolution he was a correspondent with 
the Allied intervention force in Siberia and also reported from China.48 
In early 1920 Ackerman was recruited by the Public Ledger to be the 
London correspondent for the paper's new foreign news service. 
Until 1913 the Public Ledger was, in the words of a contemporary 
observer, "one of the staidest of Philadelphia's institutions, a perfect 
46 Moms Janowitz: 'Professional Models in Journalism: the Gatekeeper and the Advocate' in 
Journalism Quarterly (Winter 1975) p 622 
47 Walter Lippmann: Liberty and the News, (Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920) p 79 
48 Brochure on Philadelphia Public Ledger Foreign News Service p 5 in Box 173, Papers of Carl 
Ackerman, Library of Congress, Washington DC 
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embodiment of. .. conservatism and propriety ... ,,49 Then it was bought 
by Cyrus H.K. Curtis, a successful magazine proprietor who aimed to 
turn it into an influential national newspaper, an American version of 
the Manchester Guardian.5o It hired young reporters who were 
enthusiastic supporters of Wilsonian democracy. In 1918 the Public 
Ledger denounced American hostility towards the Russian Revolution, 
an editorial stance which provoked "intense conflict between its liberal 
editors and its conservative readers ... ,,51 But after the Bolsheviks signed 
a peace treaty with Germany its editors "reverted to a cautious 
conservatism. ,,52 Thus, despite having "a remarkable foreign service 
which it has widely syndicated,,53, the paper laid itself open to the 
charge of being "a creature of many opinions but of no convictions ... ,,54 
Ackerman began work as the London correspondent of the Public 
Ledger at the beginning of March 1920 and, as he confessed to his 
editor, his early despatches were largely composed from whatever news 
appeared in the London press while he waited to establish his own 
contacts.55 On March 20th a despatch from Ackerman appeared in the 
Public Ledger which declared that Ireland was "in a state of civil war" 
as demonstrated by the occurrence of "a crop of crimes." The evening 
newspapers in London, Ackerman reported, were "crowded with news 
49 Oswald Garrison Villard: Some Newspapers and Newspaper-men, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
1926)p 151 
50 Ibid P 151-152 
51 Christopher Lasch: The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1962) p 77 
52 Ibid P 88 
53 Garrison Villard: Some Newspapers op cit p 153 
54 Ibid P 169 
55 Letter from Carl Ackerman to John J. Spurgeon, March 1 Olh, 1920, John J. Spurgeon File, Box 131, 
Ackerman Papers 
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of riots, murders, robberies, hold-ups, raids and assassinations from 
Cork to Dublin.,,56 Early the following month, Ackerman made his first 
visit to Ireland. The anarchy suggested by the news reaching London 
was not reflected in his initial despatches from Dublin. Instead of-a state 
of disorder he found a country in a ferment of convivial intellectual 
debate: "As I saunter about the city meeting almost every hour some 
new leader or representative citizen, because all men of all factions and 
beliefs and parties are exceedingly approachable and cordial, I am 
impressed by the seriousness and firm convictions which all hold. Even 
those who pride themselves on their detached viewpoint become after 
fifteen minutes' conversation the most confirmed partisans. Like all 
revolutionary movements, this one in Ireland has its camp followers 
from every corner of the globe. There are Englishmen, Frenchmen, 
Americans, and may be Germans for all I know, in every camp. Each 
leader has his satellites, who, over whisky and soda and champagne, 
sing the praises of each leader and his 'solution of the Irish problem' all 
based upon distrust in England. ,,57 
Travelling by train to Cork he was struck by the ubiquity of rebel 
sympathisers and described a city in which the revolutionaries were in 
control. "They ... drove me to my hotel; they served me in the restaurant; 
they showed me about the city; they talked revolution and independence 
late into the night; they greeted me again this morning. Everywhere I 
look, everywhere I go, I meet Sinn Feiners ... Everywhere people appear 
56 Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 20, 1920 
57 Philadelphia Public Ledger, April 4, 1920 
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determined, defiant, confident.,,58 By contrast with the cocksure swagger 
of the revolutionaries, the police were portrayed by Ackerman as 
isolated, cowering figures without authority. "As I drove or walked 
about the city I met the same groups of eight, ten or twelve members of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary, huddled together in a comer of the post-
office building or at a theatre or a street comer, armed with rifles, also 
defiant. But their defiance was pathetic. Last night eight of these 
policemen, armed with rifles and revolvers, were standing in a corner of 
two buildings near the post office, silent and, from outward appearance, 
terrified, while across the street crowds of young men, women and boys 
passed, avoiding the police as if they were contaminated. ,,59 By the time 
of his next visit in July, Ackerman had reached an unequivocal 
conclusion: "The facts about Ireland today are these: There are two 
governments, Sinn Fein and the British; there are two armies, 
Republican and royal.,,60 
Ackerman's reportorial eye, when engaged, could be keen and watchful. 
Arriving at the ferry port in Dublin he took note of how "even Irish 
sailors showed feeling" towards the British troops helping them to 
unload ships. But the railway station nearby was "about as dead as some 
depots in Poland during German invasion when all inhabitants had 
fled.,,61 In an unpublished draft of a magazine article he described how 
one day a car drove past him down the quay of the River Liffey with its 
roof tom to shreds. "In the rear seat, behind the chauffeur, sat a Black-
58 Philadelphia Public Ledger, April 6, 1920 
59 Philadelphia Public Ledger, April6, 1920 
60 Philadelphia Public Ledger, July 20,1920 
61 Entry for June 30, 1920 in "London Notes", Ackerman Papers 
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and-Tan trooper holding one of his comrades whose face, hands and 
green uniform were covered with blood. Death was running them a close 
race to the Royal Hospital on the hill.,,62 However, these vignettes were 
incidental to Ackerman's work. Investigating the war in more detail, 
beyond the scenes that were thrust in his path, held little interest for him. 
He stayed in the city; there are no accounts of visits to the scenes of 
ambushes or reprisals in rural areas or of civilians caught up in the war. 
And the tactics of the IRA or the Black and Tans - the obsessive focus 
of interest for British correspondents in Ireland, as we have already seen 
- rarely concerned him. 
Ackerman's view of the conflict in Ireland was that of the disinterested 
yet appreciative spectator, observing a battle of wills with cool 
discrimination. A few months after Ackerman began his posting in 
London he and his colleagues in other European capitals were chided by 
Spurgeon, their editor in Philadelphia, for writing daily aoout "a new 
move on the political chessboard" rather than thinking of "news in the 
human sense.,,63 Significantly, in an article specially commissioned by 
the New York Times to mark the truce in 1921, the chessboard is the 
analogy Ackerman himself chose to explain the conflict. The war was 
rendered as a contest between two well-matched adversaries. "No matter 
what the Irish did the equilibrium of British statesmanship was 
maintained, and each time the British Government made a move on the 
chessboard of negotiation or warfare the Irish counter move was a 
master stroke. The Irish sense of humour and British poise prevented 
62 Typescript entitled "When Ireland's Freedom Hung by a Thread", SpeechlArticle/Book File, Box 
174, Ackerman Papers. 
63 John J. Spurgeon to Carl Ackerman, May 25th , 1920, Spurgeon File, Box 131, Ackerman Papers 
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the checkmate until the hour arrived for the settlement of the century-old 
score.,,64 A joust between "Irish humour" and "British poise" placed the 
war on a very different plane to Francis Hackett - who saw the issues at 
stake as "fundamentally moral" - or the British correspondents for -
whom the campaign of reprisals by the Black and Tans called into 
question Britain's claim to be a beacon of civilisation in a barbarous 
world. How did Ackerman arrive at his particular understanding of the 
Irish revolution? One explanation is to be found in the intimate affinity 
between the beliefs of a generation of American foreign correspondents 
and Wilsonian ideology. Another derives from the conception of 
journalism and their own professional role held by Ackerman and his 
colleagues in the mainstream American press. As we shall see, both 
explanatory threads are intertwined. 
Ackerman believed that being American endowed his work a.s a foreign 
correspondent with unique and desirable qualities. A brochure for 
prospective clients of the Public Ledger foreign news service informed 
them that it stood for "fair play - for the broadest, bravest and most 
chivalrous Americanism". Its correspondents, including Ackerman, had 
spent years acquiring expertise in European capitals but subscribers 
were assured that they had not been corrupted by exposure to Old World 
intrigues: they were "native Americans who [would] see the Old World 
through American eyes" and they had been "instructed to take no sides, 
play no favourites, reflect no prejudices.,,65 The brochure included a 
tribute paid to Ackerman by the American ambassador to Berlin during 
64 The New York Times, August 7, 1921 
65 Ledger Syndicate News Service brochure pI, Box 173, Ackerman Papers 
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the war who contrasted Ackerman's "unimpaired Americanism" with 
the pro-German tendencies of the other correspondents, complimenting 
him on his "splendid patriotism under fire.,,66 When he resigned from 
the Public Ledger in 1921, after a series of disputes with his editors, 
Ackerman wrote that he had wanted "a foreign service which is all-
American, which aims for accuracy and reliability first and which is free 
of propaganda and foreign entanglements ... ,,67 
This depiction of specific professional ideals - fairness, accuracy, 
reliability - as inherently American is characteristically Wilsonian. In 
the sense that Wilson believed Americans brought a set of intrinsic 
ideals to politics, Ackerman believed the same about the American 
contribution to journalism. And in his approach to international 
relations, Ackerman had revealed himself as a true Wilsonian long 
before he began to report on Ireland. In a series of books written out of 
his foreign assignments, Ackerman aligned himself with the policies of 
the Wilson administration. Covering the American intervention in 
Mexico he concluded that continuing guidance from Washington was 
indispensable if Mexico was to fulfil its potential to become a great 
nation.68 He even identified a local whom he suspected of spreading 
pro-German propaganda as "a trouble breeder, who might, with 
advantage, be watched by the [US] Department of Justice.,,69 
66 Ledger Syndicate News Service brochure p 4--5 Box 173, Ackerman Papers 
67 Carl Ackennan to Cyrus H.K. Curtis, publisher, Philadelphia Public Ledger, July 8,1921, Curtis 
File, Box 133, Ackerman Papers. 
68 Carl W. Ackerman: Mexico's Dilemma, (George H. Doran Company, New York, 1918) P 136 
69 Ibid P 59 
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After his time with the Allied forces in Siberia he dismissed Bolshevism 
as merely a passing fad and, in a somewhat tortured metaphor, 
conceived a vision of progress entirely commensurate with Wilson's 
doctrines. "The pendulum of history has swung from reaction to 
revolution, but civilization has been advanced only when the pendulum 
swung backward and forward evenly over the arc of Time .. .It is the task 
of the peoples and governments of the world to generate the gravity 
which makes the pendulum swing ceaselessly and regularly, ticking the 
hours of progress which make the days of happiness and the centuries of 
advancement." 70 The provision of facts to an enlightened public opinion 
would be the motor of this pacific evolution. "The senseless demands of 
the radicals find no support among the great mass of people in any 
country where the facts can be shown. Facts are the deadliest arguments 
. . d I' ,,71 agamst reactIOn an revo utIOn ... 
Perhaps most revealing of all is a note Ackerman made in the diary he 
kept while living in London (and which is mostly devoted to his work on 
Ireland). On January 10, 1921, he transcribed a passage from a book by 
an English traveller to the American colonies in the mid-eighteenth 
century: "An idea, strange as it is visionary, has entered into minds of 
the generality of mankind, that empire is travelling westward and 
everyone is looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that 
destined moment when America is to give law to the rest of the world. 
But if ever an idea was illusory and fallacious I will venture to predict 
that this will be so." Then Ackerman added his own gloss to this rash 
70 Carl w. Ackerman: Trailing the Bolsheviki: Twelve Thousand Miles With the Allies in 
Siberia, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1919) p xi-xii 
71 Ibid P 258 
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dismissal of eventual American hegemony: "But was not this 
prophesy ... fulfilled in 1917, 1918, 1919? One hundred and fifty years 
for an idea to develop and be expressed."n The notion that America 
would "give law to the rest of the world" was central to Wilson's vision 
of the part he would play in a new post-war settlement.73 
Ackerman's adherence to a Wilsonian worldview was not merely an 
intellectual position. In London he received daily guidance on his 
despatches from Colonel Edward House, President Wilson's former 
confidant and fixer, who had been retained by the Public Ledger as an 
advisor on diplomacy.74 Several years earlier, when the Public Ledger 
was trying to establish itself as a major liberal paper, House had made 
friends with several of its young journalists, entertaining hopes of 
making the paper "a semi-official organ of the Wilson administration.,,75 
He may not have achieved this, but he did convince some key journalists 
that "he represented the pinnacle of political wisdom.,,76 Certainly 
Ackerman's diary reveals that during his time as London correspondent 
Colonel House had a major influence on his reporting. He refers to the 
72 Carl Ackerman: "London Notes 1920-21", Box 1 Ackerman Papers 
73 The British historian and diplomat H.A.L. Fisher wrote that at Versailles "the American president 
shone ... with the lustre of a Messiah." Quoted by Ronan Brindley: "Woodrow Wilson, Self 
Determination and Ireland 1918-1919: A View from the Irish Newspapers" in Eire-Ireland Vol 
23, No 4 (Winter 1988) 
74 Ray Stannard Baker characterised House as "a liberal by instinct though not at all a thinker. He is a 
conciliator and arranger." Quoted in Inga Floto: Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American 
Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, (Princeton University Press, 1980) p 28. Walter 
Lippmann described the service House rendered to Wilson: "The things which Colonel House did 
best, meeting men face to face and listening to them patiently and persuading them gradually, 
Woodrow Wilson could hardly bear to do at all ... Lacking all intellectual pride, having no such 
intellectual cultivation as Woodrow Wilson, he educated himself in the problems of the day by 
inducing men of affairs to confide in him." Quoted in Ronald Steel: Waiter Lippmann and the 
American CentUry, (The Bodley Head, London, 1980) p 108 
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ways in which he might make use of Colonel House's analysis of world 
affairs in his own despatches and plans how he will "carry out Col. 
House ideas and carry on his work after he leaves Europe ... ,,77 
Ackerman's reliance on Colonel House was not unconnected to his view 
of how he should collect news as a journalist; the idea that good 
journalism was the fruit of being on excellent terms with powerful 
contacts. In an unpublished magazine article Ackerman outlined his 
belief that "every correspondent who has had foreign experience seeks 
to discover 'key men' in 'key positions' - men who know what is being 
privately discussed by cabinet officers, men who know what 
governmental policies are and when they are apt to be modified or 
changed." Ackerman professed more trust for these sources than the 
views of ministers or heads of departments because "influential 
statesmen too frequently have axes of their own to grind.,,78 In a letter 
in March 1920 - ten days after the launch of the news service -
Ackerman wrote to his boss in Philadelphia that he had been working 
assiduously on developing connections. "I think I have the American 
Embassy with me now. I have a good friend in the Foreign Office and 
for the moment I am working Downing Street. I find all English 
officials very reserved toward American correspondents because as my 
best friends explain they have been 'let down' frequently of late by 
American newspapermen and they are taking no chances. It may be a 
long uphill fight but, fortunately, this is not my first encounter with 
77 Carl Ackerman: "London Notes" op. cit, entry for June 27,1920 
78 Carl Ackerman, unpublished version of "Ireland - From My Scotland Yard Notebook", p 2 in Box 
1, Ackerman Papers 
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foreign government indifference, tinged with opposition. My first task, 
naturally, is to win their confidence even by sacrificing my work.,,79 
As Ackerman intimates in his article, the idea that 'key men in key 
positions' should be the foundation for respectable journalism was a 
doctrine commonly held by American correspondents in Europe. The 
first American journalism textbook - referred to already for its dictum 
that the journalist should reproduce others' opinions not his own-
emphasised the importance of authoritative sources.80 By 1906 a new 
textbook for young journalists advised them to "cultivate the friendship 
of influential citizens ... ,,81 And there is evidence that the ability to 
make prized contacts and passively await the transmission of 'inside' 
information was by then more valued in a reporter than a talent to 
explore an eclectic range of sources. In 1903 Julian Ralph, a New York 
Sun correspondent, observed that publishing an exclusive news story 
was "growing to be more and more a product of intimate acquaintance 
with public men, and less and less a result of agility of mind and body." 
Ralph chose a striking simile to illuminate contemporary journalism 
practice: "No one looks for news anymore. That is an old-fashioned idea 
which outsiders will persist in retaining. News is now gathered 
systematically by men stationed at all the outlets of it, like guards at the 
gate of a walled city, by whom nothing can pass in or out unnoticed.' ,,82 
For Ackerman the gates of his own walled city were to be found at the 
79 Carl Ackerman to John J. Spurgeon, editor of Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 101\ 1920 in 
Spurgeon File, Box 131 Ackerman Papers 
80 Stephen J.A. Ward: The Invention of Journalism Ethics op. cit. p 210 
81 Quoted in Dan Schiller: Objectivity and the News: The Public and the Rise of Commercial 
Journalism, (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1981) P 182 
82 Ibid P 183 
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American Embassy, the Foreign Office and Downing Street. The 
combination of Ackerman's Wilsonian outlook - in which Ireland 
became a problem on the chessboard of international relations, to be 
solved by liberal pragmatism - and his belief that his credibility 
depended on his proximity to powerful sources is to be seen in how he 
set out his credentials in an article in the New York Times explaining 
how the British Government and the IRA came to agree a truce in 1921. 
"For nearly two years", Ackerman wrote, "I have been in intimate 
contact with both British and Irish leaders. I have travelled frequently in 
Ireland and between that country and England. As a result of first-hand 
observations I propose to relate, for the first time, the inside story of the 
event which led to the truce and to the present conferences in London 
and Dublin."s3 A year later in a remarkable series of long articles in the 
Atlantic Monthly Ackerman spelled out his role in even more detail. It 
was only partly a behind-the-scenes account of negotiations between the 
British government and the Irish rebels; it also explained how Ackerman 
himself became a participant in the negotiations as a mediator. 
One of Ackerman's most reliable sources was Sir Basil Thomson, 
Director of Intelligence at Scotland Yard. Shortly after he started to 
work as a correspondent in London, Ackerman went to tea at the 
Foreign Office where he was advised by the Under-Secretary of State, 
William Tyrell to call on Thomson "because everything of a confidential 
nature relating to Ireland and from Ireland passed through his hands 
83 The New York Times, August 7, 1921 
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before it reached the Prime Minister.,,84 Soon Ackerman was calling at 
Scotland House every day. At their first meeting in May 1920 Thomson 
passed to the correspondent documents relating to Michael Collins, 
commander-in-chief of the IRA and Richard Mulcahy, the IRA Chief of 
Staff seized during a raid in Dublin, as well as a copy of the constitution 
of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the secret revolutionary 
organisation of which Collins was a member. Ackerman wrote an 
article about the documents for publication which he sent to Thomson 
for revision.85 
From Ackerman's account Thomson intended the leak would prepare 
the ground for negotiation with the IRA leaders, weakening the 
movement's appeal as the expressed will of the Irish people by 
disclosing its secret and sinister puppeteers. Ackerman writes that 
Thomson believed it "necessary for all parties to realize ... that the real 
leaders of Sinn Fein were not the men then in the public eye.,,86 But 
Ackerman writes also that Thomson was "doubtful of the possibilities of 
suppressing the Sinn Fein movement by military means." As their 
relationship progressed, Thomson briefed Ackerman to carry messages 
to Sinn Fein and IRA leaders in Ireland, using Ackerman's journalistic 
missions as a cover for advancing an Irish settlement by negotiation. 
84 Carl Ackerman, typescript of 'The House of a Thousand Mysteries" p 5 in Box I, Ackerman 
Papers 
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After meeting Basil Thomson in London, Ackerman often went to 
Dublin to see General Nevil Macready, the Commander of British 
Forces in Ireland. Ackerman met Macready on his first visit to Dublin 
at the beginning of April 1920.87 He decided that Macready, like 
Thomson, was blessed with "the traditional poise of the British 
people.,,88 Thomson gave Ackerman letters of introduction and it was 
Macready who facilitated his contacts with the underground leadership 
of the IRA.89 On the afternoon of June 30th , 1920, Ackerman took tea 
with Sir Nevil Macready at his headquarters in the Royal Hospital, 
Kilmainham in Dublin "[a] most beautiful old place with veterans of 
[the] Crimean war in their faded red, blue costumes hanging about 
everywhere.,,9o Macready said he would welcome some kind of 
mediation because "something ought to be done ... before [the] troops 
[got] out of hand.,,91 Thus, Macready gave Ackerman permission to 
make contact with IRA figures who would be captured if they appeared 
in public. This licence was granted at the behest of Thomson who had 
chosen Ackerman as the conduit for "a confidential exchange of views 
between representatives of the two peoples.,,92 The idea was that if Sinn 
Fein were agreeable to the idea, Colonel House could take on a formal 
mediation role. 
In the days after his tea with Macready, Ackerman met Arthur Griffith 
the leader of Sinn Fein and the man considered by the British to be the 
87 Ibid 
88 Ackerman: "Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook" op cit p 436 
89 Entry for June 28, "London Notes" op. cit. 
90 Entry for June 30, "London Notes". 
91 Ibid 
92 "Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook" op cit p 435 
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leading moderate. Griffith told him he would accept mediation if 
Ireland could be recognised as the "Switzerland of the seas.,,93 
Ackerman returned to London to brief Basil Thomson at Scotland Yard, 
bearing news that Sinn Fein was interested in a settlement. On the basis 
of this briefing, according to Ackerman, "it was decided that steps 
should be taken to persuade the British Cabinet and the Dail to invite 
Colonel House [to be mediator.]" This involved Basil Thomson 
speaking directly with Lloyd George and others enlisting support of civil 
servants and leading politicians.94 Thus, Ackerman's sources mounted a 
concerted effort to argue for negotiations rather than a military solution 
based on the information Ackerman had gathered on his reporting trip to 
Dublin. Eventually, according to Ackerman, this remarkable campaign 
of persuasion was successful and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, 
asked Colonel House to become a mediator. The scheme foundered 
when Sinn Fein decided "that there could be no negotiations except 
between accredited representatives of the 'Irish Nation' and official 
representatives of the British Government.,,95 
The collapse of the attempt at mediation did not mean that Ackerman's 
role as a go-between was over. In mid-August FitzGerald sent a 
telegram to Ackerman saying he had arranged an interview with 
Michael Collins and that he should come to Dublin at once.96 Ackerman 
delayed his journey for four days so that he could have more 
consultations with Special Branch. "Sir Basil was extremely anxious to 
93 Ibid P 437 
94 Ibid P 437 
95 Ibid P 438 
96 Entry for August 18,1920 in "London Notes" op. cit., Ackerman Papers 
198 
know what kind of man [Collins] was; why he would not agree to 
independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations wherein lay 
his strength with the Irish army and people.,,97 
Shortly after his arrival in Dublin Ackerman met Desmond FitzGerald, 
Dail Eireann' s Director of Propaganda at the Shelbourne Hotel in the 
centre of the city and they went on a walk, ending up in front of the door 
of a Georgian house in nearby Fitzwilliam Square. After an elaborate 
series of coded knocks, Ackerman was taken to a back room on the third 
floor and after a short while Collins "boldly entered" and shook hands. 
"I noticed that [he] was quite young", Ackerman later wrote, "and 
expressed my surprise that a man who was supposed to have all [the] 
power he had in Ireland should still be in his thirties.,,98 Collins then 
indulged in a further piece of theatre, producing cuttings of articles 
Ackerman had written on the basis of his briefings from the Special 
Branch. "I see you are publishing my private correspondence before it 
arrives", Collins said.99 Then he added: "Y ou see 1 know you better 
than you know me."lOO For two hours Collins and FitzGerald discussed 
Sinn Fein demands with Ackerman. Collins said there would be no 
compromise until the British government recognised Ireland as a 
republic. But later he said Sinn Fein's fundamental demands were that 
Ireland controlled finance, the courts, the police and the army.101 When 
Ackerman returned to London he had several conversations with 
Thomson trying to interpret which of Collins' statements was the best 
97 "Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook" p 439 
98 Entry for August 23-25, "London Notes" op. cit. 
99 Ibid 
100 "Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook" p 440 
101 Ibid 
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reflection of the real position; in other words whether the Irish rebels 
should be regarded as absolutists or compromisers. Thomson asked 
Ackerman for a memorandum which could be shown to the Irish 
Secretary, Hamar Greenwood. Ackerman discounted the demand for the 
Republic and favoured Thomson's assessment that Collins could deliver 
a settlement acceptable to the British government. But Ackerman wrote 
that the final decision rested with Lloyd George and the Prime Minister 
chose to interpret Collins' remarks as a renewed challenge. Ackerman 
blamed Lloyd George for the failure of these negotiations. In his 
Atlantic Monthly articles, Thomson and Macready on the British side 
and Collins and Griffith on the Irish side are portrayed as peacemakers. 
Lloyd George wanted a "truce of surrender" and "was not yet in favour 
of a 'peace without victory.",I02 
The Irish historian Paul Bew, who has used Ackerman's Atlantic 
Monthly articles to re-consider British policy in Ireland, argues that 
Ackerman was co-opted by a network of British officials in Dublin 
Castle, the Foreign Office and Downing Street who "had a clear picture 
of the [eventual] settlement. .. and a confidence in their ability to deliver, 
in the end, the prime minister." I 03 Ackerman's job was to ascertain if the 
IRA leadership was ready for a compromise. On his visit to the Foreign 
Office as he was starting out in London, Ackerman had been told by C.J. 
Philips, Lord Curzon's chief assistant on Irish affairs, that "within three 
years Ireland will be a republic in everything but name. Within less 
102 Ackennan, "The Irish Education of Mr Lloyd George", The Atlantic Monthly, May 1922, p 606 
103 Paul Bew: "Moderate Nationalism and the Irish Revolution, 1916-1923" in The Historical 
.Tournai, Vol. 42, No.3 (1999) P 743 
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time than that all the British troops will be out of Ireland."lo4 Bew notes 
that Curzon told his cabinet colleagues in July 1920 that they had to 
negotiate with Sinn Fein since "[we] shall be driven to dominion home 
rule sooner or later." To this Balfour replied: 'That won't solve the 
question. They will ask for a republic.,,105 Bew suggests that the Curzon 
and the officials pushing for negotiation used Ackerman "to find out, in 
effect, if Balfour's contention had substance.,,106 There is no sign that 
Ackerman's employers were aware of the secret work he had 
undertaken. In August 1920 Ackerman's editor, John J. Spurgeon, wrote 
to him expressing relief that Colonel House had abandoned the idea of 
becoming a mediator in Ireland. The editor felt that for House "in his 
present capacity as a member of the Editorial staff of an American 
newspaper, such a role would be absolutely out of the question.,,107 If it 
was out of bounds for House to become a mediator on grounds of 
preserving editorial independence - even though he was an advisor to 
the Public Ledger and not a journalist - it must have been an equally 
forbidden path for Ackerman. 
In Ackerman's account of his adventures the one character who stands 
out is Basil Thomson of Scotland Yard. Thomson had taken over the 
Special Branch in 1913 after spending ten years in the Colonial Service 
in Fiji, New Guinea and Tonga and several years as a prison governor. 
He was a qualified barrister and had published novels and popular 
104 Carl Ackerman: "Janus-Headed Ireland", Atlantic Monthly, June, 1922 p 812 
105 Paul Bew: "Moderate Nationalism" op. cit. p 743 
106 Ibid P 744 
]07 Letterfrom John J. Spurgeon to Carl Ackerman, August 6,1920, Spurgeon File, Box 131, 
Ackerman Papers 
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histories. 108 By the time he met Ackerman, Thomson was skilled at 
using journalists in his detective work. After journalists objected to 
Special Branch officers posing as reporters to get into syndicalist and 
suffragette meetings, Thomson won approval from the Home Secretary 
for paying a press agency to provide regular reports of the meetings. I 09 
And after the Easter Rebellion in 1916 Thomson persuaded the 
American journalist, Arthur Bullard, that the Irish rebels had merely 
been the dupes of a cynical German plot to divert British troops from 
Flanders to Dublin. I 10 There is no evidence that Ackerman was aware 
of Thomson's previous manipulations of journalists or that it caused him 
any concern if he was aware of it. Ackerman's veneration for Thomson 
is expressed at length in an unpublished article entitled "The House of a 
Thousand Mysteries." Ackerman found Thomson to be "the most 
painstaking, patient, persistent person I ever met. .. the embodiment of 
British poise, that national characteristic which keeps the ship of state 
always on an even keeL,,111 This impression of imperturbability is at 
odds with the assessment of Thomson by a historian of the Special 
Branch who remarked on the "exaggerated view of the subvertability of 
society" held by its detectives, a paranoia exemplified by "the 
ludicrously extravagant accounts of their exploits" published by 
108 Rupert Allason: The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883-
1983, (Secker and Warburg, London, 1983) p 34 
109 Bernard Porter: The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch Before the First World War (The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1987) p 175 
110 F.M. Carroll: American Opinion and the Irish Question op.cit. p 60 
111 Carl Ackerman, typescript of "The House of a Thousand Mysteries" p 5 in Box 1, Ackerman 
Papers. 
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Thomson himself.112 There is no sense in which any of this side of 
Thomson's character appears in Ackerman's appraisal. 
Even more impressive for Ackerman than Thomson's poise was the 
omniscience of the Special Branch; he portrays it as both a panoptic 
gatherer of information and the essential intelligence storehouse of the 
state. "Without Scotland House", Ackerman wrote, "the government of 
the day would be blind and deaf.,,113 Images of omniscience recur in his 
descriptions of the work of the Special Branch. The agency is "the 
tower of observation" of strikes, rebellions and revolutionary plots, 
expert in "mass psychology.,,114 The detectives who protect the prime 
minister are gifted with the ability to gaze into men's souls: "Like 
eagle's eyes they penetrate beyond the mask of a facial expression. 
They sense men's motives and thoughts.,,115 Above all, Thomson makes 
his decisions on facts which "can be fitted into the Chinese puzzles of 
politics or conspiracies with which he has to deal every day.,,116 
Ackerman lists the plots that have been broken by Thomson's 
investigators: "Bolshevist plots" in Ireland and India, the attempted 
assassination of Lloyd George by anarchists in Paris, the financing of 
uprisings in Mesopotamia and Egypt. 117 All of these schemes were 
allowed to proceed until the moment was right to cut them down. 
112 Bernard Porter: The Origins of the Vigilant State op.cit. p 147. Poise was hardly in evidence 
either in the incident which ended Thomson's public career when he was arrested in Hyde Park in 
December 1925 on charges of 'fondling' a prostitute. He said he had been researching a newspaper 
article but was found guilty and fined. Rupert Allason: The Branch op.cit. p 87 
113 Ibid pI 
114 Ibid P 6 
lIS Ibid P 3 
116 Ibid P 5 
117 Ibid P 2, P 4, P 5 
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For Ackerman, the secret of the Special Branch's success was tolerance. 
"It is this fact which those who predict revolution in England overlook. 
Liberty within the British Isles is more elastic than rubber. Is there any 
place in the world outside of Trafalgar Square, Hyde Park and the 
Marble Arch where anarchists, dreamers, religious fanatics, politicians, 
Communists, Scientists, Ministers and Whatnots may rant against the 
government, society, religion and the press without being molested?,,118 
It is possible to attribute Ackerman's fascination with Thomson to the 
reporter's desire to be "close to and conversant with the 'inside story' of 
political and economic life.,,119 In his discussion of the emergence of 
the interview as a form, Michael Schudson has also identified a 
complementary desire among reporters to be seen not, as the journalistic 
myth would have it, to speak truth to power but to speak "close to 
power.,,120 And in the relationship revealed in Ackerman's notes and 
articles there is also another dynamic at work, one identified by 
Christopher Lasch in describing Colonel House's delight in watching his 
words being taken down by admiring reporters. This was the 
interviewee's self-conscious sense of being a figure in a big news story: 
"In a world which manifests itself through the mass media, ambition is 
more likely to take the form of a kind of voyeurism directed in upon 
oneself, a longing to see oneself as one appears to the world, 
immortalised in the glare of publicity." 121 
118 Ibid P 6 
119 Michael Schudson: Origins of the Ideal of Objectivity op. cit. p 257 
120 Michael Schudson: The Power of News (Harvard University Press, 1995) p 92 
121 Christopher Lasch: The New Radicalism in America op.cit. p 244 
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But there was a wider influence at work as well, situated, as was 
Ackerman's professionalism, in the widespread popularity of scientific 
solutions to America's problems. In the time of Wilson's presidency 
"many were increasingly emphasising the need for scientific expertise 
and administrative efficiency as the essential means to bring about 
ordered, benevolent change.,,122 This was as true in journalism as in 
other fields. In 1920 Walter Lippmann was arguing that journalists 
should choose as models "the patient and fearless men of science who 
have laboured to see what the world really is" and that "good reporting 
requires the exercise of the highest of the scientific virtues.,,123 Louis 
Menand has suggested that this respect for professionalism, expertise 
and the efficiency of institutions had its origins in the attraction of these 
qualities for the generation which had been through the American civil 
war.
124 
"[Pragmatists] spoke to a generation of academics, journalists, 
jurists, and policy makers eager to find scientific solutions to social 
problems, and happy to be given good reasons to ignore the claims of 
finished cosmologies.,,125 For Ackerman, Basil Thomson's composed 
and masterful manipulation of the facts allowed him to control fanatics 
and revolutionaries through the application of psychology rather than 
brute force; in the same scientific spirit, the director of intelligence at 
Scotland Yard was engineering peace and restoring order in Ireland 
(with the assistance of the correspondent from the Public Ledger). 
122 Edward A. Purcell: The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of 
Value, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1973) p 24-25 
123 Walter Lippmann: Liberty in the News op.cit. p 82 
124 Louis Menand: The Metaphysical Club, (Ramingo, London, 2002) p 59 
125 Ibid P 372 
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Comparing the work of Francis Hackett and Carl Ackerman has 
revealed not just two different approaches to coverage of the Irish 
revolution but two different conceptions of journalism. Both men were 
proud to define themselves as Americans, both were politically 
committed to liberalism and both shared a respect for fact and 
observation. However, one had an exalted sense of the importance of 
journalism as a profession whereas the other saw it as a way of 
advancing an argument. In a speech delivered after he had become dean 
of the Journalism School at Columbia University, Ackerman described 
the modem newspaper as "a laboratory where man is portrayed as he is 
so that he may learn how to improve himself.,,]26 Contrast this with 
Hackett's deeply sceptical notion that "we pick up a paper without any 
suspicion that we are about to commit intellectual felony. We do not 
know that the news editor is in a conspiracy to play on our minds."] 27 
Behind those two views lay widely divergent ideas of the relationship 
between journalism and power. In Hackett's articles his political 
argument in favour of the Irish cause is overt and his reportage is 
naturalistic and first-hand, refusing to give any special authority on 
powerful sources. Ackerman's despatches, by contrast, strive for an 
apparent neutrality and their validity, by his own measure, rests on how 
conversant he has been with sources close to power. In Ackerman's 
view of journalism the newspaper is an adjunct to the institutions of 
state: "When ... the leaders of two belligerent peoples are unable to meet 
personally they frequently accept the press ... as a forum before which 
126 Carl Ackerman: Remarks at a conference on 'The Press and Crime Prevention", Albany, 
Wednesday, October 2, 1935, Ackerman Papers, Box 160 
127 Francis Hackett: The Invisible Censor, (Books for Libraries Press Inc., New York, 1968) p 48-
49 
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they can present their views ... This is the great service that the modern 
newspaper renders to the public .. .It is more influential than parliaments 
and its verdict is as decisive as any recorded vote of elected 
representatives of the people." Hence his view of his mission in Ireland: 
"[Michael] Collins did not speak to me but through me to the citizens of 
his own country, England and the United States ... ,,128 
I would argue that the different ways in which Hackett and Ackerman 
positioned themselves in relation to power in covering Ireland provides 
a snapshot of a key moment of transition in American journalism, from 
what Stephen Ward has characterised as "active empiricism" to "passive 
empiricism".129 The era of the muckrakers - with which Hackett was 
temperamentally aligned - was giving way to an age of professionalism, 
exemplified by Ackerman. Or as Ward has put it: "Journalism turned 
from 'robust empiricism' in the nineteenth century into "careful, rule-
bound method of objectivity in the twentieth.,,130 The ideal of the 
journalist "crusading against the 'powers that be'" persisted in American 
journalism but the professional model became predominant.131 
Ackerman's methods of reporting gradually became the norm for 
correspondents in the United States. The procedures of American 
reporters covering foreign affairs examined by Bernard Cohen in the 
early 1960s were the same as those Ackerman had practised in Ireland 
in the 1920s: "The reporter's formal ideology of the press as the neutral 
link between the active participants in the policy-making process finds 
128 "Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook" op. cit. p 441a 
129 Stephen 1.A. Ward: The Invention of Journalism Ethics p 197 
130 Ibid p219 
131 Daniel C. Hallin: The 'Uncensored War' op. cit. p 68 
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expression in a set of roles that have as their aim the more effective 
performance of the linkage function. In other words, these images of the 
reporter's role are designed to make the formal process work better, by 
improving the capacity of the political participants to act 
constructively ... ,,132 Daniel Hallin has identified the incorporation of 
the American press as "an integral part of the governing process" as a 
phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century.J33 But I would 
argue that my account of Ackerman's reporting from Ireland shows that 
this incorporation was well underway at the time when Ackerman was 
reporting from Ireland. Ackerman and the elite group of foreign 
correspondents who were his contemporaries were distinguished by their 
belief in Wilsonian ideology and their ties to the administration itself.134 
This is the beginning of a process by which the correspondents become 
"deeply intertwined in the actual operation of government.,,135 As we 
have seen in Ackerman's case, elite correspondents won the confidence 
of government officials who regarded them as a conduit to the public 
and other political actors; for their part, the correspondents regarded 
them as the most important source for information and often shared their 
'inside' view of the political problems to hand. 
132 Bernard C. Cohen: The Press and Foreign Policy, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1963) p 22 
133 Daniel C. Hallin: The 'Uncensored War' op. cit. p 69 
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What of the implications for the Irish revolution of Hackett and 
Ackerman's coverage? As with the reporting of the British 
correspondents and those from Europe, Hackett's focus on the morality 
of coercion and the rights of the Irish nation were entirely in accord with 
the message that Sinn Fein sought to project to the world. It was a 
message the Irish revolutionaries hoped would sway President Wilson to 
their cause. The message of Ackerman's coverage reflected Wilson's 
admission in March 1919 that, despite the appearance he had given of 
making the Irish question a matter of disagreement between Britain and 
the United States, in reality it was "a domestic affair of the British 
Empire and ... neither he nor any other foreign leader [had] any right to 
interfere ... "l36 In June 1919 when an Irish-American delegation in Paris 
asked Wilson about the application of self-determination to Ireland he 
replied: "You have touched on the great metaphysical tragedy of 
today.,,137 Ackerman himself recalled how Michael Collins had resented 
his efforts during his secret mediation "to show Collins why and how 
the American people would not go to war over Ireland ... ,,138 
136 Michael Hopkinson: "President Woodrow Wilson and the Irish Question" in Studia Hibernica 
No. 27 (1993) p 96 
137 F.M. Carroll: American Opinion and the Irish Question op.cit. p 136 
138 Carl Ackerman: Unpublished version of "When Ireland's Freedom Hung by a Thread" in 
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CHAPTER 6 
Literary Travellers: G.K. Chesterton, Wilfred Ewart and 
V.S. Pritchett as reporters. 
In the previous chapters we have examined the work of professional 
newspaper correspondents engaged in filing daily reports from the 
war in Ireland. This chapter will look at three exponents of British 
literary journalism who went to Ireland at different stages in the 
period covered by this thesis. G.K. Chesterton published an account 
of a visit to Ireland just before Sinn Fein's sweeping victory in the 
1918 election. Wilfred Ewart travelled through the country in the 
months before the signing of a truce in the summer of 1921. Both 
published their work in books, although Ewart's account of his 
journey was originally commissioned as a series of newspaper 
articles and Chesterton, of course, was a legendary newspaperman, a 
prolific columnist and "one of the great exponents of the Fleet Street 
myth."l Finally, we will look at the work published by V.S. Pritchett 
in the Christian Science Monitor when he was the paper's 
correspondent in Ireland during the Civil War in 1923. The pieces 
Pritchett published in the Monitor at the beginning of his career as a 
writer are in many respects the precursor of his later travel books.2 
All of the work published by these three writers is journalism, written 
to the moment but free of many of the routine occupational 
constraints on the regular newspaper correspondents. They share 
some of the practices of their less exalted colleagues (particularly, as 
we shall see, in their reliance on some of the same sources) but they 
1 John Gross: The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters: Aspects of English Literary Life 
Since 1800 (Penguin Books, London, 1991) P 237 
2 His biographer has described Pritchett's journalism as "serial autobiography". Jeremy 
Treglown: V.S. Pritchett: A Working Life, (Chatto & Windus, London, 2004) p 11 
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are freed from the tyranny of news production and thus open up a 
wider angle of observation of the events of the Irish revolution.3 
Indeed, it is arguably best to look on this kind of journalism as a 
form of travel writing and place it in the context of almost a century 
of attempts by British writers to describe Ireland for the general 
reader in London. There is a long line of English literary travellers 
who regarded Ireland as unexplored territory. In 1818 J. C. Curwen 
described Ireland as a country "which, although almost within our 
view, and daily in our contemplation, is as little known to me, 
comparatively speaking, as if it were an island on the remotest part of 
the globe." A contemporary of his, John Alexander Staples, who 
also published a travel book on Ireland, described it as "a country 
that Englishmen in general know less about, than they do of Russia, 
Siberia or the Country of the Hottentots."4 This sense of the 
neighbouring island as alien territory for the British writer has 
already surfaced in the newspaper reporting and we will see this 
theme emerge again in Chesterton, Ewart and Pritchett. 
A sense of bizarre unfamiliarity possessed by a writer crossing the 
Irish Sea was usually accompanied by the prospect of excitement. 
The political turbulence that made Ireland a central issue for British 
politics in Edwardian and Victorian times promised rich material and 
a more attentive audience for literary travellers. Glenn Hooper notes 
that "if travellers to the Orient went in search of exoticism or to 
3 "Essentially, daily publication cuts things out of a larger reality in order to dispose of them and 
clear the decks for tomorrow's edition. There can be little historical or philosophical scale in 
such reports, because every day's events must be presented as deserving of equal attention." C. 
John Somerville: The News Revolutiou in England (Oxford University Press, 1996) p 4 
4 Both quoted in The Tourist's Gaze: Travellers to Ireland 1800--2000 Glen Hooper (ed) 
(Cork University Press 2001) p xx 
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Africa for adventure, then many came to Ireland for the simple 
pleasure of politics as an unfolding, almost theatrical experience. 
Everything, it would appear, was on offer; everything they had heard, 
especially how intractable the place was, seemed true. If travel 
writers journeying in other countries needed occasionally to enliven 
their narratives, travellers to Ireland had only to write up their 
experiences, like anthropologists on a field-trip."5 
In placing Ireland for an audience back home, calculating the desires 
of its inhabitants and interpreting the claims of the separatists in the 
context of an otherwise entirely familiar Anglicised culture, British 
correspondents and writers would have been dealing with the 
currency of Anglo-Irish relations for centuries. Terry Eagleton has 
defined the question of Irish identity for Britons as "a matter of some 
unthinkable conundrum of difference and identity in which the 
British can never decide if the Irish are their antithesis or mirror 
image, partner or parasite, abortive offspring or sympathetic 
sibling."6 This was a problem for Irish nationalists as well. In their 
efforts to forge a pure national identity they came up against the 
pervasive influence of the bigger island across the Irish Sea. Often 
these dilemmas have intruded on something as given as the physical 
relationship between the two islands. The thinking of Conor Cruise 
0' Brien, a persistent critic of Irish nationalism, is encapsulated by 
his use of a geographical metaphor: "The sea which we think of 
separating the two islands actually joins them."7 In his dense 
examination of British and Irish identity across two centuries, Oliver 
5 Ibid P 115 
6 Terry Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger (Verso, London, 1995) p 127 
7 Conor Cruise 0' Brien, Neighbours: The Ewart-Biggs Memorial Lectures (Faber, London 
1980) p 33 
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MacDonagh shows how maritime reasoning was similarly deployed 
in London. "Seen in one geographic light Ireland could appear as 
the largest severed part of a single broken land mass, 'the British 
Isles' which themselves took on the form of an occidental Japan or 
an eastern-Atlantic New Zealand. In another geographic light 
however, Ireland could look to be a distinct and independent entity 
with the Irish Sea as wide and deep a separating stretch as the North 
Sea or the English Channel."8 As we shall see, the task of placing 
Ireland in relation to Britain is fundamental in the work published by 
Chesterton, Ewart and Pritchett during the Irish revolution. But at a 
time when the whole world order was being overturned by the 
settlement at Versailles and issues of democracy, nationalism and the 
struggle between capital and labour had become vital issues across 
Europe, other themes intrude on their preoccupation with the 
relationship between the two islands. 
G.K. Chesterton's book, Irish Impressions, was published in 1919 in 
the months after Sinn Fein's sweeping victory in the General 
Election and the establishment of Dail Eireann. It was based on a 
speech-making visit Chesterton made to Ireland in late 1918 to 
recruit volunteers for the final push on the western front (as well as 
delivering a lecture at the Abbey Theatre at the behest of W.B. 
Yeats).9 More than once, Chesterton apologises for the speed with 
which he has set down his thoughts for publication. He laments that 
his notes suffer "all the stale scurry of my journalistic trade"l0 but his 
8 Oliver MacDonagh, States of Mind: A Study of Anglo-Irish Conflict 1780-1980 (e Allen & 
Unwin, London 1983) p. 31 
9 For Yeats invitation see R.F. Foster: W.E. Yeats: A Life - Vol II: The Arch-Poet 1915-
1939 (Oxford University Press, 2003) p 131 
10 G.K. Chesterton: Irish Impressions (W Collins, London, 1919) p 25 
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notetaking was not the only sign that in Ireland Chesterton played the 
journalist as much as the recruiting sergeant. 
One of his key interlocutors in Dublin was George Russell, the poet, 
intellectual and controversialist known by his pen-name, "AE", who 
published a weekly newspaper dedicated to promoting the material 
and intellectual development of rural Ireland and who was an active 
sponsor of the agricultural co-operative movement. Russell's office 
in Merion Square in the centre of Dublin was an essential stopping-
off point for any writer or journalist looking for background on 
events in Ireland. Russell was not a member of Sinn Fein but his 
commitment to Irish self-determination made him a valuable ally of 
the movement and an articulate explainer of the cause. The English 
writer, Douglas Goldring (who lived in Dublin at the time and met 
Chesterton during his visit) recalled how Russell "could ... be relied 
upon to fire off a succession of quotable sayings for the benefit of 
any respectful caller at the Plunkett House in Merrion Square."11 And 
Russell as a literary figure was instantly appealing to visiting British 
writers; Nicholas Allen has noted how Russell's "sense of mission 
was common to British intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries ... his compound interests in poetry, the occult and 
social organisation identify Russell as an Edwardian intellectual, 
albeit of Irish provenance."12 It would be Russell that Chesterton had 
in mind when he wrote of "the stimulating society of the intellectuals 
of the Irish capital" and their opinions "which moved both my 
II Douglas Goldring: The Nineteen Twenties: A General Snrvey and some Personal 
Memories 
(Nicholson & Watson, London, 1945) p 117 
12 Nicholas Allen: George Russell and the New Ireland 1905-30 (Four Courts Press, 
Dublin, 2003) p 20-21 
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admiration and amusement."13 As we shall see, Russell's 
championing of rural self-sufficiency would strike a chord with 
Chesterton's own political views. 
For Chesterton, one of the most shocking features of Dublin was the 
extent of the British military presence. "My first general and visual 
impression of the green island was that it was not green but brown; 
that it was positively brown with khaki ... 1 knew, of course, that we 
had a garrison in Dublin but I had no notion that it was so obvious all 
over Dublin. I had no notion that it had been considered necessary to 
occupy the country in such force, or with so much parade of force. "14 
Alongside this visible British presence Chesterton was struck by 
difference: "a stream of ten thousand things all pouring one way, 
labels, titles, monuments, metaphors, modes of address ... that make 
an Englishman in Ireland know that he is in a strange land ... "15 This 
quotidian distinctiveness stimulated his thinking about Irish 
nationality. He wrote that he had "come to appreciate more 
imaginatively the importance of daily symbols like street names and 
pillar-boxes"16 and argued that a sense of nationality was an 
eminently practical experience, inviting his English readers to 
imagine their irritation if such normal things like signs in railway 
carriages were written in German.17 
In this context Chesterton decried British recruiting efforts in Ireland. 
He repeated a story he was told of the display of a poster of the 
13 Chesterton: Irish Impressions op. cit. p 8-9 
14 Ibid P 69 
15 Ibid P 204 
16 Ibid P 193-194 
17 Ibid P 196-197 
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Union Jack bearing the legend "Is not this your flag? Come and fight 
for it" and recalls Latin grammar lessons "about questions that expect 
the answer no ... "18 Similarly he cited a controversy over the 
prohibition of Irish children wearing green rosettes in schools: the 
effect, according to Chesterton, was to remind an Irish audience of 
past occasions when Britain was in the wrong and to occlude the 
circumstances of a war for civilisation in which Britain was in the 
right.19 Chesterton's own version of a recruitment speech was to 
acknowledge that Britain had been guilty of cruelty towards Ireland 
in the past and to try to convince his audience that the mass of 
English people were aware of wrongs done to Ireland. "We stand 
here in the valley of our humiliation, where the flag we love has done 
very little that was not evil, and where its victories have been far 
more disastrous than its defeats."20 Chesterton then tried to pull a 
quick rhetorical move: the past behaviour of England towards Ireland 
was tyrannical, analogous to Prussianism. Therefore for the Irish to 
challenge tyranny they had to confront the real Prussians in the 
European war; to uphold the integrity of their fight against the British 
they were obliged to join Britain in war against Germany. 
For Chesterton, Irish nationalism had, by its very nature, to put 
Ireland on the side of Germany's opponents in the European war. 
Nationalism "appeals to a law of nations"; it was naturally part of 
"Christendom" . 21 It was also, he argued, an antidote to imperialism: 
"It was exactly because Germany was not a nation that it desired 
more and more to be an empire ... A group of Teutonic tribes will not 
18 Ibid p 119--120 
19 Ibid P 122 
20 Ibid plIO 
21 Ibid P 147 
216 
care how many other tribes they destroy or absorb ... "22 By contrast, 
Irish nationalism would be too aware of the need to preserve its own 
boundaries to indulge any desire to draw new ones. In a rhetoric 
suspiciously like flattery, Chesterton praised the restraint of "the 
civilised Irish nation, a part and product of Christendom [which] has 
certainly no desire to be entangled with other tribes or have its 
outlines blurred with great blots like Liverpool and Glasgow, as well 
as Belfast."23 
This then was the basis of the recruitment appeal that Chesterton 
sought to put across on his journey to Ireland (although what hope 
recruitment had by 1918 is debatable.) 24 But what he saw and heard 
in Ireland filled him with despair. It was not simply an issue of 
making the wrong arguments for fighting the war against Germany; it 
was also the behaviour of the British forces themselves. Chesterton 
retold a story of a military plane dropping flares on a crowd of people 
attending an Irish music festival in Co. Cork.25 From the context he 
appeared to have picked up this story from the newspapers or from 
friends in Dublin. The incident became, in Chesterton's eyes, a 
perfect metaphor for English Prussianism. The use of a plane to 
frighten a crowd of men, women and children with flares 
"reproduced all the artificial accessories of the most notorious crimes 
of Germany" without any obvious point. "It was as if the whole 
British army in Ireland had dressed up in spiked helmets and 
22 Ibid P 150 
23 Ibid P 150--151 
24 By the time that Chesterton made his journey to Ireland the horror of the war and the scale of 
its casualties may have been a bigger obstacle to recruiting than Irish nationalism per se. Ben 
Novick notes that by 1918 Sinn Fein was attracting voters because Ireland was "increasingly war 
weary." See Ben Novick: Conceiving Revolution op.cit. p 67-71 
25 Chesterton: Irish Impressions op cit p 128 
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spectacles, merely that they might look like Prussians ... These 
Christian peasants have seen coming westward out of England what 
we saw coming westward out of Germany. They saw science in 
arms; which turns the very heavens into hells."26 Here Chesterton 
was acknowledging - .albeit with horror - the institutionalisation of 
air warfare and its deployment as a new form of policing in Ireland. 
At the outbreak of the First World War attacks on civilians from the 
air were regarded was beyond the rules of civilised combat. But by 
the time Chesterton was writing - and in the years afterwards - air 
power became an indispensable tool in colonial control.27 Thus the 
use of a military plane in Cork was for him not only an act of 
stupidity which inflamed nationalist resentment but also a 
demonstration of how modem values had come to sanction tactics of 
warfare previously regarded as barbaric, Teutonic departures from 
the civilised norm. In Ireland, Chesterton was noticing - and resisting 
- the triumph of 'total war' as a military doctrine. 
This was just one instance of how Chesterton made use of Ireland as 
the site of a continuous argument with the modem world. It was the 
key theme of his account of his journey to Ireland. The condition of 
the country was appropriated to his larger argument by a critique of 
the traditional view of 'the Irish Question.' Chesterton asserted that 
an Englishman entering Ireland had to discard his prejudices and 
pretend, if possible that he was on an exotic island of which he knew 
nothing: "the best thing a stranger can do is to forget the Irish 
26 Ibid P 130-131 
27 In October 1914 the Entente powers regarded a German air raid on Paris in which three 
civilians died as "an ... unacceptable broadening of the forms of warfare." Modris Eksteins: Rites 
of Spring op.cic p 158-159. By 1921 Britain ruled Iraq through the RAP; see Toby Dodge: 
Inventing Iraq op. cic p 132 
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Question and look at the Irish."28 Chesterton pleaded that the traveller 
appraise Ireland as a man in a fairy tale would observe a fantastic and 
strange land of talking cows or walking haystacks; only then would 
the visitor be able to truly 'see' Ireland. In terms of politics his 
argument was directed as much at English liberals who professed the 
greatest sympathy for Ireland as towards those hostile to Irish 
nationalism. "What has been the matter with their Irish politics was 
simply that they were English politics. They discussed the Irish 
question; but they never seriously contemplated the Irish Answer."29 
The Liberal declared that the Irish should not be prevented from 
having whatever law they liked but he rarely contemplated what kind 
of society the Irish would choose because "the law the Irish would 
like is as remote from what is called Liberal as from what is called 
Unionist."30 Ireland outside the union, Chesterton argued, would be 
neither lawless (as the naysayers warned) or free (in the sense 
understood by English Liberals and Radicals); "it would be an 
orderly and even conservative civilisation like the Chinese."31 Later 
he came up with another geographical analogy: Ireland as Serbia, a 
nation of peasants set alongside an industrial power. For Chesterton 
Ireland was a key actor in a larger political drama "the real 
question. .. [is] what is going to happen to the peasantries of Europe, 
or for that matter, the whole world?"32 From this starting point 
Chesterton painted a picture of Ireland as an alternative to modem 
industrial society and thus it became for him a critique of his own 
society. In this sense, he appropriated Ireland to his own sense of 
28 Chesterton: Irish Impressions op cit p 22-23 
]29 Ibidp 24 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid P 25 
32 Ibid P 33 
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Englishness which Patrick Wright has defined as "a defensive stance 
adopted against the power of the state and transformations that 
follow in the wake of modernisation and change ... "33 
It was on a drive through the countryside in the north-west ("slowed 
down to a solemn procession by crowds of families with their cattle 
and livestock going to market") that Chesterton observed a scene that 
would illustrate his vision of Ireland as a prototype of a more 
desirable social organisation. He noted that on one side of the road 
the harvest had been gathered in "neatly and safely" while on the 
other side "it was rotting in the rain." 34 The saved harvest was on 
land farmed by peasant proprietors; the wasted hay lay on the 
grounds of a large estate. This Chesterton took as a sign of the 
superiority of peasant values over those of the landowner and he 
projected it back towards the growing conflicts of industrial England 
and its competing ideologies. "England may seem to be rent by an 
irreconcilable rivalry between Capital and Labour; but the peasant 
across the road is both a capitalist and a labourer. He is several other 
curious things; including the man who got his crops in first; who was 
literally first in the field."35 The struggle between capital and labour 
was producing stalemate; in contrast the land of small-scale 
proprietors was vital and dynamic. What Chesterton saw in the 
north-west of Ireland he regarded as "the flattest possible 
contradiction to all that is said in England, both by Collectivists and 
Capitalists about the efficiency of the great organisation."36 
33 Patrick Wright: "Last Orders", The Guardian Review, April 4, 2005 P 4-6 
34 Ibid P 29 
35 Ibid P 29 
36 Ibid P 30 
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Chesterton also saluted other features of Irish society, notably how, 
as he saw it, the family retained a "corporate conception" connecting 
individuals to their communal pastY A peasant in a mud cabin in 
Co. Clare, Chesterton argued, possessed a superior knowledge of 
Christian history to a clerk in Clapham Common who was likely to 
be oblivious to the theological foundations of his own society. "In 
the face of that simple fact, I have no doubt about which is the more 
educated man; and even a knowledge of the Daily Mail does not 
redress the balance. "38 During the Dublin lockout in 1913 English 
socialists had proposed taking the children of strikers to England to 
be looked after. This was furiously resisted by priests and families in 
Ireland despite assurances that care would be taken not to undermine 
the children's faith. Chesterton found this protectiveness entirely 
understandable; English socialists, he argued, did not understand 
religion as "the world a man inhabits" and would have no idea 
therefore whether they were tampering with it or not.39 Chesterton 
believed the Irish wanted to be free of both liberalism and socialism: 
the series of Liberal reforms in the previous decade had been enacted 
"at the expense of the independence of the family" and Ireland's 
demand for Home Rule was at least partly an expression of a desire 
"to be emancipated from this emancipation."40 Thus the exemptions 
applied to Ireland exposed the supreme irony of British rule: 
that a man stands up holding a charter of charity and peace for all mankind; that he lays down a 
law of enlightened justice for all the nations of the earth; that he claims to behold man from the 
beginnings of his evolution equal, without any difference between the most distant creeds and 
colours; that he stands as the orator of the human race, whose statute only declares all humanity 
37Ibidp51 
38 Ibid P 52-53 
39 Ibid P 79 
40 Ibid P 64-65 
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must be human; and then slightly drops his voice and says, This Act shaII not apply to 
Ireland.'41 
Here Chesterton reached the nub of his argument that "the real case 
against the Union [is] a case against the Universalists."42 When Irish 
Impressions was published in 1919 the terms of the debate over 
Ireland were being swiftly transformed. The guerrilla campaign of 
the IRA had not begun when Chesterton left Ireland to write up his 
book. In the years that followed, Ireland was to be the centre of a 
different debate in Britain about the morality of British 
statesmanship. 
By the time that Wilfred Ewart wrote his book, Journey in Ireland, 
the war of reprisals had become notorious and, as we have seen in 
previous chapters, was cast by prominent English journalists as a 
stain on the British character. In the summer of 1921 Ewart was 
commissioned by The Sunday Times to write a series of articles about 
the war in Ireland. He had just submitted the final draft of his Great 
War novel Ways of Revelation which became a bestseller when it was 
published in the autumn of 1921 and was described by reviewers as 
'the English War and Peace. '43 The book is a melodramatic story of 
two friends who went to fight in France: one dies, the wife of the 
other is seduced by a draft resister, becomes addicted to cocaine and 
dies. But in a satisfying resolution, her former husband marries his 
dead friend's fiancee. The historian Hugh Cecil has noted that the 
ending signified that "the sacrifice of good men and women had not 
been in vain ... This was a message that people wanted to hear just 
41 Ibid P 65-66 
42 Ibid P 65 
43 Hugh Cecil: The Flower of Battle: How Britain Wrote the Great War (Steerforth Press, 
Vermont, 1996) p 168 
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after the war; it was comforting but did not trivialise the calamity."44 
Ewart himself had endured plenty of experience of the war. He was 
wounded in 1915 and sent back to battle after six months 
recuperation in England. He took part in the Battle of the Somme, 
developed gastroenteritis and was sent home again. In July 1917 he 
was sent back to the frontline in Flanders and was lucky to escape 
when his company was decimated in an attempt to take the town of 
Cambrai. He lay behind a tree under fire from a German machine-
gun and watched German soldiers burning the British dead and 
wounded with phosphorus bombs.45 Ewart also had some knowledge 
of Ireland. His father came from a well known military family46 and 
one of Ewart's closest friends as he grew up was the nephew of 
George Wyndham who, as Chief Secretary for Ireland, had authored 
the act that ended the Irish Land War in 1903 by committing 
government money to the purchase of landlord's estates.47 
Ewart spent three weeks in Ireland, from mid April to early May 
1921. In the preface to his book Journey to Ireland 1921 (published 
the following year) Ewart wrote that he had gone to assess "the state 
of feeling in the country, as to which ... propaganda and partisanship 
persistently vied ... For my part I offer no conclusions, nor 
deliberately sought any."48 Ewart spent time in Dublin, Cork and 
Belfast. But he also traversed the countryside, undertaking a few 
twenty-mile walks along roads in the south and the midlands. Cecil 
44 Ibid P 139 
45 Ibid P 153-166 
46 Ibid p 140 
47 Ibid P 145. Despite this, Wyndham nearly suffered a nervous breakdown dealing with Ireland 
and ended up being "driven from office into lasting and ignominious obscurity." F.S.L. Lyons: 
John Dillon op. cit. p 273 
48 Wilfred Ewart: A Journey in Ireland 1921 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, London, 1922) pix 
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suggests that Ewart was, like many other English literary figures of 
the time, a pantheist, whose writing came alive in his depictions of 
rurallife.49 Indeed, many pages in Ewart's book are devoted to 
lyrical descriptions of landscapes and nature, as he made his way, 
pilgrim-like, through the Irish countryside. But secreted within these 
passages of pastoral ecstasy are physical reminders of the troubles: 
"After a while the sun came out and set the gorse aflame. Patches of barley and potatoes 
alternated with gorse and heather. Larks sang ... There was a complete dearth of traffic. Every 
two or three miles occurred loose places in the road's surface, as though it had been dug up and 
replaced. A definite reminder of the realities of the countryside came beyond the village of 
Blackpool. Where a grey stone bridge crosses a stream which sings and ripples down a narrow 
ravine, a neat trench four feet deep by three broad had been dug across the road.50 
This dissonance between normality and disturbance, gaiety and 
menace runs through Ewart's whole portrait of Ireland at war. 
Unlike the trenches in France, war in Ireland is fought on a terrain 
which is at first glance appealing and soothing. "On fine afternoons 
the white-fIannelled students play cricket on the grassy lawns of 
Trinity College, a stone's throw from Nassau Street. And as you 
stood, one of a group, watching them through the railings, through an 
opening in the foliage, you could not foresee that from here a 
fortnight hence revolver-shots would be fired or that the daisy-
sprinkled bank would be stained by a girl's blood."51 In the Phoenix 
Park in Dublin on a hot April afternoon "one saw old men dozing on 
seats and nurserymaids reading novelettes, and the children shouting 
and playing on grassy slopes for all the world as if Dublin herself 
were a playground. One passed out of the gates into the North 
49 Hugh Cecil: The Flower of Battle op. cit. p 142-143. By the age of 18 Ewart was an 
expert on poultry. 
50 Ewart: A Journey in Ireland p 55 
51 Ibid P 7 
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Circular Road and lorries came tearing along at twenty-five miles an 
hour, their dark green or khaki loads bristling with rifles."52 
In Ewart's prose, the Black and Tans regularly intrude as aliens on an 
otherwise tranquil landscape. At curfew hour in Dublin "black 
motor-cars containing mysterious-looking men rushed out of College 
Green at breakneck speed like bats or night-insects."53 While Ewart 
is discussing horse racing with a priest over breakfast on the train to 
Cork "four big Black and Tans with revolvers strapped to their thighs 
tramped in, sat down at the next table, and leant their rifles against 
the backs of their chairs. A prosperous-looking country fled by. The 
greenness of everything, the grazing cattle, the snug appearance of 
the white cottages and farmsteads against the sunlit landscape, 
protested against the presence of a spectre that stalked through the 
counties of the South."54 
If the Black and Tans encroach suddenly on otherwise gentle 
surroundings, the IRA is an even more spectral presence in Ewart's 
account of his travels; a phantom army usually detectable by traces 
of its activities. Walking from Birr to Tullamore in the otherwise 
undisturbed Midlands, Ewart came upon a barrier across the road as 
it curved around a hill at a point where it was shaded with trees; an 
excellent spot for an ambush. "Four heavy beech-trunks interlaced 
with boughs had been thrown across it, forming a twelve-feet high 
obstacle not dissimilar to, though far more substantial than, a fence at 
Aintree. "55 Further along the road he noticed "a figure [standing] on 
52 Ibid P 6 
53 Ibid P 2 
54 Ibid P 26 
55 Ibidp 125 
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the skyline at some distance from the road, watching me intently."56 
After an encounter with half-a-dozen youths outside a pub at a 
crossroads he was joined for a while by a middle aged farmer who 
"turned into a field and left me with, as I thought, a rather sinister 
grin."57 Shortly afterwards five young men on bicycles caught up 
with him shouting 'Stop! Hands Up!'. He was searched and ordered 
to sit by the roadside until they decided he was unthreatening and 
allowed him to continue. The half-hour had not been pleasant for 
Ewart. "Innocuous tourist though I was, friend of Ireland though I 
believed myself to be ... my eyes repeatedly wandered to the bog and 
my thoughts to the number of people who had lately been found in 
bogs with brief notes attached to them."58 
The mystery of the Irish rebellion was not confined to menacing 
incidents on lonely country roads. Ewart confessed his difficulty in 
getting to grips with the idea of the IRA and its leadership. Even as 
he set out on his journey to Ireland it had seemed to him curious that 
"while our 'governing classes' had been stirred to the depths by the 
war in Ireland, the leaders of that war on the opposing side were all 
but unknown even by name."59 In Dublin he followed the path of 
Chesterton and other writers and journalists to the house of George 
Russell in Merrion Square. Russell told Ewart that the rank and file 
members of the IRA were 'inspired by a mystical passion of 
nationality' and that they considered themselves as fighting for their 
country's integrity as Ewart did while fighting the Germans. 'As to 
murders' , Russell advised Ewart, 'you must have seen Germans shot 
56 Ibid P 126 
57 Ibid P 127 
58 Ibid P 128 
59 Ibid P 34 
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in cold blood - prisoners for instance? Such things happen in war 
and always will. '60 In Cork, Ewart met the Lord Mayor, Barry Egan, 
a Sinn Feiner who "reminds one of certain symbolists of the French 
Revolution [with] the thin precise lips of - a doctrinaire?"61 Egan 
argued for the morality of guerrilla strategy, telling Ewart that an 
ambush - the signature tactic of the IRA - was a legitimate act of 
war and comparing the Irish rebels to the Boers, who had also 
refused to fight in uniform. 
Ewart never really comes to a conclusion about these arguments. He 
is genuinely bewildered by the type of warfare being practised in 
Ireland. Unlike Chesterton, Ewart brought no ideological scheme to 
help him interpret the upheaval in Ireland. His template was the 
Great War, the clash of states and armies. He was genuinely puzzled 
by stateless nationalism and guerrilla tactics - a puzzlement I would 
argue that was borne of the novelty of this form of struggle, with its 
combination of the familiar and the new and its intertwining loyalties 
(Ewart repeatedly met people who were Unionists but opposed to the 
Black and Tans or who managed to be pro-Sinn Fein as well as being 
landowners and imperialists). The shape of the war in Ireland-
reprisals and counter-reprisals between the Black and Tans and the 
IRA - was opaque compared the fixed identities of the epic war in 
which he had served. After attempting to investigate the deaths of 
two Sinn Fein politicians in Co. Limerick (Sinn Fein said they had 
been killed by the Black and Tans, the British military that they had 
been killed by Sinn Feiners) Ewart concluded that what had 
happened during the war in Ireland was only "half known" and that 
60 Ibid P 20 
61 Ibid P 35 
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"much of it probably never will be known, that a man has to dig out 
and unearth the truth for himself, that, in short, the condition of the 
country during the insurrection was a 'history within a history."'62 
The fascination of Ireland's war for literary travels outlasted the truce 
agreed shortly after Ewart finished his journey. In July 1923 V.S. 
Pritchett, the Ireland correspondent for the Christian Science 
Monitor, published an article looking back at his first three months 
reporting from the newly independent country. "Three months ago I 
landed at Kingstown, or, more correctly, Dun Laogaire [sic], 
wondering how exciting life would be in a country engaged in civil 
war. My luggage had been searched for arms at Holyhead; my 
person was searched on landing in Ireland. By the time I had arrived 
in Dublin itself, I was prepared for the wildest thrills, accompanied 
by a goodly share of what we Sassenachs call 'Irish humour. "'63 
How had Ireland matched up to his high expectations? His 
confession is a clue to two things: how Ireland since the Easter 
Rising of 1916 had become a country where things happened, a place 
of intense interest to newspaper readers and, secondly, how remote it 
could seem to a visitor from England, even someone with Pritchett's 
literary sensibility. Pritchett describes in his memoirs how in 1922 
he had gone about Fleet Street seeking commissions to begin his life 
as a writer. Finally a Mr Bassellthorpe, the London editor of The 
Christian Science Monitor, returned his calL "What, he said, did I 
know about Ireland? Almost nothing I said. All I knew was that the 
Irish Treaty had been signed and that, as was foreseen, the Irish were 
62 Ibid P 102 
63 V.S. Pritchett: "Three Months in Ireland" in Christian Science Monitor July 23, 1923 
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fighting one another... The war was dragging on. Why, I did not 
know. "64 Mr Bassellthorpe reassured him that the readership of the 
Monitor was mostly Protestant and that they would be sure to be 
interested in Ireland. 
The Monitor had been established by the founder of Christian 
Science, Mary Baker Eddy in 1908. In a manifesto published on the 
anniversary of its first issue in November 1909 the paper said its 
mission was "not only to keep its readers informed of events all over 
the world, but to interpret those events in a way to show their 
relation to the great movements that are of significance to the human 
race."65 Despite the intimation that the Monitor might align itself 
with movements of social change, one historian concluded that, on 
the contrary, its editorial philosophy exuded "contentment with the 
established order of political and economic arrangements."66 But 
Pritchett's sardonic observation that in those days the Monitor "was 
really more of a daily magazine than a daily newspaper" reveals how 
this woolly commitment to explain world events did mean that the 
paper offered its contributors freedom to write.67 Pritchett himself 
confessed that he was "untrained and innocent", an unlikely 
candidate for the role of roving reporter at a time of civil disturbance. 
"I had never been in a newspaper office. I did not know how one 
64 V.S. Pritchett: Midnight Oil (Chatto and Windus, London, 1971) P 108 
65 Quoted in Lawrence N. Strout: Covering McCarthyism: How the Christian Science 
Monitor Handled Joseph R. McCarthy 1950-1954 (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1999) p 
XIV 
66 Bryan R. Wilson: Sects and Society: A Sociological Stndy of Three Religions Groups in 
Britain (William Heinemann, London, 1961) p 125. Quoted in Jeremy Treglown: V.S. Pritchett 
op. cit. p 21 
67 Pritchett Midnight Oil op. cit. p 109 
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gathered news. I did not know that one could actually call on a 
government office or a politician. I knew no one in Ireland." 68 
When Pritchett went to Ireland its intractability - from a British point 
of view - was on full display. Under the treaty signed in London in 
December 1921 to end the Anglo-Irish War, the Irish Free State-
covering twenty-six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland - was 
granted Dominion status within the British Empire and a Provisional 
Government established in Dublin. However, within days of the 
treaty being signed, a significant minority of the nationalist 
movement rejected it because of the failure to achieve the thirty-two 
county republic the rebels had fought for. It was a bitter but reluctant 
split. For several months in 1922 leaders from both sides tried to 
find an accommodation that would avoid all out conflict. The most 
charismatic IRA figure during the War of Independence, Michael 
Collins - who had signed the Treaty - tried to devise a constitution 
that would be acceptable to those who opposed the treaty. But 
"British opposition, oblivious of the human cost to Ireland, and at 
least in some quarters, relishing the prospect of civil war among the 
wretched natives, compelled him to modify the constitution in 
accordance with the Treaty."69 The opponents of the Treaty regarded 
the Free State government as "a military junta set up and armed by 
England" to crush the true army of the Republic established in 1919 
by Dail Eireann.70 The Times judged that with "the passing of British 
responsibility ... Irishmen are shown at death grips with the monster 
their own folly has begotten." The conflict developing between the 
68 Ibid P 109 
69 J J Lee: Ireland 1912-1985 op. cit. p 59 
70 Bill Kisssane: The Politics of the Irish Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2005) p 30 
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pro and anti-treaty factions was "none other than that between human 
progress and the resurgent powers of a darker age. "71 
In June 1922 the civil war began when government troops assaulted 
the Four Courts building in Dublin to dislodge a group of rebels who 
had taken it over. The British government demanded of the new 
leadership in Dublin that they put an end to the rebellion or face re-
occupation for being in breach of the Treaty. "This was virtually an 
ultimatum requesting one set of Irishmen to fire on another set of 
Irishmen at the behest of the British cabinet."72 By the time Pritchett 
arrived in Dublin in early 1923 the dissidents, known as "Irregulars", 
had been pushed out of the main towns and cities; their numbers had 
dwindled and their campaign was heading towards defeat. But the 
cost in lives and property over the previous nine months exceeded 
that incurred during the War of Independence that lasted two years. 
Historians have not agreed a figure for civilian and military deaths 
although four thousand is the accepted (though probably 
exaggerated) estimate.73 The methods used by the Provisional 
Government to suppress the threat to its authority represented an 
even more vicious version of the reprisal tactics that had been used 
on its leaders by Lloyd George and the Black and Tans. The 
"Irregulars" assassinated members of the new Free State parliament; 
in response the government began executing prisoners: seventy-seven 
were killed before the war ended. "The sad irony by which the new 
state was instantly reduced to the same political bankruptcy as the 
former British state in countering violent political challenge left an 
71 The Times, April 21, 1922 
72 ES.L. Lyons: Ireland Since the Famine op. cit. p 461 
73 See Lee op. cit. p 69 
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indelible mark on Irish history. "74 It was an irony not lost on those 
who had supported the Irish nationalist cause in Britain. C.P. Scott 
remarked to Asquith's wife: "Who would have believed that, having 
got rid of us, the Irish would start a terror of their own ?"75 
From his earliest dispatches from Ireland, V.S. Pritchett was keen to 
show that the terror in Ireland was the responsibility of a minority 
obsessed by a warped patriotism which was itself fast becoming an 
anachronism. A little over a month after his arrival in Ireland, full of 
expectation of adventure, Pritchett published the second of his pieces 
in the Christian Science Monitor. It occupied most of a column on 
the back page and was signed with his initials, "V.S.P.". His first 
piece, an account of a disrupted rail journey from Dublin to Cork in 
the south west, had been more concerned with scenery and the 
weather than with politics. But in his second piece he established his 
point of view by gazing from his window overlooking one of the 
main streets in Cork city: "My window is one of the little windows of 
the world, a peephole into southern Irish life."76 In contrast to the 
wild thrills he had prepared himself for, and the expectations of his 
readers who associated Ireland with war and revolution, Pritchett's 
first snapshot of the disturbed country highlighted a resilient 
normality and the triumph of commerce over political passion. 
Cattle are driven through the streets; lorries turn down the side roads towards the quays where 
ships are loading and unloading; farmers' carts are coming to town and going away; there are 
businessmen in the hotels from all parts of the country; there is a pleasant hum of activity 
74 Charles Townshend: Political Violence in Ireland op.cit. p 373 
75 Michael Hopkinson: Green Against Green: The Irish Civil War (Gill and Macmillan, 
Dublin, 1988) p 276 
76 V.S. Pritchett: "A Glimpse at a Southern Irish Town" in Christian Science Monitor March 
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everywhere. The pleasure seeker is here as well. There is golf if you want it; and football 
whether you want it or not. At night the theatres and cinemas are crowded. There has been a 
two weeks' Shakespeare season, the popularity of which attests a love for the finer things in 
human thought.?7 
Pritchett argued that the very appearance of normality as he 
described it was a reliable indicator of the pacific intentions of the 
majority of Irishmen. This majority retained only a "theoretical" 
sympathy for Republicanism and none at all for its methods. They 
were indifferent to "the occasional spell of firing at night" which was 
all the Irregulars could now manage. If only people had developed 
self-awareness, Pritchett believed, and had not been inhibited by "a 
trait of suspicion in Irish character generally" there could already 
have been peace.78 With the possibility of a settlement growing, the 
Irish people were ready to close ranks behind their government. 
However, Pritchett suggested that once peace was established, not 
only the romantic idealism of the republicans but even the 
conservative nationalism of the pro-treaty government might become 
passe: nationalists of all hues would be supplanted by an economic 
elite. "It is remarkable how closely associated with beautiful poetic 
expression the movement for Irish self-government has been. The 
patriots have given a poetical halo to their country's tradition; but 
with law and order established, the tum of the patriots will have been 
served."79 The fighting poets and patriots would be supplanted by an 
economic elite. Pritchett reported that he had been told by 
"responsible men" that in elections over the next decade the entire 
political class which brought about the retreat of the British 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
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administration would be replaced "by men who have a stake in the 
country".80 Pritchett was convinced by this prognosis. His summing 
up at the end of his second dispatch for the Monitor is remarkably 
assured for somebody who only a few months previously confessed 
to knowing "almost nothing" about Ireland. 
There are broadly speaking, two types of Irishman today. The one who will not easily forget old 
differences, a dweller in a melancholy and ineffectual past, perpetuating the old myth that an 
Irishman is never happy unless he is fighting; the other, one who sees the apathy and evils to be 
met and is enthusiastic and practical enough to suggest remedies. I believe that in the new 
Ireland the word will be to him.81 
In the attempt to trace how Pritchett arrived at his conclusion, it is 
useful to examine the autobiographical sketches he published 
decades later. Pritchett's reflections appear in his memoir Midnight 
Oil- published in 1971 - and a book on Dublin published in 1967. 
Here Pritchett explains that at the time he came to Ireland he still 
retained the views of his family who were "firm Manchester 
Guardian liberals and Home Rulers." These views should have made 
him sympathetic to Irish nationalism. But he suggests that even 
sympathetic British liberal notions had little resonance in Ireland: his 
inherited views "condemned me from the start" in a country "which 
is innately illiberal" - a conclusion similar to Chesterton's 
argument. 82 Writing almost half a century after his time as Ireland 
correspondent for the Monitor, Pritchett reflects on his personal 
identification with Irish rebellion. "I had easily rid myself of the 
common English idea that Ireland was a piece of England that for 
some reason or other would not settle down and had run to seed .. .I 
80 Ibid 
81 Ibid 
82 V.S. Pritchett: Dublin: A Portrait (The Bodley Head, London, 1967) p 4 
234 
ardently identified Irish freedom with my own personal freedom 
which had been hard to come by. A revolutionary break? I was for 
it. Until you are free you do not know who you are."83 Using Ireland 
for such a purpose, as an unshaped reality that could allow for 
experimentation with new identities, is a pattern identified by Roy 
Foster. "From an early period disaffected British people used Ireland 
for dreams or ideas or insecurities too uncomfortable for home."84 
Pritchett's elation was heightened by the knowledge that he was 
being paid to observe and write up "the first modem defeat of 
colonialism." Watching the debates in Dail Eireann from the press 
gallery was, he remembers, "like being at school taking a course in 
the foundation of states."85 But despite his predetermined sympathy 
for the cause of Irish nationalism and his youthful enthusiasm for 
upheaval and flux, Pritchett equally confesses to a sense of 
estrangement. "I realized what a social revolution was, although I 
was (inevitably as an Englishman and Protestant) much more in the 
old Anglo-Irish society, the majority of whom reluctantly accepted 
the new regime, than among the rising Catholic middle class."86 
Forty years later, Pritchett appears to be ambivalent about the people 
towards whom he naturally gravitated socially. He remembers 
himself become "sensitive, snobbish and fey" as a consequence of 
"this easy going life in a Victorian lagoon" (an image which conveys 
a sense of a whole society being lost or marooned. )87 But he also 
claims credit for clear sightedness, for recognizing that "the Irish 
83 Pritchett: Midnight Oil op.cit. p 118 
84 R.F. Foster: Paddy and Mr Punch: Connections in Irish and English History (Allen 
Lane, London, 1993) p 282 
85 Pritchett: Midnight Oil op. cit. p 119 
86 Ibid P 119 
87 Pritchett: Dublin: A Portrait op. cit. p 4 and Midnight Oil p 120 
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Troubles were, in an important sense, a continuation of the European 
revolution caused by the European war." Both the Irish working 
class and the Anglo-Irish - whom he considers "more European than 
they were patriots" - had been bypassed by the nationalists.88 
The idea of the Anglo-Irish and working classes being "European" is 
likely to have been Pritchett's retrospective term to characterise what 
in 1923 he regarded as a commonsense aversion to republicanism. 
This theme emerged in his dispatches to the Monitor in June. On a 
visit to the Midlands Pritchett's driver, Paddy 0' Brien, recounted an 
exchange with an "Irregular" who had claimed to have played a large 
role in "pushing the British Empire into the sea." Mr 0' Brien told 
Pritchett that after listening patiently to the IRA man's story he had 
replied: "So it's after pushing the British Empire into the sea, you are, 
is it? Sure, you couldn't push a little pussy cat into the sea!"89 The 
Anglo-Irish landowners were similarly derisive of the efficacy of the 
revolutionaries but their crisis was acute; Pritchett noted that the 
owners of the country estates were losing money and influence. 
"Many of them are saddled with mansions built for more spacious 
times when their owners were more prosperous; and when such an 
idea as the eventual decay of the 'country gentleman' as an 
institution was never entertained ... "90 These mansions were being 
burned down and many former Unionists were choosing to leave the 
Irish Free State. Pritchett understood the despair of an entire class. 
"It is not altogether unnatural- nor, perhaps, unreasonable - that the 
88 Pritchett: Dublin: A Portrait p 6-7 
89 V.S. Pritchett: "In the Queen's County", Christian Science Monitor June 5,1923 
90 Ibid 
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country folk, pestered about their estates, should become pessimistic 
about the country."91 
Pritchett himself was struck by the divergence between the national 
ideals expounded by the revolutionary leaders and the state of social 
organisation in the Irish countryside. "When one sees the scattered 
cottages, the tumble-down farms, the strange-eyed unkempt 
peasantry, the 'backward' little towns ... the station masters who will 
keep a train for you half an hour if necessary, the national school 
with its thirty or forty pupils, who attend when it pleases their 
parents, one wonders what all this has to do with the 'national 
consciousness' and 'the splendour of the Gael' about which so much 
is written and spoken in Dublin." 92 But just as in his earlier dispatch 
from Cork, Pritchett predicted that a practical Irish mentality was in 
the ascendant, a spirit in which the local schoolteacher - though 
apparently surrounded by an apathetic peasantry - would replace the 
man of action as a hero-figure in anew, enlightened Ireland. 
"Education will destroy superstitions - religious, pagan and social; 
and while pessimists with hundreds of acres make despairing 
epigrams about what is called the Irish temperament, men like the 
national schoolmaster think that the salvation of the country lies in 
the educating of its consciousness."93 
Pritchett considered that an obsession amongst the Irish about their 
history was inhibiting the creation of that new consciousness. He 
embarked on another train journey from Dublin to Belfast, passing 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid 
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over a bridge that had been blown up during the fighting but repaired 
and now protected by a special corps of troops whose job was to keep 
the railways running. An hour out of Dublin the train crossed the 
River Boyne as it entered the town of Drogheda. The Boyne was the 
site of the famous battle in which the army of William of Orange 
defeated James II in 1691, the iconic defeat of Catholics by 
Protestants. Crossing the Boyne, Pritchett was reminded of one of his 
"favourite theories about Ireland" that "it is the country of old history 
books." This is a visual trope for an enduring motif in English 
writing about Ireland: the fixation with history, an immersion in the 
wrongs of the past inimical to utilitarian optimism. "I could take 
you to a second-hand bookshop in Dublin where there are books on 
Irish history from all possible points of view between bigotry and 
blarney, piled from floor to ceiling. If the Irish would go back to 
Cuchu1ain and the giants of Ulster there might not be any objection; 
but they stop at Cromwell or William of Orange." 94 
Later, Pritchett discovered a more benign Irish approach to history, 
more in tune with his vision for a practical future. In early summer he 
went to Trinity College in Dublin for the annual end-of-term 
celebrations. Trinity had always been identified as one of the most 
important institutions of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland; to 
some nationalist ideologists it was "the chief agent of English culture 
in Ireland."95 Trinity's position in the new state was precarious. This 
sense of displacement was conveyed by Pritchett's account of the 
visit of the Governor-General to the college during Trinity Week. 
94 V.S. Pritchett: "Northward Bound" in Christian Science Monitor June 29, 1923 
95 Terence Brown: Ireland: A Social and Cultural History 1922-79 (Fontana, London, 1981) 
p 115 
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The college authorities were in a quandary as to what tune to play for 
his arrival: "God Save the King" and "Rule Britannia" were deemed 
unsuitable (even though the Governor-General was the King's 
representative in Dublin). In the end "the Governor-General arrived 
and scarcely anyone knew what the band was playing." 96 Pritchett 
noted the irony of how Trinity, though "an emblem of loyalty", had 
produced nationalist leaders and key figures of the Irish Literary 
Revival as well as serving as the custodian of some of the prized 
antiquities of Irish literature. The secret of Trinity's endurance, 
Pritchett concluded, was that it remained aloof from the events 
unfolding outside its walls. "The fact is, history may have made 
Trinity; but Trinity has never made history. Her attitude has been 
that of the scholar than that of the politician. She has been more 
concerned with ideas than with agitations."97 Now that scholarly 
detachment, cultivated over the centuries, would be a boon to the 
new Ireland. Pritchett observed how Trinity, like the English 
universities, had become less the property of a particular class; 
farmers' sons and "boys of similar standing" were now being 
admitted to what had once been the preserve of the gentry. Pritchett 
exulted at how liberal education might eventually permeate all ranks 
of society. "There is an urbanity in the history which shelters in 
Trinity's quadrangles and rests under its academic elms. It has a 
leavening influence in a country which has too often been on the one 
hand lulled into ignorance, and on the other sharpened into bigotry. 
Trinity stands for tolerance. "98 
96 V.S. Pritchett: "Trinity - Past and Present" in Christian Science Monitor July 13, 1923 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid 
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After a few months in Ireland, Pritchett believed that tolerance, level 
headedness and an interest in the practical were winning out over the 
romantic visionaries and their violence. The Irregular campaign had 
badly faltered, reduced to "wordy threats" and Ireland was in 
transition from· civil war to normallife.99 Pritchett even regarded the 
eruption of a series of strikes (particularly those by agricultural 
labourers seeking better conditions from the big farmers) as a sign of 
progress. Unlike Chesterton, who, as we have seen, believed that 
Irish peasant society offered an alternative to industrialism, Pritchett 
saw Ireland moving towards modem norms - and he approved of it. 
"Before", Pritchett held, "the country was governed by what was 
more or less of a benevolent despotism, which created a state of 
society in many respects feudaL" In post-independence Ireland "you 
have democracy with a vengeance."IOO 
This last phrase suggests a degree of violence in the imposition of 
civility on a disordered country, and is probably unwittingly 
suggestive of the part that score-settling and retaliation played in the 
restoration of order during and after the civil war. There is no doubt 
that Pritchett admired the leaders the Free State government in the 
struggle to assert their authority. In his memoirs he writes ofW.T. 
Cosgrave, the leader of the government, as "the clever and dogged 
little Cosgrave" who astonished people by his political aptitude. "He 
was the perfect exemplar ... of the ordinary man suddenly elevated to 
high office, who had the inborn moral character that is required for 
rule. It was a delight to hear this little fighter with the gay brushed-up 
99 V.S. Pritchett: "Three Months in Ireland" op. cit. 
100 Ibid 
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hair, in debate."101 This preference for the pro-treaty politicians ran 
through his despatches to the Monitor. There is no sustained analysis 
of the Free State government's opponents, no humanising pen 
portraits of its leaders or followers. Mostly the views of the 
Republicans are dismissed as visionary rhetoric: wild, irrelevant or -
increasingly as 1923 wore on - shopworn. In Pritchett's despatches, 
the Republican position is almost always compared unfavourably 
with the flux of ordinary life and the creative endeavours of state 
building. 
A typical example of Prichett's attitude was his account of a visit to 
Clare in the west of Ireland in the autumn of 1923. A historian of 
the Irish revolution in Clare has characterised the county at that time 
as "in some respects ... typical of rural Ireland, in some respects a 
caricature, in some respects unique." 102 The spectacular electoral 
success in County Clare in 1917 of the Republican leader, Eamon De 
Valera, had put Sinn Fein on the political map. In the general 
election of August 1923 De Valera came out of hiding to stand in 
Clare and was arrested in dramatic fashion as he tried to address an 
election meeting in the county's main town, Ennis. "It was difficult 
to believe", Pritchett wrote of his journey to Clare, "as one trotted 
among these bare green hills, with their patchwork of little fields, and 
their fierce stone walls, their scraps of bogland, and those misty 
mountains lying all around, that the inhabitants of each innocent-
eyed cottage were violent politicians."l03 
101 Pritchett: Dublin: A Portrait op. cit. p 6 
102 David Fitzpatrick: Politics and Irish Life p xii 
103 V.S. Pritchett: "Men of Clare" in Christian Science Monitor October 13, 1923 
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But Pritchett regarded County Clare's reputation for violence 
exaggerated. He met local people, some of whom he thought were 
"wild-looking", but found no hostility towards him as an 
Englishman. Indeed he discovered that the people in Clare were 
"children" who had lived in a kind of prelapsarian state of anarchy 
throughout the revolution and were finding it difficult to re-adjust to 
a new era of civic responsibility. "Lawlessness became the law; 
revenge was the only form of justice; and the simple men of Clare 
and of all the counties of Ireland became 'free'. In those days no-one 
was 'agin the government'; there was no government in authority to 
be 'agin'. But now that has changed or is changing; law and order are 
returning and with them has returned the old tradition of being 'agin' 
the Government - this time an Irish Government."104 In another 
report from Clare published two weeks later Pritchett noted the 
observations of the novelist William Thackeray who visited Ennis in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Thackeray had remarked that Ennis was 
"foreign-looking" and Pritchett concurred, adding that parts of 
Ireland possess qualities of charm that he associated with France. 
He visited the town's main square where De Valera was arrested in 
such dramatic circumstances in August and tried to imagine the 
emotion of that day. But he concluded that the enthusiasm of the 
locals for De Valera was feckless and misguided, another symptom 
of their flight from civic duty. "[The] only side the people of Ennis 
see is that de Valera is a 'grand speaker' who has been carried off by 
the same tyrannous soldiers who chased the poor young boys up into 
the hills. Incidentally, de Valera has not tried to make them pay 
104 Ibid 
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rents, and taxes and rates; but has succeeded in being the most 
talked-about person in Clare."105 
V.S. Pritchett's dispatches from Ireland throughout 1923 consistently 
returned to one theme: that Republicanism was a political dead end, 
that the people knew this and that Ireland was about to embrace a 
liberal future. Thus he attempted to confound a perennial British 
view of Ireland as politically intractable, forever given to dissension. 
But at the same time he employed a familiar Victorian conceit about 
the "childlike" Irish.106 Pritchett repeatedly cautioned against 
pessimism and predicted the triumph of distinctly liberal values. 
However, he was soon disappointed. Years afterwards, recalling his 
return to Ireland in the late 1920s after two years in Spain, Pritchett 
confesses to a surprisingly bitter disillusionment: "One could smell 
the coming reaction and the dullness of growing religious 
obduracy. "107 
The work of Chesterton, Ewart and Pritchett examined here shares 
many common themes. One of the most consistent is the difficulty of 
truly knowing Ireland. Chesterton claims that many people in Britain 
have misunderstand Ireland; Ewart is constantly surprised by the 
differences he encounters; Pritchett goes there slightly ashamed at his 
ignorance. Perhaps because Ireland is exotic to them it becomes, for 
all three writers a place to imaginatively re-work some personal or 
political argument which began before they left Britain. For 
105 V.S. Pritchett: "Men of Clare" in Christian Science Monitor October 13, 1923 
106 "The equation of the Irishman with the child in Victorian thinking was based on the fear of 
the inner child within many adult males. It is this that had led to a ferocious disciplining of their 
offspring." Dec1an Kiberd: Irish Classics (Granta Books, London, 2000) p 326 
107 Pritchett: Midnight Oil op cit p 173 
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Chesterton the state of Ireland provides evidence for his arguments 
against industrialism. Ewart too questions the morality of modem 
warfare. And for Pritchett - aged twenty-three - the revolution in 
Ireland become synonymous with his own bid for personal freedom. 
All of them note the paradox of revolution in a society that otherwise 
appears stable. Both Chesterton and Pritchett characterise Ireland as 
illiberal; Ewart is struck by the irony of normality and practicality 
persisting side by side with risk and menace. But most importantly 
all of them place Ireland outside of the context of the Union. 
Chesterton highlights how the predominance of the peasantry equates 
Ireland with Serbia or Slovenia. Pritchett suggests that the Irish 
uprising is a continuation of the European revolution. Ewart 
perceives Ireland through the prism of the Great War. Thus, as with 
the newspaper reports from Britain and the United States, literary 
travellers to Ireland sought to explain the conflict that convulsed the 
country between 1919 and 1923 in the context of the forces changing 
the whole world as "the great edifice of nineteenth century 
civilisation crumpled in the flames of world war as its pillars 
collapsed."lo8 
108 Eric Hobsbawm: The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991 (Pantheon 
Books, New York, 1994) p 22 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to address two lacunae in the historical literature on 
Ireland and journalism. In the writing of Irish history, the role of the 
British, American and international press in influencing the outcome of 
the revolution has been acknowledged in a perfunctory fashion; the 
professional practice or political thinking of the special correspondents 
and writers who went to Ireland has rarely been explained or indeed 
explored in this literature. In classic studies of the media on the other 
hand, changing historical circumstances are often ignored or - in the 
case of Anglo-American media history of the period covered here - a 
narrow topic such as the activities of the press barons dominates the 
research agenda. I set out to address these deficiencies by examining the 
work of British and American journalists who came to Ireland as special 
correspondents and their engagement with the military, political and 
ideological struggles of the time. 
The validity of this approach is based on two arguments. Firstly, that 
special correspondents and literary journalists enjoy a degree of relative 
autonomy and that this premise is a fruitful point of departure for 
appraising their work. In this sense my approach corresponds to a 
fundamental aspect of Pierre Bourdieu' s field theory which regards the 
journalistic field as both constrained and free, where "one has to take 
note of this relative autonomy in order to understand [its] practices and 
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works ... ,,1 Secondly, this thesis has been based on the idea that 
journalists are influenced by contemporary ideological debates and that 
a key dimension of making sense of press coverage is to look beyond 
the journalistic domain itself to the dominant political and cultural issues 
prevailing in the world at large. As Daniel Hallin pointed out in his 
important study of the Vietnam war, journalistic decisions which 
generate news are "guided by the cultural assumptions of the wider 
society,,2 Or, as Philip Schlesinger has argued elsewhere, "If we restrict 
ourselves to what appears in the media this plainly does not tell us much 
about the process whereby it comes to be there ... ,,3 In examining the 
work of a selection of individual writers and correspondents who went 
to Ireland to report on the war I wanted to keep alive the sense in which 
they were relatively autonomous agents and also political actors, 
responding to rapidly changing circumstances and scrambling to make 
sense of the shifting meanings of the conflict. To this end Bourdieu' s 
idea that the political field and journalistic field "have in common the 
fact that they .. .lay claim to the imposition of the legitimate vision of the 
social world ... " is especially apt as a description of the struggle 
described in the previous chapters.4 
For British correspondents particularly, covering the war in Ireland 
presented an opportunity to respond to a major assault on their own 
I Pierre Bourdieu: "The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field" in 
Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (eds): Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field (Polity Press, London, 
2005) p 30-32 
2 Daniel Hallin: The 'Uncensored War'op.cit. p 69 
3 Philip Schlesinger: "Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism: Source Strategies and the Limits of 
Media-Centrism" in Marjorie Ferguson (ed): Public Communication: The New Imperatives (Sage, 
London, 1990) p 72 
4 Bourdieu op.cit. p 36 
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cherished sense of autonomy. From 1914 to 1918 the mainstream press 
in Britain was co-opted for the war effort. Newspaper proprietors 
acquiesced in the system of censorship and their journalists followed 
suit. The correspondents who tried to report independently from 
northern France in the early days of the war were arrested and expelled. 
Soon afterwards official war correspondents were sanctioned to send the 
news back to London. They were carefully escorted to the front and the 
despatches they wrote in the specially appointed villas situated well 
behind the lines were only sent out after being scrutinised and passed by 
military censors; they could hardly be said to have witnessed the war in 
any real sense. By examining the memoirs of Philip Gibb, Henry Wood 
Nevinson and Hamilton Fyfe, I have been able to show how influential 
correspondents were acutely aware that the recognition they achieved 
for their war coverage was undercut by their collusion with censorship 
and that they gradually began to feel they had betrayed their calling. 
This sense of shame was accentuated by the emergence in Britain of a 
wider post-war critique of the perils of propaganda which assimilated 
fears that the press had become the political tool of powerful interests 
seeking political advantage. Hilaire Belloc's complaint that an 
oligarchy controlling the press had "come to believe that it can suppress 
any truth and suggest any falsehood" was not untypical.5 The evidence 
of contemporary journalistic memoirs presented in this thesis suggests 
that this critical perspective on the role of correspondents during the war 
was incorporated by many of them into their view of what journalism 
should aspire to achieve. Barbie Zelizer has written of how journalists 
continually renew their sense of purpose by judging contemporary 
5 Hilaire Belloc: The Free Press op.cit. p 37 
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practices in the light of past events. "Reporters create their own history 
of journalism by making each critical incident representative of some 
greater journalistic dilemma or practice.,,6 By analysing the debates 
among press critics 3J:'1d prominent journalists after the First World War I 
have demonstrated how a notion that the reputation of the press had 
been tarnished by collaboration with the government had begun to take 
hold on the eve of the war in Ireland. Correspondents for major London 
newspapers, whose professional self-image was based on the idea that 
they reported what they saw, went to Ireland in the context of 
complaints that journalists had compromised their integrity and that 
reporters were frauds because they had not been doing the job which the 
public had been led to expect of them. 
As well as differing in scale to the worldwide conflict that had just 
ended, the war the correspondents went to cover in Ireland was different 
in character. It was not just that Lloyd George wished to portray it as a 
criminal disturbance in part of the United Kingdom; even in the 
nineteenth century "Ireland was administered in an exceptional way, 
more like a grand colony than an integral part of the United Kingdom.,,7 
More significantly, the unrest in Ireland was of a piece with a series of 
revolts around the empire which coincided with the Versailles treaty. 
As well as the troubles in Ireland, Britain was confronted with uprisings 
in Egypt, Afghanistan, India and the new protectorate of Mesopotamia 
as "a new and more elaborate set of crises marched indefatigably on 
6 Barbie Zelizer: "Journalists as Interpretive Communities" in Critical Studies in Mass 
Communications 10 (September 1993) p 226 
7 Charles Townshend: Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain 
(Oxford University Press, 1993) p 23 
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through the body politic of Empire, like gout through the enfeebled 
frame of a toper."s By their nature these small wars offered "wider scope 
for diversity of perception than ... genuinely large ones" in which the 
entire nation was mobilised. 9 But, as this thesis has demonstrated, in the 
case of Ireland these doubts and disagreements about the correct course 
of action were publicly exposed and dissected in a fashion hardly ever 
equalled in the case of small wars in more distant lands. 
In Chapter 2 I traced how, as the conflict in Ireland escalated, 
correspondents for the Daily News, The Times, and the Manchester 
Guardian shifted to more adversarial reporting. At first the 
correspondents were prepared to take on trust the official line that the 
Sinn Fein MPs, who had inaugurated their own parliament in Dublin 
rather than cross the Irish Sea to attend the House of Commons, would 
soon come to their senses. But as the volunteer army that became the 
IRA stepped up its campaign during 1919, the reporting from Ireland 
grew more sceptical of official explanations, openly questioning whether 
the Irish administration had the ability or the means to contain it. When 
the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries were introduced in 1920 to 
bolster the disintegrating Irish police force, the challenge of controlling 
perceptions became even more difficult. In a typical gambit in the 
House of Commons the Irish Secretary, Hamar Greenwood, tried to 
portray the sister island as largely serene and loyal. "In two-thirds, or 
nearly three-fourths of Ireland, there is as great peace as there is in the 
county of Kent", Greenwood insisted, dismissing the remaining fraction 
8 John Gallagher: "Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire" op. cit. p 355 
9 Paddy Griffith: "Small Wars and How They Grow in the Telling" in Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Vol 2, No.2 (August 1991) P 216-217 
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of the country (anything from one-third to one quarter according to his 
lights) as a manageable area of distemper infected by sedition with 
foreign roots. IO But as the war of reprisals became the focus of 
coverage in the London (and international) press, it was hard to 
convincingly portray Ireland as a peaceful corner of the kingdom beset 
by bandits; as with Vietnam nearly half a century later, there came a 
point where "events themselves ... could not longer be rationalized or 
suppressed or distorted by 'progress reports. ",11 Reporting of the IRA 
campaign confounded the idea that Ireland was in the grip of a 
temporary disturbance. And coverage of reprisals for the Crown forces 
provided evidence that an incompetent administration had become 
lawless as well. Correspondents such as Hugh Martin travelled the 
country to interview witnesses to atrocities. As I have shown, the 
presence of the Black and Tans and the notoriety they attained through 
their indiscipline opened a new vista for the reporting from Ireland. 
They were disliked and shunned by the many of the correspondents who 
regarded them as not proper soldiers or gentlemen. 
By contrast, the rebels were regarded as legitimate and honourable 
sources of news. British correspondents would have been intimately 
familiar with the Irish nationalism. For one thing, the Irish question had 
been a staple of metropolitan politics for generations and representatives 
of the Irish cause enjoyed a status and authority beyond the reach of 
other contemporary anti-colonial nationalist movements: it should be 
remembered that the deputies in the first Dail Eireann had been returned 
10 Hansard Fifth Series Vol 135 Col494 [November 24,1920] 
II Philip Geyelin: "Vietnam and the Press" op. cit. p 171 
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to the House of Commons in a British general election. British reporters 
would also have been personally familiar with Irish concerns because 
London journalism had been colonised by the Irish. A survey of Irish 
emigrants in Britain published in 1872 reported that "there is not a 
newspaper in London without its one, two, three and four Irish writers 
and Irish reporters on its staff - indeed, Irish reporters are not alone 
numerous but are the best and ablest who supply the daily papers with 
the Court and Parliamentary records of the day.' 12 And their activities 
bore directly on perceptions of Ireland in Britain because "in many cases 
what they were involved in marketing or publicising concerned views or 
interpretations of Ireland, contemporary or historical.,,13 The reporting of 
Terence McSwiney's funeral procession through the streets of London, 
analysed in Chapter 3, can be read in this context. 
The ability of the British government to prevent correspondents from 
reporting the Sinn Fein view of the war was also fatally undermined by 
emergence of critics of Lloyd George's strategy within the government 
itself and in the wider political elite. In Chapter 4 I showed how 
members of the cabinet and senior officials in London and Dublin 
combined a sensitivity towards public opinion with distaste for the 
tactics of reprisals. The reality of powerful dissenting voices at the 
highest level in London and in the Irish administration in Dublin Castle 
extended the limits of legitimate political controversy and meant that Sir 
Hamar Greenwood - whose sole aim according to T.P. 0' Connor was 
"publicity and more publicity and still more publicity" - lost control of 
12 Fintan Cullen and R.F. Foster: 'Conquering England': Ireland in Victorian London (National 
Portrait Gallery, London, 2005) p 15 
13 Ibid P 18 
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the press in Ireland. 14 The British government failed to monopolise the 
interpretation of the news. As such, the evidence presented in this thesis 
supports Philip Schlesinger's critique of Stuart Hall's idea that the 
powerful become "primary definers" of news. Schlesinger argues that 
Hall "does not take account of contention between official sources in 
trying to influence the construction of a story.,,15 As the war of reprisals 
in Ireland worsened powerful figures in the political elite - both inside 
and outside the cabinet - took issue with its conduct. This was also a 
situation where "the media take the initiative in the definitional process 
by challenging the so-called primary definers and forcing them to 
respond,,16, a case in point being Hugh Martin's adversarial reporting 
which directly contradicted Sir Hamar Greenwood's explanations in 
parliament. Finally, the evidence presented in this thesis sustains 
Taylor's argument that the media sometimes has the capacity to 
"crystallize slogans or themes which are subsequently taken up by the 
primary definers.,,17 As has been shown, the conceits of British, 
European and American correspondents (such as the idea that British 
forces were engaged in a policy of Prussian frightfulness in Ireland) 
were reproduced by prominent figures such as Asquith in political 
debate in London. 
Thus the war in Ireland allowed the journalists who were under attack 
for their collusion with government propaganda during the First W orId 
War to reassert their identity as truth tellers. This return to the ideals 
14 Quoted in 'Periscope' (G.C.Duggan): "The Last Days of Dublin Castle" in Blackwood's 
Magazine (August 1922) p 156 
15 Philip Schlesinger: "Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism" op. cit. p 66 
16 Ibid P 67 
17 Ibid 
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made famous by The Times coverage of the Crimean War was not only 
proclaimed by the newspapers themselves (in articles such as the 
Manchester Guardian editorial claiming that the only way of knowing 
the truth of events in Ireland was by reading the correspondents' 
despatches.) More important was the consecration offered by the 
repetition of these despatches by the government's critics in the House 
of Commons. In his study of the political press, Stephen Koss noted how 
politicians "sedulously fostered newspapermen's self-images" as 
representatives of the Fourth Estate. I8 This thesis argues that coverage of 
the war in Ireland was a classic case in point. The persistent quotation in 
parliament of the reports written by British, American and European 
correspondents covering the war seemed to vindicate the myth of the 
vigilant press. Barbie Zelizer has pointed out how the authority of 
journalists "is assumed to derive from their presence at events, from the 
ideology of eyewitness authenticity. In producing metaphors like 
'eyewitnessing', 'watchdogs', 'being there', practices of discovery, or 
'being on the spot' , reporters establish markers that not only set up their 
presence but also uphold its ideological importance.,,19 This watchdog 
role was reinvested with validity during the Anglo-Irish war. In his 
memoirs Philip Gibbs takes up this theme of valiant crusading for truth 
by suggesting that there was "a boycott of news" from Ireland and that a 
few courageous newspapers broke through "this conspiracy of 
silence.,,2o At the same time, and with no apparent sense of 
contradiction, he also manages to argue that it was at least a year after 
the end of the Anglo-Irish war before admissions were made in the 
18 Stephen Koss: The Rise and Fall of the Political Press op.cit. p 445 
19 Barbie Zelizer: "Journalists as Interpretive Communities" op. cit. p 224-225 
20 Philip Gibbs: The Hope of Europe op.cit. p 73 
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.,-". 
House of Commons and "facts [published] in papers like The Times. ,,21 
As well as suiting his thesis that the God fearing Englishman would 
never have condoned the activities of the Black and Tans had he known 
about what was going on in Ireland, Gibbs's torturous argument 
encompasses the idea of a small band of journalistic heroes redeeming 
their much traduced profession. 
This thesis argues that for once there was a grain of truth in the 
journalistic legend. In the sense that the conflict in Ireland was a small 
colonial war it received an inordinate amount of attention in the press, 
not least because Ireland's status was associated by British politicians 
with "the integrity of the British state itself.,,22 The campaign in Ireland 
generated more critical coverage than most of the foreign expeditions 
which preceded it. In his survey of nineteenth and twentieth century war 
reporting Joseph Matthews noted that although small imperial wars 
regularly provoked internal political dissent in Britain, France and 
Germany "none of this ... was reflected in news despatches from the 
field.,,23 Correspondents might criticise specific tactics or a shortfall in 
provision for the troops but the essential thrust of their reporting "was 
one of wholehearted belief in the blessings of civilisation that were 
being carried to the heathen for the good of the heathen and for the good 
of the conquerors." These battles were usually "set in romantic 
surroundings, far removed from the troublesome controversies at home, 
21 Ibid P 74 
22 Stephen Howe: Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) p 65 
23 Joseph J. Mathews: Reporting the Wars (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957) p 
139 
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and the reporters took care that the two did not meet.,,24 I have 
demonstrated how the war in Ireland changed the terms of that calculus 
for the British reporters because its proximity and the ambiguity of 
Ireland's status combined to make the conflict a highly visible test of 
some of the most cherished imperial illusions. 
Many champions of the imperial adventure "believed that the strength of 
the Empire lay not in its territorial magnitude but in its liberalism, its 
moral greatness.,,25 Condemnation of German militarism had been at 
the core of Allied propaganda during the First W orId War; "Liberal 
supporters of the war needed a just peace to vindicate their position.,,26 
In the immediate aftermath of the war Lloyd George's government 
advanced legal arguments for prosecuting German war criminals 
according to British standards of justice.27 This opened the way for any 
other state to object to British methods of warfare in its colonies.28 I 
have tried to show how this political climate influenced the reporting 
from Ireland and argued that it is in this context that we should read the 
repeated references in correspondent's despatches to how the methods of 
the Black and Tans were undermining Britain's right to be the arbiter of 
universal morality, its post-war standing, as The Times put it, as "the 
proved champion of civilisation.,,29 International press coverage spread 
the notoriety of the war of reprisals in Ireland around the globe; 
descriptions of a Britishfreikorps who self-consciously modelled 
24 Ibid P 140 
25 Gary Peatling: British Public Opinion and Irish Self-Government op.cit. p 61-62 
26 Peter Clarke: Liberals and Social Democrats op. cit. p 180 
27 Gary Bass: Stay the Hand of Vengeance op. cit. p 73 
28 Brian A.W. Simpson: Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis ofthe 
European Convention (Oxford University Press, 2001) p 322 
29 The Times, November 3, 1920 
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themselves on the gunslingers of the Wild West were little aid to the 
image that the British government was trying to project to the world?O 
After a visit to the United States Henry Wood Nevinson wrote that it 
was "a terrible thing to feel ashamed of the country one loves. It is like 
coming home and finding one's mother drunk upon the flOOr.,,31 
But international reprobation was not the only reason why British 
correspondents in particular should be so critical of the methods of 
coercion in Ireland. Running through the correspondents' despatches 
was a fear that Ireland might be an experiment in maintaining public 
order that could eventually be re-imported to Britain itself at a time of 
deep insecurity. In 1920, at the height of the Irish troubles, W.B. Yeats-
an avid imbiber of the zeitgeist - wrote to Lady Gregory of his fear that 
"everywhere governments & military power are let do much what they 
like. People speak quite calmly of a large part of Europe sinking back 
into barbarism & compare it to the break up of civilization at the fall of 
the Roman Empire. They cling to any authority.,,32 The Labour Party 
was alive to the possibility that repression in Ireland might inspire 
emulation in Britain. Its leaders "believed that reactionary groups 
within the government were exploiting unrest in Ireland as an excuse to 
develop a paramilitary force that could be mobilized against labour 
militancy at home.,,33 This idea was not new: in his classic tract on 
imperialism published at the turn of the century I.A. Hobson had warned 
30 One former Auxiliary officer recalled how, influenced by Western films, they wore revolvers in 
holsters "slung low on the thigh." Quoted in David Leeson: The Black and Tans: British Police in 
the First Irish War, 1920-21 (unpublished PhD thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 
2003) p 122 
31 Quoted in Gary Peatling: British Public Opinion and Irish Self-Government op.cit. p 93 
32 Quoted in R.F. Foster: W.B. Yeats, A Life Vol II op. cit. p 184 
33 Jon Lawrence: "Forging a Peaceable Kingdom" op. cit. p 582 
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that autocratic mentalities fostered among British administrators in the 
colonies were being introduced to Britain on their return. "It is indeed, a 
nemesis of Imperialism that the arts and crafts of tyranny, acquired and 
exercised in our unfree Empire, should be turned against our liberties at 
home.,,34 As I have tried to show, these arguments played a part in how 
the news from Ireland was framed by British correspondents. 
The nature of this sustained press critique and the extent to which, as I 
have shown, it both reflected and encouraged dissenting opinion within 
the political elite lends support to the argument that "the actions of 
liberal states ... cannot be explained convincingly without an account of 
their principled ideas ... ,,35 Indeed, Gary Peatling has argued that the 
force of these ideas ultimately prevented the deployment of 
overwhelming military force to crush the rebellion in Ireland. "[The] 
idea of a self-governing Ireland and resistance to the coercion of 
nationalist Ireland, obtained substantial, ready and ultimately decisive 
support from longstanding and self-consciously 'British' traditions ... [It] 
must be conceded that without such assistance, Irish nationalists would 
have found it much harder to establish the Irish Free State, not to 
mention the Republic.,,36 This thesis has shown that the desire of British 
correspondents to re-invigorate the myth of their independence from the 
state was one tradition which served to support resistance to coercion in 
Ireland. 
34 l.A. Hobson: Imperialism: A Study (James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., London, 1902) p 160 
35 Gary Bass: Stay the Hand of Vengeance op. cit. p 280 
36 Gary Peatling: British Public Opinion and Irish Self-Government op.cit. p 175 
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The Irish revolution coincided with the birth of mass democracy in an 
age when the press was perceived to be a decisive factor shaping the 
political world. The newspaper reader - or "audience man" in the words 
of one historian of the period37 - had become an active figure in history, 
and debates about the influence of the press, whether pernicious or 
uplifting, flourished among politicians, intellectuals and journalists. 
This was as true for Ireland as for the United States, Britain and the rest 
of Europe. In a contribution to the national debate about how the ancient 
Irish nation could cope with modernity W.B. Yeats argued that 
journalese was the most debased form of English and thereby a 
corrosive component of Anglicization.38 Ironically, he pursued this 
argument in voluminous contributions to newspapers and journals where 
controversy raged on the future course of cultural and political 
nationalism. Newspapers were the lifeblood of agrarian agitation and the 
movement for Home Rule in the late nineteenth century. J.F. McCarthy, 
a reporter who covered the Land War for the Freeman's J oumal, 
recalled that for the Catholic peasantry the newspapers had become 
"part of their everyday life, speaking to them in a thrilling, palpitating 
language [which] enabled them to hear their friends at a distance talking 
to them in accents of power about the wondrous doings of the Land 
League.,,39 The nationalist press quoted extensively from British 
newspapers to authenticate their favourable assessment of Charles 
Stewart Parnell's performance as leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party 
37 Charles Maier: Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in 
the Decade After World War I (Princeton University Press, New Haven, 1975) p 585 
38 Ben Levitas: The Theatre of Nation op.cit. p 49 
39 Quoted in James Loughlin: "Constructing the political spectacle: Parnell, the press and national 
leadership, 1879-86" in D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day (eds): Parnell in Perspective 
(Routledge, London, 1991) p 225. According to Charles Townshend the term "Land War" was 
invented by journalists; Charles Townshend: Easter 1916 op. cit. p 2 
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pushing for Home Rule legislation in the House of Commons.40 At the 
end of his career in the 1920s the veteran Irish journalist J.B. Hall came 
to the conclusion that reporters were deserving of better conditions 
because they were "the most important arbiters of the situation in which 
their profession places them.,,41 Picking up on the growing perception in 
the political world that publicity was essential to success, Hall urged his 
colleagues to demand more respect from politicians "who live, move, 
and have their being" in the columns of coverage printed in the 
42 
newspapers. 
News was now the chief currency of the commercial press for a mass 
audience. Becoming newsworthy or receiving favourable treatment in 
the news was a fundamental aim of political movements. As this thesis 
has demonstrated, Sinn Fein was no different. The chief representatives 
of the rebels whom correspondents first encountered when they arrived 
in Dublin - Desmond FitzGerald and Erskine Childers - were 
themselves British-born, urbane and well connected to the media world 
in London. They in turn opened doors to intellectual apologists for the 
Sinn Fein cause such as George Russell and the popular historian Alice 
Stopford Green whose outlook was essentially the same as English 
liberals. An official at Dublin Castle is reputed to have surprised a 
visiting correspondent by describing in detail the itinerary the journalist 
had already been taken through by Sinn Fein: "You went to ... the home 
of Sir Horace Plunkett and you had a couple of hours with George 
40 Ibid P 230 
41 J.B. Hall: Random Records of a Reporter (The Fodhla Printing Company Limited, Dublin, 
1928) p 226. 
42 Ibid 
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Russell at Plunkett House. Desmond FitzGerald called on you at the 
Shelbourne Hotel, and with an elaborate show of secrecy arranged an 
interview with Arthur Griffith. One or two harmless young Catholic 
priests fell into conversation with you at the Shelboume. You had 
invitations to tea from Mrs Erskine Childers, Maud Gonne MacBride 
and Mrs Stopford Green, who described atrocities they claim to have 
seen ... " 43 Sinn Fein's focus on publicity - analysed in Chapter 4 - was 
consistent with work carried out by other insurgent groups in the new 
media age. Prior to the American intervention in Cuba in 1898, Cuban 
exiles in New York had helped journalists from the major papers there 
to write about the scorched earth tactics being practised by the Spaniards 
in the effort to suppress Cuban nationalism.44 And during the Mexican 
revolution Pancho Villa used the press to disseminate "ready-made 
perceptions of him and his struggle in terms of three fundamental issues 
- his morality, his and the United States' mutual self-interest, and 
American pragmatism.,,45 He regularly gave interviews to American 
newspaper correspondents including John Reed and provided a special 
carriage on his military train for journalists.46 One of Villa's lieutenants, 
Pablo Lopez, once gave an interview to a correspondent of a Texan 
newspaper after he discovered that the reporter was Irish by birth. 'Ah', 
said Lopez, 'you are not then a gringo. Well, that makes a little 
43 Richard Bennett: The Black and Tans op. cit. p 100 
44 Richard Gott: Cuba: A New History (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004) p 93-95 and p 
100 
45 Mark Cronlund Anderson: Pancho Villa's Revolution by Headlines (University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2000) p 44 
46 Friedrich Katz: The Life and Times of Pancho Villa (Stanford University Press, 1998) P 322 
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difference; you have revolutions in your own land. Is it not so? Yes, my 
friends keep me posted on outside news.,,47 
This story points to a key strategy of the Irish rebels: the attempt to 
universalise their cause and thus invite visiting journalists to frame their 
struggle within greater world-historical dimensions. By claiming the 
right to self-determination the Irish revolutionaries were connecting 
themselves to the idea being promoted by President Woodrow Wilson as 
a prophylactic against future imperial wars. This "allowed Sinn Fein to 
represent itself to the world as more than just a physical force party.,,48 
And it associated the struggle in Ireland with nascent anti-colonial 
nationalisms around the world. "The concept of Indians as brown 
Irishmen" had already been promoted by Fenian intellectuals in the 
nineteenth century.49 Now Sinn Fein was attempting to "persuade the 
English that nationalism was not a vile Irish disease but a natural and 
irresistible phenomenon."so In a memorandum written in 1922, Gavin 
Duffy - the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Free State 
government - argued that Ireland could be a force to be reckoned with in 
the League of Nations because it was regarded as standing for 
"democratic principles, against Imperialism and upon the side of liberty 
throughout the world."sl This was the master narrative which Sinn Fein 
pressed on journalists covering the Anglo-Irish war. 
47 Ibid P 559-560 
48 Bill Kissane: The Politics of the Irish Civil War op.cit. p 46 
49 H.V. Brasted: "Irish Nationalism and the British Empire" op. cit. p 89 
50 Ibid P 97 
51 Quoted in Donal Lowry: "New Ireland, Old Empire and the Outside World" op. cit. p 173-174 
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Historians who have written about Sinn Fein's propaganda effort have 
dealt with it in isolation, often regarding it as an ingenious sales pitch. I 
have argued that it should be looked at in tandem with British efforts to 
influence journalists as a very modem struggle to define the news. 
Writing in 1936, the historian and journalist R.C.K. Ensor argued that 
the relationship between journalism and politics had changed in the 
previous fifty years: in the nineteenth century "propaganda was made by 
open argument" whereas in the twentieth century it was achieved by 
"the doctoring of news.,,52 Ensor's insight appeared to be borne out by 
the observation by one of Britain's propagandists during the First World 
War, Sir Gilbert Parker, to the effect that he and his colleagues had been 
more successful than the Germans because they used the "objective" 
language of news to mobilise opinion rather than crude propaganda of 
the Germans.53 During the Anglo-Irish war both sides realised that 
influencing the news was vital to controlling public perceptions of the 
conflict. Echoing Parker, the head of the News Bureau at Dublin Castle, 
Basil Clarke, tried to persuade his political and military masters that 
news was a more effective propaganda weapon than argument. 
"Whereas views like a quack medicine, must be 'pushed' with influence, 
with petitions and grovelling only to find a niggardly resting place in a 
single journal ... news travels of its own volition without need of any 
further expenditure of energy on the part of the original transmitter, and 
pokes its own way into journals home and foreign, friendly and 
52 R.c.K. Ensor: England 1870-1914 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985 edition) p 144. However, 
Lucy Brown and others have contended that the 'doctoring of news' was not as absent from the 
nineteenth century press as Ensor made out. Lucy Brown: Victorian News and Newspapers 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985). 
53 Mark Hampton: Visions of the Press op.cit. p 153 
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unfriendly, the world over.,,54 He argued that labelling news as 
"official" would give it a "hallmark" that would trump whatever 
opinions were held by the correspondents and guarantee publication. 55 
What he had not accounted for was that Sinn Fein propagandists were 
also well aware of what journalists needed to write their stories. 
Describing his day to day encounters with correspondents in a letter to 
his fiancee, Frank Gallagher wrote that he strived to "give them news" 
(my italics).56 To Basil Clarke's dismay, many correspondents who went 
to cover the war in Ireland proved reluctant to regard "official" news as 
the only legitimate news: this thesis is essentially an explanation of why 
this happened. 
Where the British officials were able gain influence, in the case of the 
American correspondent Carl Ackerman, they did so by enlisting him on 
one side of the debate within the elite, recruiting him to explore the 
possibilities of a negotiated truce. A crucial reason why Ackerman was 
drawn to this role was the attraction of dealing behind the scenes with 
powerful officials and men of influence, not mere spokesmen or press 
agents. Ackerman's concept of his own professionalism, his belief that 
experts and highly placed administrators were the true source of news, 
and his close affiliation with Wilsonian foreign policy, drew him first to 
British intelligence officials and diplomats and then into becoming a go-
between in one of several failed mediation efforts to end the war in 
Ireland. In contrast with the British correspondents, Ackerman saw 
54 Basil Clarke, undated memo, COl904/168/915 
55 Basil Clarke COl904168/843 
56 Letter from Frank Gallagher to Cecilia Saunders, November 13, 1921, Frank Gallagher Papers, 
Trinity College Dublin, 132 
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himself as part of the policy-making process rather than as a critical 
outsider. And, as I argued in Chapter 5, his coverage of Ireland presages 
the emergence of a culture among American foreign correspondents 
which bound them closely to government and to a liberal internationalist 
view of American foreign policy. This goes to show that while the 
"Anglo-American model" of journalism does rest on common practices 
and reciprocal exchanges between the two traditions there are important 
divergences as well. 57 
What the British and American journalists whose work I have examined 
in this thesis do have in common is an irresistible inclination to place 
their coverage of the Irish revolution within a context of other issues that 
they found more pressing. Sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, 
their interpretations of events in Ireland are interventions in debates 
about their own societies. In the passage quoted earlier from Hugh 
Martin's despatch, written as he returned to London for Armistice Day 
in 1920, he represents Ireland as a theatre where British morality was 
being put to the test on a stage visible only to newspaper correspondents 
who watched the drama unfold as stand-ins for the public.58 G.K. 
Chesterton was able to use the vigorous upsurge of Irish nationalism to 
make his case against industrialism and collectivism. For V.S. Pritchett, 
being a correspondent in revolutionary Ireland was a personal liberation 
from the stultifying horizons of his lower-middle class family. And Carl 
Ackerman saw Ireland in terms of the anti-revolutionary creed of 
57 For recent references to the Anglo-American model see Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu: 
"Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress" in idem Bourdieu and the ,Journalistic Field op. 
cit. p 8 and Daniel C. Hallin: "Field Theory, Differentiation Theory, and Comparative Media 
Research" ibid p 232 
58 Daily News November 11, 1920 op. cit 
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Wilsonian democracy. A particularly enduring conceit among the British 
journalists is the tergiversation from virtuous standards of governance. 
Thirty years after the Irish revolution the Daily Mirror began to carry 
reports by James Cameron criticising the conduct of the war in Kenya 
(in which he compared the Mau Mau to Sinn Fein).59 Cameron wrote 
that Britain had to protect "our good name ... our reputation" as much as 
the white settlers.60 In an editorial in support of Cameron's expose, the 
Mirror argued that although Mau Mau was "a vicious organisation" the 
greater issue was "the ruin of Colonial goodwill and the strange sad 
corruption of British rule"; the conflict essentially came down to "our 
own morality as rulers.,,61 It was as if the debate on Ireland had never 
happened. 
This tendency among many liberal British correspondents to view the 
Irish troubles overwhelmingly in terms of their implications for the 
ethics of British rule is partly responsible for what some see as a 
distorted account of the conflict enduringly popularised by Sinn Fein 
apologists. Robert Kee has argued that the success of Sinn Fein publicity 
made it appear that the IRA had merely acted in response to the 
ruthlessness of British mercenaries whereas the reality was that many of 
the Crown forces killed were Catholic Irishmen, not Black and Tans.62 
Kee observed that "so much efficient propaganda about reprisals was 
made on behalf of the Sinn Fein cause that it can now be too easily 
59 Joanna Lewis: "'Daddy Wouldn't Buy Me a Mau Mau': The British Popular Press & the 
Demoralization of Empire" in E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (eds): Mau Mau & 
Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (James Currey, Oxford, 2003) p 234--235 
60 Ibid P 238 
61 Daily Mirror, December 1,1952, quoted in Ibid p 236 
62 Robert Kee: The Green Flag op.cit. p 686 
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forgotten that a strong element of civil war was involved in the events of 
1920-21; it accounted for much of the peculiar savagery .,,63 It's true that 
correspondents from The Times, the Manchester Guardian and the 
Daily News were so focussed on doeumenting reprisals that the IRA's 
campaign virtually escaped scrutiny, save for a periodic totting up of 
"outrages", a practice which gave the impression that assassinations and 
ambushes were merely an incidental backdrop to the reprisals 
themselves. There was hardly any attempt to explain IRA tactics or its 
practice of kidnapping magistrates and shooting informers. This kind of 
news usually appeared in the pro-Unionist Morning Post, albeit often in 
the form of the verbatim recycling of press statements from Dublin 
Castle. But it did at least partially reflect a feature of the war which the 
other papers deemed unimportant. The same fate mostly befell other 
specifically local dimensions of the revolution: language, religion and 
the nature of Irish nationalism itself were rarely explored in their own 
right. The work of foreign correspondents covering the Irish revolution 
was mainly about other things besides Ireland.64 
As I made clear in the introduction, I intended this thesis to make a 
contribution towards redressing a bias in media scholarship towards 
ahistorical studies of journalism. By examining work produced by 
foreign correspondents at a moment of revolutionary change in Ireland I 
63 Ibid P 684 
64 A similar conclusion can be drawn from reading the work of American journalists who covered the 
Vietnam War: "[they] are much better on how Americans endured despair than on how the 
Vietnamese inflicted it. .. [Their work] induces a sense that Vietnam was not a place but an evil state 
of mind in which all those names of reallocations - Hue, Highway 1, Con Thien - were merely 
poisonous disorders of the American psyche, to be examined with horrid satisfaction." See Maurice 
Walsh: "Saigon Stories", a review of Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism, 1959-75 (Two 
Vols) (Library of America, New York, 1999) in New Statesman, August 23, 1999 P 42 
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have tried to show how embedding an account of professional norms 
within the wider context of shifting political and cultural struggles will 
yield a richer and more satisfactory explanation of journalistic practice. 
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